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Philosophy that satisfies its own intention, and does not childishly skip behind its own 
history and the real one, has its lifeblood in the resistance against the common practices 
of today and what they serve, against the justification of what happens to be the case.1 
 
—Theodor W. Adorno 
  
                                                
1 Theodor W. Adorno, “Why Still Philosophy,” in Critical Models: Interventions and 
Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 6. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation contends that North American culture is in the grip of a 
reductionism that neglects plurality while seeking after pseudo-universality and pseudo-
individuality, exemplified by the apparently contradictory tendencies to take as normative 
what can be generalized and to deny universally applicable normativity. I pay special 
attention to gender stereotypes, in which the particular (individual) becomes irrelevant, 
ignored, or perceived as a threat unless it can be treated as part of the general 
(stereotype). I argue that philosophical fiction—and, in particular, young adult fiction—
contributes to a principled plurality in both lived and academic philosophy. It does so 
through its imaginative power to enlarge perspectives, criticize from the margins, and 
galvanize readers to engage with injustice. I focus on young adult fiction because of its 
wide reach, relevance for ethical formation, and exceptional tendency to question 
stereotypical understandings of human existence.	After explicating the distinction 
between lived and academic philosophy and situating my project in the larger 
conversation about fiction and philosophy, I argue for the ethical significance of 
philosophical interaction with story. In conversation with Martha C. Nussbaum and 
Hannah Arendt, I draw together three themes—the integrality of form and content, the 
ability of storytelling to act as critical thinking in context, and the key role of particularity 
in the context of plurality—in order to emphasize the need to approach fiction in its 
intrinsic plurality without losing the possibility of shared criteria. A causal model is 
insufficient in this regard. Drawing on Lambert Zuidervaart’s conception of imaginative 
disclosure, I show that art both suggests and requires interpretation and that fiction’s 
   vi 
ethical contribution to philosophy needs to be understood as thoroughly hermeneutical. I 
settle on “narrative companionship,” a variation of Wayne C. Booth’s metaphor of stories 
as friends, as a helpful noncausal metaphor for interaction with fiction. Then I seek to 
demonstrate the fruitfulness of this metaphor, in contrast to academic philosophy’s 
traditional approaches to fiction as either a tool or an example, by commenting on several 
stories that have informed my own lived philosophy. 
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1. Introduction of the Problem 
Buckled into a stiff airplane seat overlooking the St. Louis tarmac, waiting for a 
slightly delayed takeoff, I focused on the book in my hand and studiously ignored my 
fellow passengers and the flight attendants bustling back and forth. I have often found the 
forced inactivity of air travel an ideal time to read the books that sit on my shelf waiting 
for me to get around to reading them some day. A flight attendant paused by my seat, 
apparently fixated on the tiny corner of the book’s cover that was visible from the aisle. 
Bemused, I looked up at the chubby, pink-cheeked face beaming down at me.  
“Is that Catcher in the Rye?” he burst out fervently. “I love that book! I re-read it 
every year. I recognized it right away from the cover. Isn’t it great?” He paused, his gaze 
moving dreamily toward the luggage rack over my head. “Holden Caulfield, you know? 
He’s so, like, real.” 
I stared after him as he moved off, still glowing. Returning to the sarcastic, 
conflicted Holden Caulfield in the book, I found the image of the cheery, chatty flight 
attendant hovering in the back of my head in incongruous contrast. As the airplane began 
to taxi down the runway, I wondered: What is it about a good book that can bridge such a 
gap? Somehow the ebullient, non-fictional adult felt a deep connection to the troubled, 
fictional teenager, bridging gaps in age, personality, and reality.  
When I look around me at interactions in politics, economics, and religion—and 
even hobbies, sports, and education—I see many more walls being built than bridges. In 
communication, relationships, and institutions, walls are built to separate people; rarely 
 2  
do we focus on bringing people together through the building of bridges over the gaps 
between us. One of the biggest walls I see is the dire suspicion with which North 
America’s statistics-loving culture regards deviation from the mean, leading to rejection 
of those who are not considered to be on the “right” side of the wall. Yet North America 
is also a culture of writers and readers, telling and responding to stories that bridge many 
kinds of gaps. Writers can, of course, build either walls or bridges, but even in nations of 
wall-building, North Americans value novels for their ability to build bridges. At the 
simplest level, a bridge is built between the reader’s world and the world of the book, and 
in traveling over this bridge, readers are given the possibility of an expanded perspective 
on their own lives and the world around them. Although not every reader self-consciously 
reflects on this phenomenon or articulates a philosophical response to fiction, many 
recognize that these are philosophical concerns. 
In this context, I explore in this dissertation the relationship between fiction and 
philosophy with special regard to the role of young adult fiction in forming or altering 
people’s philosophies of life. I seek to align myself with the imaginative power of story 
for enlarging perspectives, criticizing from the margins, and galvanizing people for the 
fight against injustice. And finally, I seek to demonstrate that a certain kind of young 
adult fiction does indeed help to inspire the resourcefulness we need in order to accept 
difference and imagine alternatives to oppression wherever it exists. 
I focus on young adult fiction primarily because of its wide reach and particular 
relevance for ethical formation. Literary critic Karen Coats says it well: “Young adult 
literature exerts a powerful influence over its readers at a particularly malleable time in 
their identity formation, and yet we still pay more critical scholarly attention to Antigone 
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(Sophocles, c. 442) and The Great Gatsby (Fitzgerald, 1925) than we do to the potentially 
life-changing books our teens read on their own. It seems to me that if we believe that 
literature has something to say about what it means to be human, and if we further nuance 
that belief with the idea that national, ethnic, and women’s literatures say something 
about the character and preoccupations of nations and the experience of being a certain 
ethnicity or gender, then we ought to approach YA literature with the same careful 
scrutiny, even if it is written about and to young adults rather than by them.”1 
Considering both the extreme popularity of and the important philosophical 
themes addressed by young adult literature (consider the Harry Potter series, for example, 
which thoughtfully addresses death, power, violence, and otherness), it is surprising that 
the genre has received so little philosophical attention. So far, calls for serious theoretical 
engagement with young adult fiction2 appear to have been largely ignored by the majority 
of philosophers and literary critics.3 By taking up young adult literature as an important 
                                                
1 Karen Coats, “Young Adult Literature: Growing Up, in Theory,” in Handbook of 
Research on Children’s and Young Adult Literature, ed. Shelby Wolf, Karen Coats, 
Patricia A. Enciso, and Christine Jenkins (New York: Routledge, 2011), 315–16. 
2 Again, Coats says it well: “[J]ust as children’s literature is viewed as both an entrée into 
more sophisticated reading for its intended audience and a viable area of academic study 
in and of itself, so literature aimed at young adults should be afforded the same dual 
valuation. Like Hunt (1996), I would like to see a more robust critical conversation 
emerge that treats YA literature as a destination literature, rather than an in-between 
phenomenon that is useful for pedagogical applications and/or diverting entertainment 
before readers enter into the more serious work of studying capital L literature. … It’s 
certainly not a question of sacrificing richness in character portrayal, beauty of the 
language, or depth of thematic significance. All of these things can be found in carefully 
chosen YA literature. The major difference seems to rest in the assignation of cultural 
value to certain texts and genres and not others, and the development of a critical 
literature than keeps texts and ideas circulating in academic contexts” (Coats, “Growing 
Up, in Theory,” 317). 
3 A few thinkers have both given and responded to the call to address young adult fiction 
as worthy of philosophical attention. Foremost among them are Robyn McCallum, who 
takes a Bahktinian approach to young adult fiction (Ideologies of Identity in Adolescent 
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philosophical contributor in its own right, I am responding to Coats’s insight on the need 
for exactly that: “What remain rare in the critical discourse are studies that seek to 
theorize YA fiction as a type of literature that has its own constellation of concerns that 
mark it as distinctive from literature for either children or adults.”4 
“Young adult” literature deals with themes that are relevant far beyond 
adolescence, however. Themes of power, personality and selfhood, relations between the 
self and others, death, gender, ethics, and ideology are consistently front and center in 
this genre. As Robyn McCallum, a literary theorist who focuses on children’s and 
adolescent literature and film, puts it, “Most of the novels I am concerned with are 
complex and sophisticated in their narrative techniques and thematic concerns, and many 
of them express or reflect highly complex philosophical and psychological ideas.”5 In 
particular, young adult fiction tends to question universalist and essentialist 
understandings of human existence, a question which—as will soon become apparent—is 
a guiding theme in this dissertation, as well. 
 At the heart of the issues I am taking on is the prevailing wind in contemporary 
Western thought that neglects plurality. This can be seen in two apparently contradictory 
trends. On the one hand, people tend to take as normative what can be generalized. 
Particulars are gathered up into descriptive generalities, which are then interpreted as 
prescriptive universal claims: “Most children read by the age of six; therefore, all 
                                                                                                                                            
Fiction: The Dialogic Construction of Subjectivity [New York: Garland, 1999]); Roberta 
Seelinger Trites, who takes a Foucaultian approach to young adult fiction (Disturbing the 
Universe: Power and Repression in Adolescent Literature [Iowa City: University of Iowa 
Press, 2000]); and Coats, who takes a Lacanian approach to young adult fiction 
(“Growing Up, in Theory”).  
4 Coats, “Growing Up, in Theory,” 317. 
5 McCallum, Ideologies of Identity, 8. 
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children should read by the age of six.” On the other hand, people tend to deny the 
existence of universally applicable normativity. Each person is a world alone, having no 
normative connection to anyone else: “What’s right for one person may not be right for 
someone else.” These two deep-seated tendencies—though opposite—do nothing to keep 
each other in check, since they come from the same root: North American culture is in 
the grip of a reductionism which privileges pseudo-universality and pseudo-individuality 
at the expense of plurality. 
 Let me briefly clarify my use of several of the terms I have just introduced. 
“Plurality” refers to a number of particulars that are grouped together but maintain their 
individuality, not as isolated individuals but always within the context of each other. I 
treat “individual” and “particular” as largely synonymous, referring to a single instance, 
item, or person. I take “general,” on the other hand, to refer to what can be said about 
what many individuals have in common—what is widespread but does not necessarily 
hold in every case. (The field of statistics, for example, derives general statements from 
empirical particulars.) Plurality cannot be reduced to a collection of autonomous 
particulars or to the general similarities that may be found between those particulars.  
I take “universal” to refer to what is always the case or always applicable. What is 
universal has no exceptions. Genuine universality, as I see it, is expressed by a sense of 
normativity to which everyone is responsible. “Pseudo-universality,” then, refers to what 
is taken to be universal when it actually is not. Likewise, “pseudo-individuality” refers to 
what is taken to be individual, but this apparent individuality is not genuine. Genuine 
individuality exists within the context of plurality—individuals are unique but connected 
to a context, not isolated and autonomous. I suggest that pseudo-universality arises when 
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what is general is treated as universal, and that pseudo-individuality arises when 
particulars are taken out of the context of plurality. Again, both pseudo-individuality and 
pseudo-universality fail to take into account the reality of plurality, making it difficult to 
find a real connection between individual and context on the one hand, and between 
individual and normativity on the other. These cultural tendencies set the stage for my 
project. 
 I have referred several times to “normativity.” Briefly, I use this term to refer to 
the sense that I (and many other people) have of a universal call to which all human 
beings must respond.6 Normativity has to do with the way things should be—how human 
beings should act and interact, whatever that may mean. In the context of this project in 
particular, in other words, I am talking about what might be termed ethical normativity. I 
examine the matter of normativity in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 In describing the basic problem this project seeks to address, I map out in this first 
chapter the specific issues that provide the background for the more detailed discussion in 
the following chapters. I have referred to North American culture as “statistics-loving.” I 
first confront this cultural distortion, which demonstrates intolerance of deviation and 
stifles imaginative alternatives, and indicate how it is a manifestation of pseudo-
                                                
6 I use this term in line with Lambert Zuidervaart’s definition of “societal principles”: 
“By ‘societal principles’ I mean fundamental expectations that commonly hold for people 
and that people hold in common. These expectations hold and are held in the context of 
historically developed cultural practices and social institutions. Economic 
resourcefulness, public justice, and ethical solidarity are examples of such principles at 
work in contemporary Western society. … Societal principles such as public justice are 
historically constituted and future-oriented callings in which the voice of God can be 
heard, and traces of a new earth can appear” (Lambert Zuidervaart, “Earth’s Lament: 
Suffering, Hope, and Wisdom,” The Other Journal 14 [January 2009]: third and fourth 
paragraphs under “Social Critique,” http://theotherjournal.com/2009/01/27/earths-lament-
suffering-hope-and-wisdom). 
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universality. In this discussion, I give special attention to the example of coercive gender 
distinction as an example of why pseudo-universality is a problem. Then I turn to the 
relationship between philosophy and story to clarify how fiction can offer a valuable 
corrective to pseudo-universal tendencies in academic philosophy as well as people’s 
philosophies of life.  
I then turn more briefly to questions of implementation. Here I come up against 
the other side of the reductionism that fails to sufficiently take plurality into account. 
First, I briefly address concerns about diversity of interpretation; then I look at the 
question of whether it is acceptable to read (or tell other people to read) books for the 
purpose of some kind of improvement. In this discussion, I too make use of 
generalizations—generalizations from experience—as I sketch the issues I am 
addressing, since I am of course basing my perspective on how my context appears to me 
through my own experience. I hope that these general statements will be taken as just 
that—expressions of my experience and part of a conversation—rather than as claims of 
universal, incontrovertible fact or as mere private, subjective opinions to be dismissed at 
will.  
 
The statistical mindset  
I live in what I feel is a culture of inevitability. I see this most poignantly in the 
way that, for most people in North America, the most reliable basis for truth remains the 
proclamations of science in the form of “studies,” which are disseminated with varying 
levels of accuracy through various forms of media. These studies are our proof texts and 
our guides. They support our opinions and direct our choices. However, it is not always 
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easy to discover a recognizable truth in the tangle of studies and rhetoric that surrounds 
contemporary research. Take an example: The authors of a popular anti-attachment 
parenting book, On Becoming Babywise, reference the American Academy of Pediatrics 
and a National Institute of Child Health and Human Development subcommittee to 
support their stance against parents and babies sharing a bed. According to “studies,” 
they imply, bed-sharing is dangerous for your baby and may increase the risk of Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS)7—a thought to strike fear into any parent’s heart. On the 
other side of the issue, attachment parenting groups such as La Leche League and the 
Mothering magazine community report just the opposite, citing “studies” which 
demonstrate the benefits of sleeping with your baby, including reduced risk of SIDS.8 
 “Don't believe those studies!” yelp the authors of Babywise, explaining that the 
studies cited by attachment parenting groups were drawn from third-world countries 
whose warm climates would reduce the risk of SIDS in any case.9 Yet Mothering 
magazine questions the validity of the studies cited by those who believe bed-sharing is 
risky, pointing to Japan—certainly neither a third-world country nor a tropical climate—
where bed-sharing is the norm and the rates of SIDS are the lowest in the world.10 
 The underlying concern for both sides, of course, is the question of how best to 
accomplish one’s parenting goals—particularly the goal of keeping the baby safe and 
healthy. Unlike in cultures that understand life to be something that happens to people 
and about which they can do little, for people in North American culture, achieving one’s 
                                                
7 Gary Ezzo and Robert Bucknam, On Becoming Babywise (Louisiana, MO: Parent-Wise 
Solutions, 2001), 196. 
8 Peggy O'Mara and Wendy Ponte, Having a Baby Naturally: The Mothering Magazine 
Guide to Pregnancy and Childbirth (New York: Atria Books, 2003), 108. 
9 Ezzo and Bucknam, On Becoming Babywise, 195. 
10 O’Mara and Ponte, Having a Baby Naturally, 108. 
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aims is understood to be a cause-effect relationship which presumably can be controlled. 
We believe that if you work hard, you are likely to achieve your goal. This expectation is 
different from conventional wisdom in China, for example, where the Confucian-based 
viewpoint says that everyone is given a certain place in society and has certain 
obligations that go along with that place; to attempt to change one’s fate disturbs the 
entire fabric of society. In other words, in Chinese culture, each individual’s life is seen 
through the lens of what is good for the entire nation. North American culture, on the 
other hand, tends to make sense of individual lives through the lens of media-filtered 
statistics—“studies show that doing such-and-such will reduce/increase your chances of 
such-and-such.” This “statistical mindset” tends to mistake a general statement for a 
universal norm. We are dealing, then, with a form of pseudo-universality. 
What distinguishes the statistical mindset from the scientific practice of statistics 
is the addition of a normative element: that what is the case for the majority should be the 
guiding ambition for everyone. While both make use of actual statistics, the statistical 
mindset is distinct from a perspective that seeks to base action upon scientific evidence. 
An evidence-based approach to action seeks to use statistics to discover what is actually 
the case and then decides upon a possible course of action that takes these discoveries 
into account. In other words, statistical findings have no direct prescriptive force; they 
inform evidence-based action but do not control it. The statistical mindset, on the other 
hand, seizes upon the generalities revealed by statistics and universalizes them, insisting 
that the way things are for most is the way things should be for all, and ignoring both the 
need to reflect upon how what we learn from statistics might be translated into action and 
the fact that even though something may be the case for a majority, a minority still exists. 
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As can be seen from the bed-sharing discussion above, evidence-based action is not 
always a simple endeavor, both since the statistics themselves may present conflicting 
descriptions of reality and because they are always directed and presented contextually, 
with certain aims and interests governing both what is studied and how the results are 
presented. The statistical mindset bypasses this complexity, considering statistical 
findings to be easily translatable into normative recommendations. 
The statistical mindset’s tendency to ignore the importance of the particular in 
bypassing this complexity has two key effects, the first having to do with the overall 
context, and the second having to do with the particular instance. First, the statistical 
mindset’s focus on the pseudo-universal—seen especially in its treatment of what is 
average—allows it to ignore what a more careful attention to the particular might reveal 
about the importance of the overall context and societal structure. Although the field of 
statistics is clear that correlation does not imply causation, to the statistical mindset, this 
distinction is irrelevant as long as we feel assured that the correlation holds in the 
majority of cases. In the statistical mindset, we recognize the existence of contingency in 
our world, but we do our best to mitigate its effects. Thus, we reason, if we act in 
response to statistical averages, we are as close as we can come to guaranteeing the 
desired effects. We seek a universal standard, and take statistical averages to be such—or 
at least to be our best guide to such. For example, if the media announce that “studies 
show” that eating an apple a day may reduce your “chance” of getting heart disease, we 
understand this to mean that the majority of people who eat an apple a day will not get 
heart disease. Therefore, by eating an apple a day, we hope to join that majority.  
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Now, eating an apple a day in an effort to help avoid heart disease is not 
necessarily a bad thing. However, the way the statistical mindset works is to focus 
attention on these small, individual changes that people make in an effort to get on the 
right side of the study, so to speak, thereby distracting attention from potentially larger, 
even systemic issues. Take the example of the ideal of the nuclear family that is often 
associated with the 1950s in the United States. This social structure dictated that men 
worked outside the home, children went to school, and women stayed home to cook and 
clean. We now recognize that for some of those women, housekeeping to perfection was 
a life of boredom and drudgery. The statistical mindset would look to majority solutions 
to relieve the problem of women being unhappy doing (only) all the housework. For 
example, if studies showed that most women—in colloquial language, “average” 
women—who got a washing machine were relieved of much of their laundry burden, the 
assumption would be that every woman should get a washing machine to reduce 
drudgery and therefore be happier. Larger, systemic issues of whether the social structure 
itself might be a problem would thereby be avoided. If someone were to get a washing 
machine and not be happier, she could safely be ignored—rather than seen as pointing to 
larger issues—because in the statistical mindset the matter of concern is always the 
majority, and the majority is understood to be represented by what is “average.” The 
statistical mindset is not interested in minority instances; the “average” person is the one 
to focus on as the trusted representative of the majority. And in the statistical mindset, the 
“average” becomes the “standard” for everyone. Averages by definition assume that there 
are occasions other than the average, while standards are goals set for everyone to meet, 
or at least gather around. In the statistical mindset, then, the minority experience becomes 
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irrelevant, rather than being potentially indicative of deeper problems and potential ways 
beyond these problems. Taking statistical findings as universal norms circumvents the 
demand that norms place on us to be responsible not merely by emulating a standard but 
by actually responding to the situation at hand in all its complexity. The statistical 
mindset therefore represents a reduction to pseudo-universality. Our desire for statistical 
findings to be universal norms, I suggest, erodes our ability both to accept the other-than-
average and to imagine alternatives. 
 The bed-sharing issue is a good example of the way in which people arm 
themselves with “scientific” artillery to prove their points and throw doubt on the 
opinions of those with whom they disagree. The statistical mindset’s de-emphasis of 
particularity does not merely lead to ignoring issues of context and the structure of 
society; it also covers up the way the statistical mindset conditions the particulars. This is 
the second effect of the statistical mindset’s disregard for particulars. A further example 
can demonstrate this even more troublesome facet of the statistical mindset: its coercive 
tendencies. The statistical mindset is not directly coercive, but resonates with the sort of 
simplified perspective that sees the world in stereotypical categories. This is the sense in 
which it is coercive, since although it does not coerce people into particular opinions, it 
does encourage thinking in terms of stereotypes. A stereotype, being a fixed and 
oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing, works to impose one 
myopic viewpoint on other viewpoints by discounting other ways of seeing that person or 
thing, paralyzing the ability to imagine other perspectives. This is precisely how the 
statistical mindset works, as the following example of gender stereotypes can show.  
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The importance, relative worth, fluidity, and scientific determinability of gender 
have been under debate for conceivably as long as human beings have been gendered. In 
contemporary North American culture, it is perhaps the paradigm example of both the 
prevalence of and the problems inherent to the statistical mindset. I have a young 
daughter and a young son, and carrying a baby around in public quickly taught me that 
most people in North America need to know a baby’s gender before they know what to 
say about her or him. The belief that boys and girls are fundamentally different is deeply 
ingrained. Girls wear pink, are pretty, sweet, and well-behaved. Boys wear anything but 
pink, are active, loud, and rambunctious. Girls like dolls. Boys like trucks. The individual 
traits, tastes, and talents of small children are largely disregarded, and their activities and 
interests urged in some directions and not others based entirely on gender. 
 For now, my husband and I have chosen not to dress our daughter in pink. Pink in 
our culture is often a symbol of the type of coercive gender distinction which we actively 
oppose for our daughter. As children, my husband and I both found gender-based 
expectations very oppressive, since neither of us conformed to most of the stereotypes 
associated with our respective genders. This experience cannot be uncommon in our 
culture, and yet the stereotypes persist. There are many reasons for this perdurance, I am 
sure. Part of it probably has to do with the innate human desire for secure boundaries, 
part has to do with issues of hoarding power, part has to do with the unabated power of 
sexuality even in our sex-saturated culture, and I suspect much of it has to do with the 
profits made from selling discord and difference and then advice about how to resolve 
them again. 
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All of this goes to illustrate the predominance of the statistical mindset in mass 
culture, for if there is any area in which deviation from the mean is suspect, it is gender. 
“Studies” showing that “most men” display certain traits and “most women” display 
certain other traits quickly become “men should” and “women should” in people’s minds. 
The “studies,” conflicting and ever-changing as they are, are not necessarily the problem; 
rather, the problem is our desire to interpret them as normative: to take them as gospel 
truth, to be both passionately believed in and conscientiously adhered to. The 
particularity of the particular instance is both ignored and coerced into conforming to the 
pseudo-universal. 
Again, the studies seek to examine aspects of the complex reality of human 
gender. We see this complexity in necessarily simplified terms, and as we seek to find 
our bearings in this intricacy and map out an understandable interpretation of our own 
experience, we often fall into seeing aspects of this complex reality in stereotypical 
terms. The statistical mindset picks up these stereotypes and treats them as normative. In 
the statistical mindset, then, the particular (individual) becomes irrelevant, ignored, or 
perceived as a threat unless it can be seen as part of the general (stereotype) and be 
treated as such. This suppression of particularity is an indication that general statements 
are being taken as universal norms—that what is the case for most should be the case for 
all. 
In the case of gender, then, studies that dwell on gender differences work to 
reinforce cultural stereotypes that men and women are deeply and intrinsically different 
in people who already adhere to this opinion. On the other hand, studies that demonstrate 
that gender differences are social constructions do not necessarily have the effect of 
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weakening preexisting stereotypes in those that hold them. In both cases, the focus is on 
general trends, which in the statistical mindset provide fodder for pseudo-universality. 
Real change, however, can come through the experience of plurality. It is through 
personal experience of alternatives, rather than abstract knowledge, that stereotypes 
diminish. The tendency to reject factual information that goes against preexisting 
stereotypes has been thoroughly demonstrated in the field of politics, for example—an 
area in which people hold opinions that are similarly strong.11 What this seems to come to 
in daily life for many people is that they find themselves in a kind of imaginative 
paralysis; they have very little room to explore their own sense of self apart from strong 
cultural stereotypes urging them to conform to the gender expectations of our society, 
unless they experience an alternative to these stereotypes either by responding creatively 
to a sense of being oppressed by them or through interaction with a real or fictional 
person who demonstrates that other possibilities exist.  
Stories offer a compelling antidote to the problem of imaginative paralysis. As I 
shall argue, stories have the power to push us beyond ourselves and our own experiences, 
expanding our perspectives and our understanding of the world. We need each other’s 
stories to enable us to imagine possibilities that our faith in statistics obscures.  
 
                                                
11 See, for example, Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “When Corrections Fail: The 
Persistence of Political Misperceptions,” Political Behavior 32 (2010): 303–330, doi: 
10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2; John Sides and Jack Citrin, “How Large the Huddled 
Masses? The Causes and Consequences of Public Misperceptions about Immigrant 
Populations,” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, IL, 2007), http://home.gwu.edu/~jsides/huddled.pdf; Charles S. 
Taber and Milton Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in Political Information Processing,” 
American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006): 755–69. 
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Philosophy and stories 
Story is one thing our statistical culture still loves. Our faith may be in statistics, 
but our hopes and desires come out in our stories, and through interaction with stories we 
can develop the philosophy that orients our daily lives. I claim, then, that one way to re-
orient our faith in pseudo-universality and pseudo-individuality toward a fuller 
understanding of plurality is through interaction with stories. 
I have described philosophy as what orients our lives. For many people, 
connecting the discipline of philosophy with daily life may seem bizarre to the point of 
unintelligibility. Academic philosophy, for the non-academician, is usually associated 
with dry, dusty tomes hidden away in dim libraries, addressing issues that have little or 
nothing to do with most people’s daily lives. Even for professional philosophers, the 
connection between inter-academy debates and the basic questions of how we should best 
live our lives has often become indistinct, if not invisible. Part of this disconnect is 
related to a distinction between philosophy as it relates to daily life (as in one’s 
“philosophy of life”) and philosophy as it is studied in the academy. I further explain this 
distinction between “lived philosophy” and “academic philosophy” in Chapter 2. 
For most people, if we want to think deeply about life and how we live it, we turn 
not to academic philosophy, but elsewhere—like to a good book. And yet, this instinct by 
itself does not appear to have made much progress in breaking through our cultural 
fascination with pseudo-universality and pseudo-individuality. The nature of the 
connections between fiction and philosophy, both academic and lived, must be 
considered carefully. This connection is a complex one, and it needs to be adequately 
analyzed. Sometimes fiction and philosophy seem totally unrelated, sometimes one 
makes use of the other, and sometimes, I suggest, they are one and the same. Over time 
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their relationship has changed and mutated. Nowadays, fiction seems for the most part to 
show up in academic philosophy in the “being made use of” category. Stories are treated 
as tools in the service of philosophy. I identify two basic aspects to this relationship: the 
story-as-hammer and the story-as-example. I briefly introduce these aspects here; I 
address them more fully in Chapter 6. 
The story-as-hammer is very straightforward: Stories are written or analyzed as 
analogies to philosophical issues—or, one might even say, as allegories. This strategy is 
particularly common in two areas: feminist thought, and the use of science fiction as 
commentary on contemporary society. In this approach, the author already knows what 
he or she wants to say and uses a story to draw attention to a systemic problem. Most 
often the stories are used very pointedly; for example, to make explicit the oppression of 
women and to hammer the point home. The story-as-hammer is directed toward 
something external to the story—the reader’s assumptions or cultural systems being 
common targets.  
The second common way that academic philosophy relates to fiction is the story-
as-example, which makes use of stories through analysis. Stories are taken apart to make 
manifest the insights they hold within themselves, and these insights are translated into 
philosophy. This approach shares with the first a common assumption that fiction is a 
tool of philosophy. In most cases, a philosopher turns to a story in the context of an essay 
or book that addresses an issue for which the story can be a useful illustration. In a sense, 
the philosophy is distilled out of the story-as-example. The issue of how form and content 
relate to each other, which I discuss more fully in Chapter 3, is key here. 
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In both these cases, what is important is not the story itself, but what the story can 
relay. I suggest that a different approach, though relatively rare, has the potential to be 
both more literarily appropriate and often more philosophically rewarding than treating 
story as a tool: Story-as-companion is a drawing together of fiction and academic 
philosophy as mutually beneficial partners. Recognizing that fiction addresses important 
philosophical questions in a way that standard academic philosophy does not, while at the 
same time appreciating the value of a philosophical discussion of good books to make 
manifest their contributions, story-as-companion stands in contrast to the story-as-tool 
approaches of much of traditional academic philosophy. 
A key question this dissertation wrestles with is how philosophy and fiction can 
usefully respond to the question “How should we live?” Answering this question, I 
suggest, is not merely a matter of making lifestyle choices that we find personally 
satisfactory. Rather, it is a question of how we can be guided into living well in response 
to a normative call. The prevailing wind in academic philosophy that privileges pseudo-
universality and pseudo-individuality at the expense of plurality leads to a tendency to try 
to answer the question of “How should we live?” by either identifying principles that 
appear to be universal and that can be abstracted from one context and applied to many 
others or by denying the possibility of sharable criteria in responding to this question. 
However, I suggest that guidance implies not merely following principles but trusting in 
the reliability of that which guides. When philosophy does not trust fiction to contribute 
in its own way, fiction becomes merely a tool.  
The prevailing wind toward pseudo-universality in academic philosophy 
frequently shows up in a tendency to esteem supposedly universalizable definitions, even 
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in response to a basic life question such as “How should we live?” Now, attempting to 
make sure that we are talking about the same things when we have a conversation is 
undeniably important. Identifying differences and similarities, categorizing, and seeking 
clarity are all useful tools. The difficulty arises when the definition, whether deliberately 
or not, attempts to completely delineate the word or concept in question. This endeavor is 
frequently both inaccurate and unhelpful, but remains an ideal for much of academic 
philosophy.12  
Take, for example, Susanne Langer’s insistence that “speech” is unique to human 
beings; animals communicate, she says, “but not by any method that can be likened to 
speaking.”13 This extreme delineation between human and animal communication debars 
exploration of potential overlap or the philosophical import of potential overlap, as well 
as denying the overlap that exists. If wild turkeys, for example, use distinct sounds to 
                                                
12 In her discussion of Jürgen Habermas’s and Hannah Arendt’s conceptions of plurality, 
philosopher Veronica Vasterling summarizes both this ideal and the importance of 
Arendt’s response to it: “Philosophers like Habermas tend to elevate consistency to an 
absolute standard: thou shall not commit contradictions, performative or otherwise. Yet, 
our lived experience is not an exercise in logic. From the almost endless range of 
characteristics applicable to the lived experience of human beings consistency is maybe 
the most unlikely: whose biography is consistent? What history is consistent? Unlike 
most philosophers, who need to be reminded of this, Arendt tries to do justice to the 
thorough contingency of human existence, the unexpected new turns one’s life and the 
world one inhabits may take. That’s why she rejects the central place, the superior power, 
accorded to reason—the way Habermas does and so many other philosophers do. 
Arendt’s point is not that the reasoning game, including its standard of consistency, 
cannot be part of the articulation of interpretational perspectives which realize plurality. 
Her point is that it is often very difficult to do justice to our lived experience in this 
particular genre or language game. She doesn’t exclude it; she deflates the bloated 
importance it tends to have in philosophy” (Veronica Vasterling, “The Hermeneutic 
Phenomenological Approach to Plurality: Arendt, Habermas, and Gadamer,” in 
Phenomenological Perspectives on Plurality, ed. Gert-Jan van der Heiden [Boston: Brill, 
2015], 168–69). 
13 Suzanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, 
and Art (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 104. 
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identify different kinds of snakes, must we insist that this does not count as “speech”?14 
Langer’s absolute definition of speech is a prime example of an attempt at complete 
delineation that is both inaccurate and unhelpful. A more recent and perhaps less 
deliberate example is Seyla Benhabib’s discussion of “situated criticism,” which she 
conceptualizes as the view that social critics speak from within a monolithic, 
homogenous culture or tradition.15 Nancy Fraser astutely points out that Benhabib’s 
conception is unnecessarily delineated, overlooking other understandings of situated 
criticism.16 Of course, there are wide variations in the ways different areas of philosophy 
approach definition. The prevailing wind of pseudo-universality, however, blows even in 
philosophical fields where it might not be expected.17 
                                                
14 See Joe Hutto, Illumination in the Flatwoods: A Season with the Wild Turkey (Lander, 
WY: Vast Horizon, 2011). 
15 Seyla Benhabib, “Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance,” in Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange (New York: Routledge, 1995), 26. 
16 Nancy Fraser, “False Antitheses: A Response to Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler,” in 
Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange (New York: Routledge, 1995), 64. 
17 Even philosophers who do not claim universal validity for their theories tend to spend 
large portions of their work responding to that expectation. A significant thrust of the 
postmodern and feminist movements, for example, has been in trying to undermine 
universal claims. This in itself indicates the prevalence of pseudo-universality as 
something that dominates philosophy; its presence is the context to which all 
philosophers must respond. For example, the introductory comments to selections from 
Gianni Vattimo, Joseph Margolis, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Derrida in Truth: 
Engagement Across Philosophical Traditions state, “Few doubt that truth is to be 
understood propositionally. But this idea seems to rest on the twin assumptions that truth 
begins with language, and that language is essentially propositional. Each of these claims 
is strongly contested here” (José Medina and David Wood, eds., Truth: Engagement 
Across Philosophical Traditions [Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005], 161). Or take Judith 
Butler’s brilliant work Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), in which she seeks to point out that simply categorizing all 
people into either male or female genders is inaccurate. In making her case for the 
uniqueness of each person’s self-expression of gender, she does not seek to absolutize 
particular forms of gender expression, but expresses a thoroughgoing recognition of the 
reality of plurality. These examples demonstrate why I use the metaphor of a prevailing 
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One of the greatest strengths of storytelling is that it communicates and makes 
recognizable ideas without completely defining them. I suggest that when philosophy 
moves away from attempting to universally define in responding to the question “How 
should we live?” while still holding out the possibility of shared normativity, it can come 
into its own as an orienting force. It can orient both the expectations we take to stories 
and our philosophical engagement with them. Stories allow us another avenue to respond 
to the question “How should we live?” that does not simplify the complexity of life but 
offers companionship as we seek to navigate unique situations.  
At the same time, philosophy can work in companionship with story as it clarifies 
the issues under consideration without denying the unique role that story has to play. 
Acknowledging the philosophical place of good books in lived and academic philosophy 
is an important correction to the reductionist tendencies toward pseudo-universality and 
pseudo-individuality, in academic philosophy as well as in the wider cultural context. 
Giving a place to fiction both fosters plurality in a quantitative sense by allowing more 
contributors to have a hand in the conversation, and recognizes the deeper plurality in the 
reality that a question such as “How should we live?” does not have a simple, single 
answer. 
 
Diversity of interpretation 
 The other side of the story, of course, is that giving priority to plurality may run 
us into other kinds of problems. An intensified sense of the importance of the particular 
must also avoid the other danger: falling into pseudo-individuality. There is already 
                                                                                                                                            
wind, which blows both on those who are blown along with it and those who are 
struggling upwind. 
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plenty of argument about traditionally academic philosophical works and how they 
should be taken. How much more argument will there be over matters of interpretation 
when it comes to stories? People love to discuss what they think about books they have 
read. Diversity of interpretation is indubitably a fact of life. If, as I have suggested, we 
are facing a vital need for genuine plurality, how do we have a constructive conversation 
without seeking generalizations that we try to treat as normative, thus falling into the trap 
of pseudo-universality?  
Diversity of interpretation creates another opportunity for reductionism to 
flourish, this time in the form of the relativism that denies any universally applicable 
norms. Taken to the extreme, the idea that each person who reads a book is an isolated 
pseudo-individual whose interpretation is not accountable to any shared norms would 
mean that an attempt to discuss the book would simply be another chance for people to 
talk past each other. At first glance, this appears less insidious than the quest for pseudo-
universality, because it gives the impression of distributing rather than accruing power, 
and therefore seems to create less opportunity for oppression. However, diversity of 
“opinion” often becomes an opportunity for the loudest voices to simply drown out the 
rest, as we see in the mass media, for example.18 In this way, the particular becomes 
perceived as the general while maintaining a mask of individuality, in much the same 
way as the statistical mindset, manifested by the idea of an average, obscures the 
particular. And, of course, it remains an instance of reductionism in its denial of any 
universally applicable normativity, and is consequently to be avoided if possible. 
                                                
18 I am grateful to Lambert Zuidervaart for this insight. 
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 I am pointing to a practical side of the issue in my framing of the question: How 
much argument will result from letting every reader’s opinion have priority over what 
can be generalized about a book? The answer to this question, of course, is that there will 
be endless argument, since each reader will claim priority for his or her own perspective. 
This is an issue that must be dealt with if my suggestion that some works of fiction be 
considered serious contributors to philosophy be taken seriously. This is true whether we 
are talking about academic philosophy or people’s philosophies of life. If a book is to be 
a contributor to the philosophical conversation, the idea that each person can interpret the 
book without reference to other people’s interpretations is supremely problematic. On the 
other hand, it is surely incorrect to return here to the quest for pseudo-universality by 
assuming that all readers should read a book alike. Both extremes shut down, rather than 
encourage, conversation.  
 The idea of story-as-companion as I have introduced it is at the heart of the issue 
in question. Mediating between academic and lived philosophy, the intention of story-as-
companion is to promote appropriate plurality in terms of questions such as “How should 
we live?” This means that the conversation should not be shut down by denying certain 
contributors (such as works of fiction) access to it in an inappropriate quest for pseudo-
universality. It also means that those involved in the conversation should bring their 
contributions together in genuine interaction, rather than merely spouting opinions in an 
inappropriate assumption of pseudo-individuality. Companionship involves authentic 
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conversation, in which the conversation partners converse about a shared topic to which 
each expects the others to bring a unique perspective.19 
 
Reading with purpose? 
 It should be clear by now that I am seeking to treat certain works of fiction with 
great respect. I do believe that reading books influences people, and I desire the 
contributions fiction makes to be taken seriously. Certain kinds of fiction, at least, meet a 
real and worthwhile need both in people’s lives and in academic philosophy, as I 
demonstrate in the chapters that follow. If I am suggesting, then, that people read books 
in order to better answer the question “How should we live?” and to add insight to the 
work of philosophers, how does this differ from the other ways I have described in which 
philosophy treats fiction as a tool? 
 The long-standing but uneasy relationship between fiction and philosophy is a key 
facet of the issues I have described. Martha C. Nussbaum summarizes the history of this 
relationship as follows:  
                                                
19 Hans-Georg Gadamer describes the active way in which the conversation partners in a 
genuine conversation seek to understand each other’s unique perspective (not each other 
as such): “Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to 
every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his 
point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he 
understands not the particular individual but what he says” (Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
2d, rev. ed., trans. rev. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall [New York: 
Continuum, 2004], 387). Likewise, Gadamer points to the fact that a conversation is 
always more than what the conversation partners themselves bring to it: “We say that we 
‘conduct’ a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies 
within the will of either partner. … No one knows in advance what will ‘come out’ of a 
conversation” (Truth and Method, 385). Thus genuine conversation offers more than a 
simple uncovering of something universal or insight into an individual, as valuable as 
these may be. 
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Philosophy and literature have had a very uneasy relationship throughout 
the Western philosophical tradition. Already in the Republic (c. 380–370 
BCE), Plato's Socrates refers to a ‘quarrel of long standing’ between the 
poets and the philosophers—which he then pursues, expressing both a 
deep love of literary art and a reluctance to admit it into the instructional 
plan of the ideal city. So central was this debate to subsequent Greek and 
Roman philosophers that one could write the history of at least the ethical 
portion of those traditions as an extended conversation about this theme. 
Later philosophers in the Western tradition continue the conversation, 
never without considerable ambivalence, but usually with a lively sense of 
the ethical insight that literature may possibly offer. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger—all these 
major Western philosophers, and many others, have contributed to 
keeping the conversation alive. Only in twentieth-century Anglo-
American philosophy has the relationship between the two disciplines 
been virtually neglected. Analytic philosophers sought to write in a 
nonliterary style and rarely discussed the contribution of literature to 
understanding; literary authors and writers about literature felt, with much 
justice, that philosophy offered little that was relevant to their concerns. 
With the exception of figures such as Iris Murdoch and Stanley Cavell, 
always treated as eccentric and marginal, there was little sustained cross-
disciplinary conversation. 20 
 
In short, though fiction and philosophy have met as something like equals (though 
rival equals) in the past, in the present North American climate they seem to be following 
two separate sets of concerns—as separate as the seemingly unrelated regard for the 
autonomous individual of pseudo-individuality and the general-turned-normative of 
pseudo-universality. In subsequent chapters I elaborate on two aspects of this seeming 
separation. In my above discussion of prevailing winds in academic philosophy, I began 
to address the first aspect; that is, the relationship between academic philosophy and 
fiction. I began to explore the way in which academic philosophy’s methodological 
infatuation with pseudo-universality prevents it from taking the philosophical value of 
story seriously. A second aspect of the seemingly separate agendas of literature and 
                                                
20 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Ralph Cohen and the Dialogue between Philosophy and 
Literature,” New Literary History 40, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 757. 
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philosophy has more to do with the relationship between fiction and what I call lived 
philosophy. It comes to the fore when we consider the purpose a person may have for 
reading fiction. Here we find a similar danger in that pseudo-individuality may prevent 
the reader from allowing the story to do more than act as a tool for the reader’s own 
purposes. To read or teach books for the potential philosophical improvement they can 
bring us could easily fall again into the problem of dividing form from content, a 
common field mark of the story-as-tool approach. 
 In turning to books with an eye to the possibility of what they can contribute to 
philosophy, both lived and academic, I suggest that it will be helpful to work with an 
imaginative framework that goes beyond the conceptual structure of a tool. The statistical 
mindset, as I described it above, tends to view the world through the lens of cause and 
effect. My hope is that the story-as-companion metaphor will provide the framework for 
an alternate approach that takes into account the thoroughly hermeneutical nature of 
fiction as an art form. That is, when we interact with art, we are neither passive recipients 
of what it has to offer, nor do we merely mine it for its meaning. Rather, it is through our 
conversation with and interpretation of art that its meaning is disclosed. We tend to 
believe that relationships with people we think of as good people can be beneficial, but 
this does not mean that we are treating these people as tools for our own improvement. In 
the same way, we can recognize that spending time with good books can be good for us, 
beyond simply using them as tools for our benefit. 
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A look ahead 
I have described the inattention to and undervaluation of plurality as a key 
problem in North American culture. In the following chapters, I more fully describe the 
way I see philosophical interaction with stories as having the capacity to break through 
the imaginative paralysis induced by this reductionism. 
In Chapter 2, I situate my project on the philosophical map. With the aid of 
Sander Griffioen’s thoughts on worldview and world picture, I elucidate my distinction 
between academic and lived philosophy. This distinction provides a starting point for 
later chapters’ examination of how we can interact with stories philosophically. I then 
provide a brief tour of the contemporary terrain in the field of philosophy and literature, 
showing where my project intersects with other thinkers’ approaches and indicating why 
I chose the major interlocutors I converse with in the following chapters. 
In Chapter 3, I introduce many of the basic themes I claim are important in the 
relationship between fiction and philosophy. By drawing Hannah Arendt (partly via Lisa 
Jane Disch), Martha C. Nussbaum, and Richard Kearney into conversation about what 
storytelling is and does, I seek to clarify how fiction can be understood as philosophical. I 
describe the kind of philosophical commentary that can partner with fiction in order to 
best contribute to the philosophical conversation, highlight the critical importance of the 
connection between form and content, and discuss the importance of and relationship 
between particularity and plurality.  
In Chapter 4, I situate these themes by seeking to connect them with a larger 
normative and societal framework in light of the need for a noncausal model and 
hermeneutical for how literature and philosophy relate. I bring Lambert Zuidervaart’s 
ideas about imaginative disclosure and art’s place in society into the conversation in 
 28  
order to provide a setting for my discussion of fiction’s unique normative interaction with 
philosophy. I return to Arendt, and especially to Nussbaum, as I seek to set the stage for a 
normative perspective on fiction. I seek to put fiction into the context of art in all its 
forms, while paying special attention to the distinctive potential I see in young adult 
literature. 
 Chapter 5 brings us back to some of the questions I started with about how 
philosophical fiction can have a positive normative influence without being treated 
simply as a tool. I turn to Wayne C. Booth, a seminal thinker on the subject in 
contemporary work on philosophy and literature, in order to help us think through how 
these themes interact. Booth’s metaphor of narrative friendship creates space for a 
discussion of criteria and character. I then bring Nussbaum back into the conversation 
once again in order to clarify the strength of Booth’s model and address potential 
criticisms. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I bring into the conversation some fictional voices through 
my own attempt at philosophical commentary, which endeavors to make explicit the 
philosophical import of several stories. Cynthia Voigt’s Izzy, Willy-Nilly21 and Ursula K. 
Le Guin’s Tehanu22 have informed my own philosophy of life, and both stories explore 
Arendtian themes of natality and “going visiting” in an exemplary fashion.23 Through my 
                                                
21 Cynthia Voigt, Izzy, Willy-Nilly (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986). 
22 Ursula K. Le Guin, Tehanu (New York: Simon Pulse Paperbacks, 1990). 
23 I am not alone in considering these authors important contributors: Trites, for example, 
names both Le Guin and Voigt as “among the many authors writing in English who have 
created texts that are in one way or another pivotal in the Anglo-American YA canon” 
(Trites, Disturbing the Universe, xiii). 
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discussion of these books and a short story, “No Woman Born” by C. L. Moore,24 I 
demonstrate the philosophical potential of treating a story as a philosophical companion 
rather than simply a tool, whether hammer or example. 
It is my hope that this manner of proceeding will make clear the imaginative yet 
philosophical power that story has to offer—a potential that might be not only 
philosophy-changing, but world-changing. Further, it is my hope that this project itself 
can function as something of a bridge between the present relationship of philosophy to 
fiction and a more inclusive engagement between the two that might develop into 
something like a friendship.
                                                
24 C. L. Moore, “No Woman Born,” in Feminist Philosophy and Science Fiction: Utopias 
and Dystopias, ed. Judith A. Little (Potsdam, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 47–90. 
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 2. Situation of the Project 
 Before beginning a journey, it is appropriate to look at a road map. A map shows 
where others have gone ahead, traced out useful paths, and settled down. Looking at a 
map can help a traveler identify where the action is and may point to some areas that he 
or she will want to avoid. In this chapter, I create something of a road map for the journey 
that is to follow, charting out where others have gone before—and which of those paths I 
try to avoid, as well as where I seek to meet conversation partners, often at the 
crossroads. 
 I begin by defining the map’s legend with a clarification of my approach to the 
term “philosophy,” paying particular attention to the distinction I have suggested between 
“lived philosophy” and “academic philosophy.” My interest in both sides of this 
distinction is one of the main motivations for the project as a whole. Both lived 
philosophy and academic philosophy have important roles to play in answering the 
question “How should we live?” Via a brief discussion of Herman Dooyeweerd’s 
concepts of theoretical thought and naïve experience, followed by a tour through Sander 
Griffioen’s reflections on worldview, I elucidate what I mean by academic philosophy 
and lived philosophy, setting the stage for my discussion of how they interact with each 
other and with story in the following chapters.  
 Next, I map out some of the philosophical terrain regarding the relationship 
between philosophy and fiction. I am far from alone in my interest in the topic in general, 
but a survey of various thinkers’ areas of focus shows that the ground I cover in this 
dissertation has not been heavily traversed. I situate my project in the larger discussion 
through a brief introduction of various philosophers’ approaches to the relationship 
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between philosophy and fiction, indicating where I am on the map and which fellow 
travelers are mostly likely to offer fruitful conversations. 
 
Academic and lived philosophy defined 
Can philosophy be a potentially life-changing activity? To address this question, I 
suggest an important distinction. “Philosophy” in its broadest sense is not just an 
academic discipline, but an integral aspect of our daily lives. Indeed, philosophy is as 
much a part of life as biotic existence or social interaction is. Consider the example of 
biotic existence. We easily make the distinction between the academic discipline of 
biology and the undeniable fact of our biotic selves. Perhaps physics is an even better 
example here, since many people react to the discipline of physics just as they do to the 
discipline of philosophy, seeing it as an esoteric, distant realm for “smart” people. But we 
all know that when we drop things, they fall, and that the discipline of physics seeks to 
understand this experience theoretically. For philosophy, too, I make a distinction 
between the discipline (what is generally known as “academic philosophy”) and the 
philosophical facet of ourselves that is just part of our lives (what I call “lived 
philosophy”).  
What makes academic philosophy academic? When we think of an academic field 
in contrast to our everyday experience of life as a whole, we recognize that what we call 
academic tends to be theoretical, abstract, and focused on a delimited area to the 
exclusion of at least some other dimensions of life. The framework for my understanding 
of academic philosophy as abstract and focused, and of lived philosophy as immediate 
and experiential, arises from Herman Dooyeweerd’s description of the difference 
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between pre-theoretical experience and theoretical thought. I find this distinction very 
helpful; in this context, I am making use of it somewhat uncritically. Put simply, the pre-
theoretical attitude of “naïve” experience is characterized by the experience of empirical 
reality as an integral whole, while theoretical thought separates empirical reality into its 
different aspects1 through analysis.2 As in my example above, we experience biotic and 
physical life in an integrated way, but when we study these areas theoretically, we focus 
on and analyze the biotic and physical aspects of life in a delineated, systematic way. 
In an analogous manner, I understand academic philosophy to be the study of the 
“philosophical aspect” of life—the philosophical facet of our everyday existence. 
Following the broadly reformational understanding of philosophy, I understand 
philosophy to address fundamental human questions and the way all of life fits together. 
Academic philosophy addresses this side of human life in a way that is focused, 
purposeful, abstract, theoretical, and systematic. Of course, academic philosophy is 
informed by context and assumptions, but its theoretical and systematic character is what 
identifies it as academic. Lived philosophy, in contrast, also has to do with fundamental 
human questions and the way life fits together, but does so in a relatively unsystematic, 
unfocused, and holistic way. 
                                                
1 “Modal aspect” is a technical term in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. 
2 “[In] the theoretical attitude of thought we analyze empirical reality by separating it into 
its modal aspects. In the pre-theoretical attitude of naïve experience, on the contrary, 
empirical reality offers itself in the integral coherence of cosmic time. Here we grasp 
time and temporal reality in typical total-structure of individuality, and we do not become 
aware of the modal aspects unless implicitly. The aspects are not set asunder, but rather 
are conceived of as being together in a continuous uninterrupted coherence” (Herman 
Dooyeweerd, The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy, vol. 1 of A New Critique of 
Theoretical Thought, trans. David H. Freeman and William S. Young [Philadelphia: The 
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1969], 38). 
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To clarify what I mean by lived philosophy, I briefly detour through the related 
concepts of worldview (Weltanschauung) and world picture (Weltbild). According to 
Sander Griffioen’s recent, wide-ranging study of the subject, a worldview is a conscious 
stance, signifying both an inner conviction and an outlook on the world.3 A worldview 
provides orientation, guides action, integrates experiential fragmentation, and calls for 
public recognition; its orienting and guiding function indicates that it plays a normative 
role. A world picture, on the other hand, is an unconscious stance—often widely 
shared—that does not have an overtly normative element.4 An example of this would be 
any of the widely held contemporary assumptions based on scientific theory, such as that 
the earth is a sphere in space.  
Somewhere in between worldview and world picture we find “embedded 
worldviews,” which are habitual rather than conscious, but still promote certain courses 
of action and block others.5 Griffioen points out that embedded worldviews are often 
lodged in standard procedures, going unnoticed except by those with minority 
worldviews. This phenomenon is common in scientific research, Griffioen notes: A 
naturalist, for example, would tend to prioritize a certain type of research, whereas an 
anthroposophist would prioritize another; however, these priorities tend to be hidden by 
accepted practices, so that the differences rarely come out into the open.6 
In fact, I suggest that this situation is common to most or all science-based fields, 
including medicine, anthropology, and engineering. All of these fields place high value 
on standard practice, and alternative or minority viewpoints struggle greatly to find a 
                                                
3 Sander Griffioen, “On Worldviews,” Philosophia Reformata 77 (2012): 19. 
4 Ibid., 21–22. 
5 Ibid., 23. 
6 Ibid., 24. 
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footing. The statistical mindset, especially in regard to the assumption of gender 
stereotypes that I addressed in Chapter 1, is another prime example of an embedded 
worldview. It is for the most part habitual rather than purposeful, but still functions to 
promote certain courses of action and block others; in other words, it retains a normative 
element. 
Embedded worldviews tend to be problematic because they act as unrecognized 
guides to action. This means that people are in effect religiously7 but unconsciously 
committed to certain perspectives, leading them to believe that practices and processes 
are inevitable, when in fact they are human artifacts—and therefore always mutable. 
Griffioen signals this appearance of inevitability as a distinctive characteristic of an 
embedded worldview: “Here then appears the difference between a manifest and an 
embedded worldview: the latter veils the existence of alternatives. Although embedding 
seems to be a normal process, in line with routinization in general, yet its effect is 
detrimental because it suggests that social processes follow their own irreversible tracks 
irrespective of human assent.”8 
Griffioen distinguishes between worldview and (academic) philosophy in that a 
worldview is inherently a guide to action, while philosophy does not guide action as such 
and is therefore not required to prioritize tasks.9 A philosopher of politics or morality 
such as Martha C. Nussbaum, who specifically defines philosophy as seeking to answer 
                                                
7 The term “religiously” is used here in line with the tradition of reformational 
philosophy, which understands religion to be the deep-seated orientation that organizes 
life into what is more and less important, indicating what life is all about, what we should 
spend our time doing, and so on—and more than this, it is a response to a transcendent 
call. One’s worldview, then, is rooted in one’s religious orientation, which has to do with 
whom one serves. The reformational catchphrase is “All of life is religion.” 
8 Griffioen, “On Worldviews,” 24. 
9 Ibid., 26. 
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the question of “How should one live?” would certainly beg to differ with this 
characterization. However, I suspect that Griffioen is simply trying to distinguish 
between the abstract, theoretical nature of academic philosophy and the normative aspect 
of worldview in order to insist that worldview is still an important concept, a matter that 
he takes to be in question. At the same time, since he recognizes border crossings among 
worldview, embedded worldview, and world picture,10 I suspect he would not deny that 
these border crossings exist in other areas of life—even in academic disciplines—as well, 
including in philosophy. 
This brief summary of Griffioen’s descriptions of philosophy, worldview, 
embedded worldview, and world picture demonstrates that we approach the world with 
variable consciousness and focus. Lived philosophy involves ways in which we approach 
the world within the range of worldview and embedded worldview—it is the action of 
living out the dimension of our lives that involves orientation, goals, integration, and 
discussion of these matters with other people. Like academic philosophy, lived 
philosophy retains a relationship with theorizing in that it involves critical reflection on 
our lives and worldviews, although this reflection does not tend to be systematic. Like a 
world picture, lived philosophy involves how we see the world, but it does not suffer the 
loss of its normative character. Lived philosophy is the activity of living out both 
manifest and embedded worldviews—it is the thinking about, discussing, and decision 
making that arise from the existence of worldviews. 
Lived philosophy, then, is related to the basic approaches to and assumptions 
about life that we demonstrate as we go about our daily business, with abiding, 
                                                
10 Ibid., 22. 
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fundamental human questions, and with the ever-present question of how we should best 
live our lives. It overlaps with various aspects of our lives, including ethical and rational 
dimensions, but cannot be limited to these aspects because—as a form of philosophy—it 
has to do with how everything fits together. 
With this bird’s-eye view of philosophy, both lived and academic, in mind, let us 
take a closer look at what others have to say on the specific topic of fiction and 
philosophy. 
 
Mapping the terrain 
Where is my project situated in relation to recent thinkers on philosophy and 
fiction? After briefly surveying the philosophy-and-fiction terrain, I discuss several of the 
major thinkers whose goals, methods, and topics overlap with mine in order to situate my 
project in the larger conversation.  
The relationship between philosophy and fiction has arguably been a topic of 
academic discussion since Plato. Interest in the topic continues unabated, as publication 
in recent years attests.11 Thinkers from a wide variety of fields are interested in the 
                                                
11 This interest (as evidenced by my choice of dissertation topic) continues to the present. 
For example, see Raymond Barfield, The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and 
Poetry (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Elisabeth Bronfen, Night 
Passages: Philosophy, Literature, and Film (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013); Noël Carroll and John Gibson, Narrative, Emotion, and Insight (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011); Philip Davis, Reading and the Reader, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Richard Gaskin, Language, Truth, and 
Literature: A Defence of Literary Humanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); 
Peter Kivy, Once-Told Tales: An Essay in Literary Aesthetics (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011); Michael Mack, How Literature Changes the Way We Think (New 
York: Continuum, 2012); and Anthony Uhlmann, Thinking in Literature: Joyce, Woolf, 
Nabokov (New York: Continuum, 2011), all published within the past five years and all 
addressing some aspect of the relationship between narrative, philosophy, and human life. 
 37  
subject of fiction, each taking an angle on the subject that depends largely on what other 
areas he or she is interested in. Fiction does indeed seem to offer something to everyone. 
Some of the variety in approach and resultant variety in theory is simply a matter of taste 
and experience, but there are also a number of significant debates that frame the way 
people think about fiction.12  
The way I frame these various approaches to fiction is based on my own research 
interests and experience. Other thinkers on the subject of philosophical interaction with 
fiction frame the matter in other ways. Some thinkers, like Joshua Landy, for example, 
map out the landscape according to what people “get” from fiction; he divides the various 
accounts of how people interact with fiction into exemplary, affective, and cognitive 
branches.13 Another commonly suggested intuition is that there is fundamentally a more-
or-less simple division among thinkers, and everyone will come down on the side of 
either Plato or Aristotle. One could also distinguish between those who place the main 
emphasis on the author or text and those who emphasize the reader’s role or mind; or one 
could map out the territory geographically, or trace historical developments. 
For my purposes, it makes the most sense to chart the terrain by way of fields of 
interest. From my perspective, every thinker who offers a philosophical account of fiction 
                                                
12 The debates that could be considered significant are too many to enumerate, but a few 
examples include the nature and existence of fictional characters (see, for example, 
Paisley Livingston and Andrea Sauchelli, “Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional 
Characters,” New Literary History 42, no. 2 [Spring 2011]: 337–60); how important is the 
author's intention (see, for example, Jukka Mikkonen, “Intentions and Interpretations: 
Philosophical Fiction as Conversation,” Contemporary Aesthetics 7 [2009], 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7523862.0007.012); and the relationship between literature 
and truth (see, for example, Bo Earle, “Plato, Aristotle, and the Imitation of Reason,” 
Philosophy of Literature 27, no. 2 [2003]: 382–401). 
13 Joshua Landy, How to Do Things with Fictions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 4. 
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does so from the intersection of his or her other areas of interest, and can be widely 
grouped into a number of families. In order to clarify where my project fits on the 
landscape, I have grouped these thinkers into three main clusters, which I call the 
cognitive/analytic, the historical/narrative, and the moral/political families. Of course, 
these families necessarily overlap where their members share points of interest. In 
particular, we find members of each family who are interested in ethics, which, along 
with fiction itself, finds a central place on the map. Let’s take a brief tour through each of 
these clusters to see what they are talking about and where I situate my project in relation 
to them. 
In the cognitive/analytic family, we find members who are interested in topics 
like philosophy of language, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, ordinary 
language philosophy, speech act theory, literary theory, phenomenology, aesthetics, 
cognitive science, and linguistics. Members of this family tend to be highly interested in 
method, and also tend to emphasize the reader’s side of the reading equation, focusing on 
what happens in the reader’s mind or psyche rather than on the author’s intentions or the 
text in abstraction. Of course, there is extensive variety even within the group. Matters 
related to fiction, narrative, and literature are major topics in the cognitive/analytic 
family. A brief survey of several key representatives provides some insight into their 
concerns. 
One of the foremost members of this family is Peter Lamarque, who places 
himself at the intersection of philosophy of language, aesthetics, and philosophy of 
literature. Lamarque has sought to articulate “philosophy of literature” on the same 
footing as other “philosophy ofs,” identifying it as a subset of philosophy of art. At the 
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same time, he recognizes that it is an unusually complex “philosophy of,” falling 
somewhere in between philosophies of disciplines (such as science or history) and 
philosophies of fundamental concepts (such as mind or action).14  
Lamarque’s approach is broadly analytic—unusually broad, but still distinctively 
analytic in that he is focused on the “logical foundations” of literature, with no interest in 
connecting his inquiries with those of literary theorists. He specifically mentions Mikhail 
Bakhtin, Walter Benjamin, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, Jacques Derrida, Paul de 
Man, Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, and Michel Foucault as “luminaries” 
of the kind of literary theory that, he says, has little direct connection to philosophy of 
literature.15 This disconnect is perhaps one of the clearest indications that Lamarque, 
while seeking to survey the entire realm of philosophy of literature, in actuality remains 
firmly within the subset of philosophical approaches to fiction that I have named the 
cognitive/analytic family. Although he addresses literature specifically as art and seeks to 
emphasize the importance of context for theorizing about literature, he does not move in 
the direction of a specifically hermeneutic understanding of art (except as a 
“controversy”) or the relevance of philosophy of literature for broadly cultural themes—
both of which are aspects of literature that particularly interest me. In other words, he is 
interested in literature “for its own sake,” while I am more interested in the way in which 
interaction with literature relates to cultural and ethical dimensions of human life. 
In contrast with Lamarque’s declaration that philosophy of literature is not 
directly related to literary theory, other members of the cognitive/analytic family 
approach literature from that very intersection. Two major recent thinkers in this general 
                                                
14 Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009), 5. 
15 Ibid., 8–9. 
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area are Stanley Cavell, at the intersection of ordinary language philosophy, literary 
theory, and psychoanalysis, and Joshua Landy, at the intersection of literary theory, 
philosophy of mind, and linguistics. Cavell has long been known for grounding his 
philosophy in and through literary works, with his primary areas of literary interest being 
American film and Shakespearian plays. He addresses philosophy and literature 
conjointly not simply because he is interested in both, but also because he believes that 
they have in some sense grown together; the arts “increasingly take on the self-reflective 
character of philosophy.”16 Cavell’s abiding interest in the ordinary, whether it be 
language, film, morality, or romance, is culturally attuned in a way that Lamarque’s is 
not, but still distinctively analytic in approach—although Cavell happily converses with 
some Continental philosophers. 
Joshua Landy appears on the other side of the intersection of literary theory and 
philosophy, on the border between the cognitive/analytic and the historical/narrative. 
Landy is pointedly uninterested in the ordinary, and is in fact strikingly elitist. In reaction 
to what he sees as a widespread, naïve desire to mine the “messages” out of fiction 
(indeed a problematic endeavor, as I show in later chapters), he has articulated a theory of 
what he calls “formative fiction”; that is, he argues that (some) fiction acts as an 
instrument to improve the (sufficiently intelligent, right-reading) reader’s mental 
capacities, especially the capacity to live on a metaphorical plane.17 This theory is in 
effect an attenuated, strangely snobbish version of Wayne C. Booth’s wide-ranging 
theory of fiction as it relates to character, which I address at some length in Chapter 5. 
                                                
16 Stanley Cavell, “Something out of the Ordinary,” Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 71, no. 2 (1997), 27. 
17 Landy, How to Do Things with Fictions, 10, 58. 
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Coming from a background in linguistics, Landy does not address many of the larger, 
ongoing analytic debates about literature, but his emphasis on instrumental method and 
the inner workings of the mind make him a recognizable member of the 
cognitive/analytic family, even while some aspects of his approach overlap with the 
historical/narrative family. 
Gregory Currie, another well-known member of this family, is at the intersection 
of aesthetics and philosophy of mind. He is distinctively part of the cognitive/analytic 
family in approach and interests (for example, he emphasizes that narratives are 
artefactual—a word that acts as a field mark for analytic philosophy). Yet he is also on 
the edge of the historical/narrative family in that he focuses not simply on stories 
themselves but on the relative “narrativity” of all things—particularly in terms of 
communication—that have narrative structure.18 Likewise, his account relies heavily on 
evolutionary psychology. However, these interests arise in his work with a decisively 
analytic flavor: He is primarily concerned with charting out and distinguishing technical 
characteristics of narrative, as well as determining external and internal psychological 
interactions in narrativity, rather than considering questions of individual or cultural 
impact and import. 
On the very edge of the cognitive/analytic territory we find Iris Murdoch, who is 
at the intersection of aesthetics and psychology, like many members of the 
cognitive/analytic family, but also at the intersection of metaphysics and moral 
philosophy. Murdoch is well known as a philosopher, and even better known as an author 
of novels. Many author-philosophers specifically choose to work out philosophical ideas 
                                                
18 Gregory Currie, Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 34. 
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through fiction, while others, like Murdoch, insist that the two fields are entirely separate. 
What Murdoch means by this is dependent, of course, on her definition of philosophy, 
which she sees as intrinsically abstract—in contrast to novels, which deal with the details 
of human life.19 In fact, she does not deny that many novels, including many of her own, 
both deal with philosophical themes and address themes philosophically. For her, the 
distinction between philosophy and fiction is one of style rather than content. 
Members of the cognitive/analytic family, then, tend to address technical issues of 
how the human mind interacts with narrative, seek to define logical foundations, and 
emphasize matters of method and instrumentality. In contrast, members of the 
historical/narrative family emphasize the narrative nature of human existence apart from 
the written word, and tend to problematize the social and political aspects of life via 
studies of power, oppression, taboos, and the like. Members of this family meet at the 
intersections of ethics, philosophical anthropology, history, phenomenology, 
hermeneutics, literary criticism, critical theory, comparative literature, linguistics, post-
structuralist studies, and psychoanalysis. Many of the “luminaries” of literary theory that 
Lamarque discarded from his philosophy of literature are formative figures in this area: 
Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault, for example, are often particularly important thinkers for 
members of this family. Henry Sussman is representative of the current generation of 
intellectual descendants from what might be called the “original deconstructionists.” At 
                                                
19 S. B. Sagare and Iris Murdoch, “An Interview with Iris Murdoch,” MFS Modern 
Fiction Studies 47, no. 3 (2001), 697. 
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the intersection of literary criticism and critical theory, Sussman picks up on Derrida’s 
readings of fiction in relation to philosophy.20 
On the less deconstructionist side of the historical/narrative territory, Paul Ricoeur 
is one of the major figures. Ricoeur writes on a number of different subjects, primarily at 
the intersection of hermeneutics and philosophical anthropology. His work on various 
forms of both discourse and action lead him to articulate the “narrative unity of human 
life,” at the heart of which is “care.”21 He is a seminal thinker in the philosophical 
approach that considers ways in which human life is like a book, rather than ways in 
which books interact with human life; my own focus is much more on the latter. 
One of Ricoeur’s disciples, Richard Kearney, takes up these themes of narrative 
identity in his own work on story. Kearney is a border figure in all three families—
intersecting with aesthetics, ethics, and history—but fits best in the historical/narrative 
family due to his abiding emphasis on themes such as violence and reconciliation, 
imagination, and otherness, all of which topics are field marks of this philosophical 
family. Kearney is one of the few members not firmly within the moral/political family 
with whom I interact in this dissertation. I have chosen him as an interlocutor largely 
because his interests do have the ethical, cultural bent that I am particularly interested in 
and because, although his professed philosophical aims are very similar to my own, his 
methods are very different. This allows my interaction with him to demonstrate the 
strength of the approach I am proposing by clarifying what is distinctive about my 
emphasis on form, discussed in Chapter 3. 
                                                
20 Henry Sussman, “Pulsations of Respect, or Winged Impossibility: Literature with 
Deconstruction,” diacritics 38, no.1-2 (2008): 44–63. 
21 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 163. 
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The third family group according to my classification is the moral/political 
family, and is the family in which I would most directly fit. Topics of interest for 
members of this family include moral philosophy, political philosophy, literary criticism, 
social theory, sociology, and—of course—ethics. At the intersection of social theory and 
sociology, we find a thinker like Susan Mizruchi. Like many historical/narrative thinkers, 
she addresses connections between fiction and society, but from a sociological 
perspective rather than a psychoanalytic or deconstructionist perspective.22 On the more 
distinctively political side are thinkers like Patrick Deneen and Joseph Romance, who 
specifically address questions of political democracy in relation to literature.23 While 
these areas of interest are more closely related to mine than are the interests of the 
cognitive/analytic and historical/narrative families, I am even more specifically interested 
in the philosophical interaction of individuals with literary works, rather than in broad, 
strictly sociological or political issues. In terms of this brief mapping out of the territory, 
then, I am at the intersection of moral philosophy, literary criticism, and ethics—with a 
specifically cultural focus on individual interaction with literature. 
This survey of the terrain would be incomplete without pointing out one of the 
mountains whose lower slopes I will be traversing: the hermeneutical tradition. I have 
already mentioned Ricoeur, a leading figure in the hermeneutical tradition, whom I have 
grouped in the historical/narrative tradition (which, in fact, he could be considered to 
have founded). Ricoeur himself has engaged in various ways with the views of other 
towering peaks whose work I do not address directly in this dissertation: Martin 
                                                
22 Susan L. Mizruchi, The Science of Sacrifice: American Literature and Modern Social 
Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
23 Patrick J. Deneen and Joseph Romance, Democracy’s Literature: Politics and Fiction 
in America (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 
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Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jürgen Habermas. Although a direct engagement 
with these philosophers is beyond the scope of my project, I engage with their legacy via 
the work of my own mentor, Lambert Zuidervaart. The main route of my engagement 
with these giants of the hermeneutical tradition is through my addressing in some detail 
Zuidervaart’s conception of imaginative disclosure (see Chapter 4), which he has 
developed through a critical examination of many of Heidegger’s (and to a lesser extent, 
Gadamer’s) insights on artistic truth and disclosedness. 
Specifically, Zuidervaart’s description of artistic truth as “a multidimensional 
process of imaginative disclosure” is rooted in Heidegger’s understanding of truth as 
“disclosedness,” along with Theodor Adorno’s idea of “truth content.” In drawing on 
Heidegger’s conception for his own theory of artistic truth, Zuidervaart pays particular 
attention to truth’s hermeneutic character.24 Zuidervaart’s critical engagement with 
Heidegger’s conception of disclosedness is also informed by Habermas’s take on John 
Searle’s speech-act theory. As I show in Chapter 4 via my discussion of Zuidervaart’s 
hermeneutical understanding of art, attentiveness to art’s hermeneutic character also 
helps make clear the ways in which engaging philosophically with fiction makes a 
significant ethical contribution to philosophy, both lived and academic.  
Although my insistence on a hermeneutical model for our interaction with 
literature does place my project within the overarching hermeneutical tradition, I seek to 
follow Zuidervaart’s lead in critically engaging with thinkers from various traditions in 
order to work out my own ideas on a topic that I see as relevant and significant. Again, I 
follow Zuidervaart in boldly suggesting that this kind of border crossing is both necessary 
                                                
24 Lambert Zuidervaart, Artistic Truth: Aesthetics, Discourse, and Imaginative Disclosure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7. 
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and fruitful in today’s world, in which both people’s lived experience and the state of 
contemporary philosophy tend to be, in Zuidervaart’s words, in an “unruly condition.”25  
While a deliberately cross-disciplinary approach almost automatically invites 
criticism from those in the various disciplines whose borders I am crossing, I believe that 
the potential for fruitful engagement between interlocutors who may not otherwise talk to 
each other vastly outweighs the risks. In particular, I share the methodological 
assumption described by Zuidervaart that a cross-disciplinary engagement with thinkers 
is to the benefit of all: “By constructing a dialogue, even where a dialogue did not exist 
prior to the interpretation, one can achieve a more nuanced understanding of both 
positions and a stronger articulation of one’s own position, whether this agrees in sum or 
in part with either position, or whether it forms an alternative to both.”26  
And although this kind of cross-disciplinary project does not allow the depth of 
engagement with central figures of the hermeneutical tradition such as Ricoeur, 
Heidegger, Gadamer, and Habermas that a single-discipline project does, I am by no 
means unaware of the fact that the path I am navigating owes much to their work. I do 
not discuss them in depth because I have made a hermeneutical judgment about the 
relative importance for my project of the specific insights of the interlocutors I do engage 
with, while recognizing that many other projects engage more directly with the giants of 
the hermeneutical tradition. Once more, I follow Zuidervaart in this regard.27 For these 
                                                
25 Ibid., 12. Interestingly, Zuidervaart specifically names Martha Nussbaum, perhaps the 
single most important of my interlocutors in this project, as one of the contemporary 
philosophers who “either transgress philosophical subdivisions or navigate nimbly among 
them.” 
26 Ibid., 14. 
27 Expressing a concern to remain intelligible to his analytic colleagues, and noting the 
relative absence in his choice of texts of central figures such as G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich 
 47  
reasons, I have chosen to engage directly with key thinkers who are claimed by a number 
of different disciplines in the hope that the resulting conversation will lead to steps in a 
fruitful direction.  
 
Key intersections 
The intersection where I place myself is precisely where the focus of my project 
overlaps with some of my primary interlocutors. At the intersection of literary criticism 
and moral philosophy is Wayne C. Booth, a seminal thinker in the area of how we relate 
to the books we read.28 His understanding of books as friends who influence us for better 
or worse brings the conversation through several thickets and into a space of clarity and 
genuine communication. He plays an important part in helping to discern the specifics of 
a normative conversation among diverse interpretations.  
Situated at the intersection of moral philosophy and political philosophy is Martha 
C. Nussbaum, who is one of my main interlocutors throughout the following chapters. I 
focus particularly on her arguments regarding the place of literary works in philosophy, 
rather than on the political side of her work. She has defended (some) novels as having an 
indispensable place in the canon of moral philosophy. I have taken up a form of her 
                                                                                                                                            
Nietzsche, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, and even, relatively 
speaking, Theodor W. Adorno, Zuidervaart writes, “their relative absence from the 
discussion does not signal a lack of appreciation for their insights. But it does indicate a 
hermeneutical judgment about what one can reasonably hope to cover and still remain 
intelligible.” Ibid., 13. 
28 According to the University of Chicago Press website, “Wayne Booth wrote some of 
the most influential and engaging criticism of our time, most notably the 1961 classic The 
Rhetoric of Fiction, a book that transformed literary criticism and became the standard 
reference point for advanced discussions of how fiction works, how authors make novels 
accessible, and how readers re-create texts” (“The Essential Wayne Booth,” 
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/E/bo3770832.html). 
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question “How should one live?” as an excellent expression of the guiding question for 
lived philosophy, and for much of academic philosophy as well. Nussbaum insists that 
academic philosophy place appropriate value on particularity, and that taking stories 
seriously as philosophical contributors is a vital aspect of this valuation. 
Apart from philosophers who specifically address philosophy and literature, I 
interact with a couple of other thinkers whose insights greatly add to my project. Hannah 
Arendt is an important contributor on several fronts.29 Taking on the statistical mindset, 
she distinguishes clearly the primacy of plurality and the absurdity of taking 
generalizations as universal norms that could be applied to particular individuals. Her 
notions of natality and “going visiting” and her brilliant description of impartiality help to 
clarify the way that stories can break open prevailing ways of thinking and thereby resist 
oppression. 
As I mentioned previously, I also bring into the conversation Lambert 
Zuidervaart, whose hermeneutical understanding of art and conception of imaginative 
disclosure add important dimensions to my consideration of fiction and normativity. His 
framework for art’s normative place and significance, as well as his insistence on the 
integration of different aspects of life, bring to light a normative perspective on the 
potential of art to be a catalyst for ethical transformation. This frame of reference is then 
                                                
29 Veronica Vasterling suggests that Arendt’s work is situated at the intersection of 
political theory, anthropology, and hermeneutic phenomenology (“The Hermeneutic 
Phenomenological Approach to Plurality: Arendt, Habermas, and Gadamer,” in 
Phenomenological Perspectives on Plurality, ed. Gert-Jan van der Heiden [Boston: Brill, 
2015], 159). This is a reasonable placement, although Arendt is also claimed by thinkers 
in a variety of other fields, including existentialism and even feminism. For this reason, 
and because Arendt herself refused to name herself a philosopher (calling herself a 
political theorist), much less a philosopher in a certain field, I hesitate to situate her in 
these terms. 
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applicable to the narrative works of fiction I am specifically addressing in that they are 
works of art. Thus, in Zuidervaart’s view, they are interpretive and inform our lives by 
way of interpretation. These insights do the vital work of binding my project together by 
articulating a frame of reference which recognizes the impact that our relationship with 
art has on us without assuming that this impact must be directly causal. 
The insights offered by Arendt and Zuidervaart clarify some gaps in the wider 
philosophical conversation on philosophy and literature. Arendt’s thoroughgoing 
emphasis on plurality points to the limitations of focusing solely on the methods and 
minds of individual readers, as is often the case in the cognitive/analytic family. 
Zuidervaart’s noncausal hermeneutical model circumvents the difficulties that arise when 
the pattern of human interaction with art is seen as universal and inevitable, as is often 
the case in both the historical/narrative and moral/political families. I seek to address 
individual philosophical interaction with fiction within the context of plurality, and 
demonstrate the potential for fiction to contribute to both lived and academic philosophy 
in a thoroughly dynamic way. 
How can fiction contribute to philosophy, both lived and academic, through 
philosophical interaction? How, specifically, can fiction be understood as philosophical? 
If this chapter has constituted something of a road map by which we can locate a starting 
point and route through these questions, the next chapter begins to follow that route.  
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3. Fiction as Philosophy 
What is it about fiction that gives it the potential to inform people’s lived 
philosophies? In this chapter, I place in conversation with each other Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Hannah Arendt (partly through the eyes of Lisa Jane Disch), and Richard 
Kearney. By examining how they have understood the significance of storytelling, I seek 
to clarify how fiction can be understood as philosophical and how it can contribute to the 
philosophical conversation in partnership with explicit philosophical commentary. 
Kearney, Arendt, and Nussbaum all desire stories to be socially transformative. I believe 
the differences between their approaches, however, are so important that it is well worth 
our time to consider them in detail.  
In order to highlight the uniquely significant perspectives that Arendt and 
Nussbaum offer, I lay out a detailed overview of what Kearney understands story to be 
and what purposes he has for it; then I address a few difficulties with his approach. I 
briefly make note of the main themes which arise in Arendt’s and Nussbaum’s views of 
story. Then I elucidate the critical importance of the relationship between form and 
content1 for what I refer to as “philosophical fiction” through a comparison of Kearney’s, 
                                                
1 I follow Nussbaum’s use of the phrase “form and content” as meaning that the 
philosophical import of a work cannot be understood outside the context of the particular 
literary manifestation or genre of that work. Thus, when I talk about “form” in this 
dissertation, I am focusing on the contribution the specific manifestation of a work makes 
to its overall meaning. For example, the “form” of young adult fiction in this sense 
includes aspects like a focus on character development and themes of power, selfhood, 
and ideology. My discussion of form and content, then, should not be taken as referring 
specifically to “form” in the sense of technical literary devices or mechanisms that a 
literary specialist would analyze. Although these kinds of literary devices are certainly 
part of the form of a work in the sense that I am using the word, a specific discussion of 
literary techniques would be outside the scope of this project. Of course, pursuing the 
connection between literary techniques and the thematic content of a work would also be 
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Arendt’s, and Nussbaum’s views, as well as examining the key role of an emphasis on 
particularity instead of consensus. Finally, I consider the significance for philosophical 
fiction of Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s differing emphases on particularity and plurality 
through an examination of their understandings of compassion, love, and solidarity. 
The term “philosophical fiction” refers to fiction that invites philosophical 
response or is experienced and interpreted philosophically, though not necessarily in a 
formal way. Philosophical fiction is not meant to be a clearly delineated category; 
although some books will almost inevitably be included, firm exclusions will almost 
never be appropriate. For example, Lois Lowry’s The Giver would be a clear instance of 
fiction that invites philosophical response, but even one of the massive, vapid, ghost-
written series—all too common in North American culture—might spark philosophical 
response in a certain context, making it at least temporarily a form of philosophical 
fiction.  
Although the direction of my discussion is in the end focused on a particular kind 
of story—young adult fiction—the terms used in this conversation vary by interlocutor. 
Nussbaum’s arguments are primarily concerned with realistic novels such as those by 
Henry James and Charles Dickens. Arendt speaks of storytelling, and makes use of 
various forms of story, ranging from the novels of Dostoyevsky to actual historical 
anecdotes; Lisa Jane Disch takes up the threads of Arendt’s thought with a particular 
focus on narratives told by oppressed or marginalized people in opposition to dominant, 
often political narratives. And Kearney uses the term story to encompass almost anything 
the word could suggest. In the following discussion, I respect each interlocutor’s use of 
                                                                                                                                            
useful. However, in this project I focus on the philosophical import of the work as a 
whole—simply put, that how you say something is inseparable from what you are saying. 
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terms, but I treat “story” as an overarching term that applies to what each thinker is 
addressing in the broadest sense. Philosophical fiction, then, is assumed to be more or 
less a subset of the category “story” as discussed by Kearney; what I conclude about 
stories in general will be taken as applicable to philosophical fiction. 
What kinds of stories these interlocutors focus on gives a clue as to what they 
expect from story, and what they want to do with story. Nussbaum, with her focus on the 
ethical development of individuals, looks primarily to realistic, literary novels. Kearney, 
who is more concerned with tolerance at a cultural level, focuses on historical and mythic 
narrative. Disch has a similar concern with a more political thrust, as can be seen by her 
stress on the self-told stories of marginalized groups. Interestingly, Arendt’s use of story 
is extremely varied, ranging from poetry to fiction to historical narrative. This indicates 
her faith in the written word to communicate in its own way, and shows her 
thoroughgoing emphasis on plurality. Although each of these thinkers focuses on 
different kinds of stories, they can be considered part of one conversation by reflecting on 
what it is they expect to accomplish through their commentaries on these stories, and in 
particular, on the ethical significance of interaction with various forms of story. 
 
Fiction as philosophy and philosophical commentary on fiction 
In her writings on various subjects, Hannah Arendt often turned to stories or 
poetic images to explore a concept, theme, or event. She practiced a kind of philosophical 
commentary on story that allowed her to address difficult questions in an especially 
relevant way, while bringing out the kind of contribution that literature can make both to 
how we think things through and to the frameworks for thought that we use, often 
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without thinking about them. Nussbaum, while never discussing Arendt’s commentaries 
directly, has defended theoretically exactly the kind of commentary Arendt practiced.  
According to Nussbaum, Western philosophical inquiry into ethics began with the 
simple question “How should human beings live?” Until Plato, says Nussbaum, it was the 
poets rather than the philosophers to whom people turned as the principal ethical thinkers 
and teachers.2 Nussbaum describes the ancient Greek poets and philosophers as both 
addressing the question of how human beings should live, but coming up with answers—
and especially, approaches—that many saw as incompatible.3 The debate that developed 
between the poets and the philosophers had as much to do with the form as with the 
content of their work, says Nussbaum, since the literary form of an ethical statement had 
much to say about one’s view of ethical truth. A tragedy, with its invitation for the 
audience to weep or rage with the hero, presented a view of life which believes that it is 
right to love and grieve, and that some things in life are beyond our control. Nussbaum 
points out that Plato’s Republic, on the other hand, left out the grief of Achilles over 
Patroclus’s death, presenting a view of life that does not believe that things outside of 
human control have ethical significance.4  
Looking for an equivalently appropriate level of depth and kind of questioning 
about the relationship between forms of discourse and views of life on the contemporary 
philosophical scene in the late twentieth century, Nussbaum found little to do with the 
form of ethical writing, although the ethical debate itself was becoming more complex.5 
                                                
2 Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 15–16. 
3 Ibid., 15. 
4 Ibid., 17. 
5 Ibid., 18. 
 54  
For the most part, her work on form and content, which led her to articulate the value of 
literature as a variety of moral philosophy, moved through uncharted territory. 
Nussbaum addresses the question of form and content in her extensive 
introduction to Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. Nussbaum 
argues that how you say what you say is a part of what you are saying, and that form is as 
intrinsic to content in philosophy as it is in literature. Because this connection seems to 
have been largely ignored in recent philosophy, or because Western philosophy had 
turned so entirely toward rationality for a time, many philosophers end up writing 
strangely self-contradictory work, Nussbaum says: “An article, for example, argues that 
the emotions are essential and central to our efforts to gain understanding on any 
important ethical matter; and yet it is written in a style that expresses only intellectual 
activity and strongly suggests that only this activity matters for the reader in his or her 
attempts to understand.”6 
The burden of Nussbaum’s argument is that (some) novels have an indispensable 
place in the canon of moral philosophy; particularly, philosophy which seeks to answer 
the question “How should one live?” While not claiming either that all philosophical 
inquiries, even about how to live, will be best answered by novels, or that all or only 
novels will be helpful, Nussbaum argues persuasively that novels do something which 
looking to abstract treatises, philosophical examples, or life itself will not accomplish.7 
Nussbaum’s insistence on the inseparability of form and content in well-written 
works means not only that novels are unique in their ability to address certain themes or 
aspects of human life, but that a philosophical style of commentary that is allied with 
                                                
6 Ibid., 21. 
7 Ibid., 45–47. 
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them must build on and not undercut the claims of the literary text. Yet as part of a 
rigorous philosophical response to the question of how we should live, literary works do 
need an ally which can—through explanation and explicit description—draw attention to 
the relevance of the novel’s features in contrast to philosophical alternatives. This ally is, 
says Nussbaum, “a type of philosophical commentary that will point out explicitly the 
contributions of the works to the pursuit of our question about human beings and human 
life, and their relation to our intuitions and our sense of life.”8 This is not to say that we 
can only read, think clearly about, or benefit from novels with the aid of academic 
philosophy, but that in order for novels to be appropriately positioned in the canon of 
academic philosophy, their contribution should be specifically articulated. 
Nussbaum’s approach to philosophical fiction is part of the more general 
approach to the question of how human beings should live that she espouses. She refers 
to this approach as the Aristotelian inclusive dialectical method, and it always begins 
with the question of how human beings should live. Nussbaum wishes to invite people 
into conversation about this question, making the conversation as inclusive as possible. 
The idea is to hold up alternative positions against one another and against the 
participants’ beliefs, feelings, and sense of life. Rather than looking for a view that 
corresponds to some sort of extra-human, transcendent reality, participants look for “the 
best overall fit between a view and what is deepest in human lives.”9 They are asked to 
continually question what they can least well live without, and what is more dispensable, 
seeking for “coherence and fit in the web of judgment, feeling, perception, and principle, 
                                                
8 Ibid., 49. 
9 Ibid., 25–26. 
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taken as a whole.”10 Appropriate philosophical commentary will point out the 
contributions of literature to this dialectical task before the investigation among 
conceptions can be thoroughly entered into. Nussbaum believes that novels best make 
their contribution to moral (academic) philosophy in conjunction with this more 
explanatory style.11 
This combination of literary richness and explanatory commentary can take many 
forms. It could combine both elements into a literary whole, or it could be written as 
separate literary texts and explicit commentary, or it could take the form of commentary 
on works by others. As Nussbaum points out, much depends on a philosopher’s own 
narrative ability, as well as his or her commitment to the project of investigating 
alternative ethical conceptions. In any case, the style of philosophical commentary will 
likely differ both from standard philosophical writing and from the novels it discusses. It 
will differ from much philosophical writing, says Nussbaum, in that “it will have to be 
non-reductive, and also self-conscious about its own lack of completeness, gesturing 
toward experiences and toward the literary texts, as spheres in which a greater 
completeness should be sought.”12 This may be more difficult than it seems on the 
surface, I suspect, since not a few philosophers have attempted to be self-consciously 
non-reductive and aware of incompleteness while failing, as Nussbaum sees it, to match 
their stylistic form to the claims they make. Appropriate philosophical commentary will 
                                                
10 Ibid., 26. 
11 Ibid., 49. 
12 Ibid. 
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also, though, differ from novels in order to clearly and convincingly contrast the 
distinctive features of the novels with the features of other philosophical works.13 
 
Fiction as critical thinking 
Having formulated a similar idea before reading Nussbaum’s work, I am in 
substantial agreement with much of what she says. Her focus, that story can sometimes 
be a more clear and helpful exploration of a topic than a non-fiction philosophical treatise 
could be, is only one way in which fiction plays a vital role as philosophy, however. We 
see another aspect, the role of story as its own kind of thinking, in Hannah Arendt’s ideas 
about story. Arendt did not explicitly theorize her interactions with story like Nussbaum 
has, but her work is littered with examples of philosophy and story working in 
companionship. To help express and clarify her ideas, she turned to a wide variety of 
story forms in her writing, ranging from novels to poems to Shakespeare’s plays, and she 
often emphasized the idea of telling the stories of human lives. This last aspect has 
frequently been taken up by political thinkers to express the importance of allowing 
marginalized groups to tell their own stories. 
In Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy, Lisa Jane Disch investigates the 
function of storytelling in Arendt’s thought as a form of critical theory.14 She shows that 
for Arendt, storytelling is a practice of critical thinking in context. This stands in contrast 
to understandings of storytelling as merely the handing down of tradition or the 
expression of a personal point of view. Disch takes seriously Arendt’s statements about 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Lisa Jane Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994). 
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situating herself in opposition to some of the key components of traditional Western 
philosophy. In particular, Arendt used story in contrast to what Disch calls “Archimedean 
philosophizing.” Archimedes recognized that a lever allows our ability to move an object 
to increase the farther we are from the object. Says Disch, “Arendt objects to 
Archimedean philosophizing because it purports to be outside the web of plurality and, as 
such, confuses power with leverage and makes abstraction a condition of reliable 
knowledge.”15 In contrast to the Archimedean ideal, Arendt’s understanding of 
storytelling provides a conception of knowledge that is both situated and critical. Both the 
teller of a story and the audience are closely, even emotionally, involved in the story’s 
plot and characters. At the same time, a story can provide the opportunity for calling into 
question the status quo and the dominant narratives of power. 
Disch is not the only recent thinker who has noticed the importance of story for 
Arendt’s ideas about theory. Lynn Wilkinson has examined Arendt’s admiration for 
author Isak Dinesen with an eye to the relationship between story and theory, pointing 
out that Arendt’s written references to Dinesen suggest “that Arendt viewed storytelling 
as inextricable from theorizing, but that her notion of storytelling was … self-conscious 
…”16 Wilkinson also points to the way that Arendt valued stories that display a certain 
lack of closure,17 and that Arendt viewed the critic’s role as working with stories to bring 
                                                
15 Ibid., 68. 
16 Lynn R. Wilkinson, “Hannah Arendt on Isak Dinesen: Between Storytelling and 
Theory,” Comparative Literature 56, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 97, 
http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/4122287. 
17 Ibid., 85. 
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out their meaning while not suggesting that past and present events are the result of an 
inevitable development.18  
Indeed, in some ways Arendt was a storyteller herself—a critic who recognized 
that form and content are inextricable, that stories have a powerful voice, and that the 
voice of the interpreter must be in tune with the stories under consideration. As Seyla 
Benhabib puts it in a discussion of Arendt and narrative, “The moral resonance of one's 
language does not primarily reside in the explicit value judgments which an author may 
pass on the subject matter; rather such resonance must be an aspect of the narrative itself. 
The language of narration must match the moral quality of the narrated object. Of course, 
such ability to narrate makes the theorist into a storyteller, and it is not the gift of every 
theorist to find the language of the true storyteller.”19 Like Nussbaum, Arendt was very 
much aware that how you say what you say is extremely important. She contended that 
abstract theories always have their beginnings in particular experiences, as Disch notes, 
and that consistency and abstraction are rhetorical effects rather inherent properties of 
rationality.20  
Arendt has brilliantly described impartiality as based not on abstraction but on the 
capacity to imagine oneself in other people’s shoes. Arendt speaks of the possibility of 
impartiality, then, not as an “objective” perspective outside people’s views but as the 
enterprise of taking others’ viewpoints into account. Storytelling is a key method of 
helping people to understand each other’s perspectives. Stories allow us to vicariously 
experience through the characters’ experiences circumstances that do not directly touch 
                                                
18 Ibid., 81. 
19 Seyla Benhabib, “Hannah Arendt and the Redemptive Power of Narrative,” Social 
Research 57, no. 1 (Spring 90): 186, http://simplelink.library.utoronto.ca/url.cfm/287320. 
20 Disch, Limits of Philosophy, 2–3. 
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our own lives. As Nussbaum says, “[W]e have never lived enough. Our experience is, 
without fiction, too confined and too parochial.”21 The more perspectives we take into 
account, the better we are able to assess a situation, since not only are we less likely to be 
missing relevant information, but the practice of walking in others’ shoes equips us for 
right response to whatever problem is afoot. Arendt also used the term “enlarged 
mentality” for this approach. Again, this conception stands in contrast to claims that 
philosophy has a privileged position of disinterested impartiality, and it is also distinct 
from a postmodern emphasis on all stories being merely matters of interpretation. 
Arendt’s view of storytelling allows for real differences and varying viewpoints without 
abandoning the possibility of developing criteria by which to discern better and worse.  
 Nussbaum and Arendt are not alone in their view that storytelling is an important 
part of human life. However, they are exceptional in the holistic clarity they achieve in 
how they understand stories philosophically. Nussbaum’s groundbreaking work in the 
1980s has contributed to a growing interest in some areas of philosophy in the importance 
of narrative for human existence. Philosophers such as Paul Ricoeur, for example, have 
dedicated much of their work to demonstrating the integrality of narrative to human 
understanding. Yet much of the work done in this area drifts away from some of the 
insights that inform Nussbaum’s claims about narrative as a form of moral philosophy 
that adds to our ethical self-understanding in a way that nothing else does. For example, a 
thinker like Kearney, while agreeing with Nussbaum’s sense of where narrative can bring 
us, has a different understanding of what story fundamentally is, which puts his work on 
                                                
21 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 47. 
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a different trajectory.22 Kearney claims that narrative is what provides us with identity 
and concord in the face of postmodern fragmentation, and is indeed what makes us 
human.23 While it is not inaccurate to claim a role for narrative in giving meaning to 
scattered experience, Kearney tends to absolutize this aspect of narrative, and, as I shall 
show, he thereby weakens the possibility of its fulfilling his hopes that story can be a 
salvific bringer of tolerance and understanding. His argument would be stronger if his 
method showed a deeper awareness of the plurality available in storytelling.  
  
Stories as history and fiction 
In his book On Stories: Thinking in Action, Kearney discusses several senses of 
story, which intersect in various ways. In his introductory section on where stories come 
from, Kearney mentions myriad aspects of story and why story is important for human 
                                                
22 Part of the reason that the trajectory of Kearney’s work is different from that of my 
own project and that of most of my other interlocutors is that we express our overall goals 
for philosophy in different terms. While I am focusing on how philosophy and story can 
interact as two distinct voices, Kearney wants to write philosophical stories. Put another 
way, while Kearney seeks to tell a philosophical narrative that will impact ordinary 
thought, I ponder how narrative influences ordinary thought philosophically. I deeply 
appreciate Kearney’s overall goal of getting philosophy and its “others”—such as art, 
religion, and psychoanalysis—to talk to each other (Strangers, Gods and Monsters [New 
York: Routledge, 2003], 7). Likewise, I appreciate Kearney’s emphasis on the 
hermeneutic nature of our interaction with story—in his words, that “storytelling 
invariably involves some kind of hermeneutic interpretation” (Strangers, Gods and 
Monsters, 231). His method of diacritical hermeneutics, which explores the “possibilities 
of intercommunion between distinct but not incomparable selves” with the aim of making 
us more hospitable to others (Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 18) also mirrors my 
emphasis on conversation among unique particulars. However, as I will discuss in the rest 
of this chapter, Kearney’s approach seems to me to be always attempting to weave 
together disparate phenomena into a common story. I, via Arendt’s concept of plurality, 
take that commonality as given, if never entirely conceptualizable. For Kearney, literature 
is always drawn into the philosophical narrative he is constructing, while I approach our 
interaction with literature as a set of irreducible conversations, each potentially having 
philosophical import. 
23 Richard Kearney, On Stories: Thinking in Action (New York: Routledge, 2002), 3–4. 
 62  
life. He states that stories are what make our condition human,24 and that our personal 
stories are the response to the question of who we are.25 He declares that every life 
searches for a narrative to introduce concord, and that stories provide individual and 
communal identity in the face of postmodern fragmentation.26 He waxes lyrical, claiming, 
“Stories were a gift from the gods enabling mortals to fashion the world in their own 
image.”27 He asserts that stories try to give answers to the unanswerable questions of 
life,28 and that even children work out inner confusions through imaginary events in 
fantastical bedtime stories.29 Clearly, for Kearney the role of story is wide-ranging and 
fundamental to human existence. 
 As he moves into a discussion of actual narratives, Kearney distinguishes three 
senses of storytelling: 1) inherited stories, which are “purveyors of tradition and heritage 
or of ideological illusion and cover-up”; 2) stories serving the purpose of creation; that is, 
self-invention; and 3) stories as creative solutions for actual problems, in which fiction 
can be “healing and transformative fantasy.”30 The first sense is one he connects closely 
with primitive and often violent nationalism or religion. The second, somewhat 
overlapping the first, has a psychological overtone and comes to the fore in much of 
Kearney’s discussion of actual narratives. The third appears to be his hope for the future, 
particularly in contrast to the first sense of narrative, which, in Kearney’s view, is the 
cause of much need for healing and transformation. 
                                                
24 Ibid., 3. 
25 Ibid., 4. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 5. 
28 Ibid., 6–7. 
29 Ibid., 7. 
30 Ibid., 29–30. 
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 Apart from these three senses of storytelling, Kearney frames his perspective in 
terms of an overarching distinction between historical and fictional narrative, both of 
which he describes as arising from primordial mythic narrative.31 Although he insists that 
this distinction is of pivotal importance for his discussion, the details of the distinction 
are sometimes difficult to work out. Historical and fictional narrative have in common a 
mimetic function, says Kearney, which he defines as “creative redescription of the world 
such that hidden patterns and hitherto unexplored meanings can unfold.” This is closely 
connected to narrative’s mythic function, which he describes as “transformative plotting 
of scattered events into a new paradigm.” Thus the role of mimesis-mythos that narrative 
assumes offers “a newly imagined way of being in the world” through which we 
experience catharsis.32 The cathartic power of stories, as Kearney recounts, is that they 
transport us to other times and places to allow us to experience what it is like to be in 
someone else’s place through vicarious imagination.33 
 This description is very important for Kearney’s discussion, a large part of which 
centers on narrative remembrance of the Shoah. Stories, says Kearney, “singularise 
suffering against the anonymity of evil” through the key function of empathy, which he 
defines as “a way of identifying with as many fellow humans as possible—actors and 
sufferers alike—in order to participate in a common moral sense.”34 However, after 
introducing the importance of empathy, he identifies what he sees as the central problem 
to be addressed in this approach: the question of “how we can move from micro-
narratives of multiple singular testimony to certain quasi-universal narratives that might 
                                                
31 Ibid., 9. 
32 Ibid., 12. 
33 Ibid., 137. 
34 Ibid., 62–63. 
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be shared by as many people as possible without succumbing to the illusion of some 
absolute scientific consensus.”35 Kearney appears to feel that the disparate particularities 
of multiple narratives must be somehow fused together in order for people to experience 
empathy for each other. One can even see this desire in the way he words his definition of 
empathy as participating in a common moral sense.36 
                                                
35 Ibid., 68. 
36 I suspect that Kearney finds this move necessary because of his understanding of 
philosophy as having the task of uncovering the formative “concepts” (The Wake of 
Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture [London: Routledge, 1994], 14), “archives” 
(Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 6), or “myths” (Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 7) at 
work. Kearney is certainly avoiding a naïve and straightforward attempt to derive 
universal truths from particular instances or to get in touch directly with the formative 
structures that condition our actions. In seeking to avoid this sort of “encyclopedic” 
approach (The Wake of Imagination, 17), Kearney takes a more flexible genealogical 
approach to this uncovering. What is uncovered in this narrative explication is not the 
structures themselves but instead something that gives us a sort of indirect access to 
them—the more narratively conditioned things he calls “concepts,” “archives,” or 
“myths.” Thus, while individual instances remain important for him (in many of his 
philosophical writings, it is precisely through a close reading of several individuals or 
particular stories from several different epochs that Kearney develops his genealogy), 
their importance is not as individuals but as indicators of these formative paradigms. We 
can see this in the way he frames his projects. In The Wake of Imagination, for example, 
Kearney says, “Thus, instead of attempting the encyclopaedic task of providing an 
exhaustive inventory of every formulation of imagination known to Western culture, we 
have chosen the more modest proposal of selecting a sample of thinkers who seem to best 
represent the ‘ideal type’ (Weber) or ‘epistemic structure’ (Foucault) which exemplifies 
the functioning of imagination during a specific epoch” (17–18). In Strangers, Gods and 
Monsters, Kearney describes his task as larger than—but based on—uncovering these 
formative influences, claiming as primary the pursuit of an appropriate philosophical 
response: “My purpose in this book is more than the investigation of certain formative 
archives in the Western genealogy of the stranger. My main task is actually to explore 
possibilities of responding to the problem of the stranger in terms of some kind of 
philosophical understanding” (Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 6). Kearney again goes on 
to emphasize philosophy’s task of telling the story of that which is formative as he calls 
for a new hermeneutic understanding of melancholy: “One of the best ways in which this 
may be done is by looking at the formative myths which epitomize this fundamental 
experience of alienation” (7). In short, Kearney’s intention is neither merely to uncover 
these formative functions nor merely to respond to them, but to do both, creating a 
narrative retelling that both describes and responds to these forces of formation. 
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Through this discussion, Kearney concludes that narrative can either reinvent the 
past or represent it as it really was. Here he gives fiction the role of reinvention, and 
historical testimony the role of telling it like it really was. Distinguishing between the 
two, Kearney attests, is ethically crucial.37 Obviously, when it comes to historical 
testimony, reinvention cannot be the guiding paradigm. 
 Kearney seeks to complexify the distinction between historical testimony and 
reinventing the past through a discussion of how historical communities constitute 
themselves through stories.38 His hope is that recognizing their own narrative character 
will allow communities to reimagine themselves in less violent ways.39 Kearney 
endeavors to bring his discussion back to the ethical tension he described earlier between 
historical and fictional narrative, but his understanding of story displays some 
ambivalence at this point. He calls for a critical dialogue between “history” and “our 
mythological memories” in order to avoid either “capitulating to the blind conformism of 
fact” or “idolising ideological doctrines” that are “sundered from the real.”40 This 
objective makes sense, and yet it is difficult to connect this critical dialogue to the ethical 
tension between “history” and “fiction” Kearney described earlier without giving rise to 
questions about the nature of this distinction. Whether or not the pairs map directly onto 
each other, Kearney’s earlier call for historical narrative to “represent the past as it really 
                                                
37 Kearney, On Stories, 69. 
38 Ibid., 79. 
39 Ibid., 82. Likewise, Kearney says in The Wake of Imagination, “Any project for future 
alternatives to the paralysis of the present needs to remain mindful of the narratives of the 
past.” Kearney sees “ethical imagination” as tasked with mining history for seeds of 
“possibilities now erased from our contemporary consciousness” (394). Although this is 
not necessarily what I see as the primary task of ethical imagination, I strongly agree that 
it is a worthy part of its mandate. 
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was” makes one question his disavowal of stories which cultures tell about themselves as 
“true.” How can one distinguish between authentic historical narrative that conveys the 
“facts” and a culture’s mythological narratives of identity? Surely history is not a-
cultural; and if it is narrated from a cultural background, as it must be, how can it be 
strictly demarcated from cultural ideology? 
 Part of the difficulty may be in Kearney’s wide-ranging use of the word “story” to 
refer to almost anything that is not said directly. In a broad sense, a story is something we 
tell; a story is something we can change. But are our deep cultural roots and inexpressible 
assumptions literally stories? It seems to me that these things can be expressed only if we 
are no longer being driven by them, or if we have undergone profound spiritual 
transformation. Kearney’s identification of traditions and ideologies as “inherited stories” 
recognizes a metaphorical similarity between ideology and narrative, but does not allow 
for the inexpressibility and deep-rootedness of the fundamental assumptions—even 
intuitions—that shape our lives.  
In Lisa Jane Disch’s account of Arendt’s understanding of story, we can see that 
ideology is not simply a story: Stories, in contrast to accounts that pretend neutrality, also 
refrain from giving the appearance of unquestionability and inevitability.41 In this way we 
can see that Kearney must be using “story” as a metaphor for the engrained assumptions 
of tradition and ideology. Since he doesn’t flag his transitions between story simply put 
and “story” used metaphorically, he leaves the reader to imagine that these deep 
assumptions can be changed in the same way that one can retell a story with a different 
ending. Because of the deeply rooted nature of tradition and ideology, however, they 
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cannot be changed so simply. Rather than attempting to see our ideological “narratives” 
as stories that we can retell in different ways, replacing the old story with a new one, 
someone like Disch would more realistically seek to tell other stories along with the 
potentially problematic narratives that arise from assumptions that cannot be easily and 
directly changed. Listening to more stories, I believe, is more likely to call problematic 
ideologies into question than simply treating these ideologies as narratives to retell 
directly. It is not simply that we try to remedy one set of stories with another, but that 
reading the new stories can actually help us go back and hear the old stories in a new way 
and see them in a new light, which also has the potential to inform our ideologies and 
assumptions on a deep level.42  
Indeed, Kearney’s goal comes down to this very power of stories to call each 
other into question, although expressed in different terms: He wants individuals and 
communities to experience the power of empathy through mythic-mimetic catharsis. It 
seems that he hopes his second two senses of story—self-inventive stories and stories as 
creative solutions—will overcome, or possibly transform, the inherited stories that he 
sees as problematic purveyors of violence. In the end, he makes an explicit connection 
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between narrative imagination and ethical sensitivity.43 If we have “narrative sympathy,” 
or the ability to see from another’s point of view, he proclaims, “we cannot kill.”44 
Empathy, for Kearney, remains the crux of story’s ethical impact. 
 
Form and content: Narrative means and ends 
Kearney’s position, then, is not a simple contrast to Arendt’s or Nussbaum’s. Let 
us look more closely at how the themes in these three thinkers’ work relate. Several 
primary themes arise from Arendt’s view of story. One of the most famous is connected 
to her statement in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy that to “think with an 
enlarged mentality means that one trains one’s imagination to go visiting.”45 As we saw 
briefly above, Disch develops this thought in connection with other of Arendt’s published 
and unpublished writings to demonstrate how storytelling for Arendt is a form of critical 
thinking. Disch states that for Arendt, stories activate the imagination and foster publicity 
“in Arendt’s distinctive sense of a decision that is tested against a plurality of divergent 
perspectives that it purports neither to transcend nor to reconcile.”46 Likewise, the 
“visitor” is not requested to assimilate different perspectives, but to converse with them.47 
Stories bring light to versions of the world that transform the way people see,48 
which makes novelists potentially skilled analysts of political phenomena.49 Stories, 
especially stories from the margins, are particularist and challenge claims to universality, 
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says Disch.50 They are “more adequate than arguments to depict the ambiguity of a social 
reality that is never linear but many-sided and multidimensional.”51 Enlarged thought 
depends not on generality, but on specificity and multiplicity of detail.52 
Similarly, but with a focus specifically on the question of how human beings 
should best live their lives, Nussbaum looks to novels for guidance and aid. Key points 
about the novel for Nussbaum, as she declares in Love’s Knowledge, are that they focus 
on our common humanity and are structurally connected to the Aristotelian ethical view 
that she defends.53 Specifically, novels tend to demonstrate the noncommensurability of 
valuable things (i.e., the pervasiveness of conflicting attachments and obligations), the 
priority of perceptions (i.e., the priority of the particular), the ethical value of emotions, 
and the ethical relevance of uncontrolled happenings.54 Also significant is the way that 
novels tend to be open-ended, not presenting an ethical view that is already “cooked.”55 
And especially important for Nussbaum’s perspective is the intimate connection between 
literary form and ethical content.56 
 Although Kearney quotes some of Arendt’s remarks on story with approbation, he 
seems to miss the significance of her emphasis on the impossibility of fully telling our 
own stories. This emphasis can be seen most clearly in her distinction between the “who” 
and the “what” of a person. The who is, so to speak, the mysterious inner kernel of a 
person’s identity, while the what is the more visible “outer shell” of someone's persona. 
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What a person is refers to characteristics he or she shares with others, such as ethnic 
background, economic status, athletic ability, or temperament, for example. Who a person 
is refers to the unique and distinct kernel of identity that makes each person different 
from every other. Arendt suggests that the who remains always hidden from a person’s 
self, and is only revealed through speech and action with other people; she compares this 
who to the Greek daemon who looks over each man’s shoulder from behind and is visible 
only to those he meets.57 For Arendt, story—like almost every other aspect of human 
existence—is primarily a matter of plurality.  
Kearney’s emphasis on narrative identity bypasses the insight that Arendt has so 
lucidly articulated about the way in which who we are, rather than being a story we tell to 
others who ask us, is something we can only know through other people, if at all. In other 
words, for Arendt we are so inextricably in ourselves that we can’t really see ourselves. 
That is something only others can do.58 Thus it makes sense in terms of consciousness for 
her to focus on the outside (even to get in touch with what is within), whereas Kearney 
seems to start with consciousness of the inside, and to be unable to get beyond that, 
perhaps simply because he’s starting in the wrong place. And while Arendt insists that 
even if you can walk in another person’s shoes, they won’t fit you (she says in her 
discussion of enlarged mentality that it “does not consist in an enormously enlarged 
empathy through which one can know what actually goes on in the mind of all others”59), 
Kearney wants to get inside the other’s head, shoes, and skin.60 Although he is a 
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professed admirer of both Arendt and Ricoeur, he cannot seem to find a way past 
“oneself as oneself” and “another as oneself” to “oneself as another.” 
A further significant difference between Kearney’s approach and the approaches 
of both Arendt and Nussbaum arises in the matter of particularity. Kearney, in his 
laudable call for empathy and listening to the specificity of testimony in the face of 
anonymous evil, concludes with his statement of the problem: How can we move from 
these “micro-narratives” to “quasi-universal narratives”? Although careful to avoid 
seeking an “absolute scientific consensus,” Kearney’s desire to move away from the 
particulars to some sort of generality stands in direct contrast to both Arendt’s and 
Nussbaum’s perspectives on this subject. He tends toward drawing things together rather 
than probing differences.  
For Arendt, as we saw briefly through the eyes of Disch, we do not need to try to 
move from the multiply specific to the general—although there is certainly a relationship 
between the two—but to take into account as many perspectives as possible, recognizing 
the always many-sided and multidimensional nature of societal reality. Arendt may be 
looking for reconciliation, but not consensus, even if it is a quasi-universal, non-absolute 
consensus. As philosopher Veronica Vasterling puts it, “A good discussion is less about 
agreement or disagreement than about enlarging one’s perspective. And we are able to 
enlarge our perspective when we understand the point the other is making, whether or not 
we agree. Thus, whether conflictual or consensual, leading to agreement or disagreement, 
the plurality of interpretational perspectives remains.”61  
                                                
61 Veronica Vasterling, “The Hermeneutic Phenomenological Approach to Plurality: 
Arendt, Habermas, and Gadamer,” in Phenomenological Perspectives on Plurality, ed. 
Gert-Jan van der Heiden (Boston: Brill, 2015), 170. 
 72  
Nussbaum is if anything even more clear on this point. Generality for Nussbaum 
is almost always a diminishing of the particular, a sort of “best we can do for now” that 
should always give way to the specific and concrete. This is because in actuality there 
will always be new and unanticipated features to a situation, the relevant features will 
always be context-embedded, and the particular persons and relationships involved will 
always have a special ethical relevance that cannot be determined by what is 
generalizable about the situation.62 The quasi-universal, then, is for Nussbaum simply not 
a useful goal to move toward. 
Perhaps the most significant difference, though, is that of Kearney’s view of form 
and content in comparison to Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s. Kearney ends his discussion 
with a description of the “evaluative charge” of narrative; narrative, he says, “dramatizes 
the moral relationship between certain actions and their consequences.” Narratives show 
approval or disapproval relative to some measure of goodness or justice, and it is up to us 
to choose from the options so proposed.63 This, I think, is a classic version of the view 
that sees stories as vehicles for a message. It seems that for Kearney, stories offer morals, 
and we as the audience can pick and choose to find the morals we take as most appealing 
or convincing. In contrast, the view I see demonstrated in Arendt and Nussbaum sees 
stories as not expressing an explicit moral but still guiding us into living moral lives. 
We can witness Kearney’s insistence on the separation of a story and its moral 
even more clearly in his recent interview with The Other Journal. In a discussion about 
evil, ethics, and imagination, Kearney repeatedly makes the claim that stories, as well as 
other human artifacts, are only ethically significant when we apply them to life. He says, 
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for example, “if art is misused, as it can be—and this is equally true of virtual 
technology—and if that misuse actually has a murderous impact on people’s lives, one 
has to question the ways in which we adjudicate the passage from art to life, not 
necessarily the original work of art. Imagination, or art that’s produced from the 
imagination, is neither good nor bad, but interpretation makes it so; and for a book like 
Ulysses, the interpreter is the reader, who after reading the book applies it to his or her 
life.”64  
Because form and content—the story’s form and the use or effect of the story—
appear to be separable for Kearney, an author can embed a moral into the story that is not 
imbibed with the story, so to speak. The story itself is distinct from the purpose we have 
for it. For Nussbaum, on the other hand, the very form is part of the meaning, and so the 
good that comes from reading the story comes in the reading itself, not simply outside or 
after it. Ursula K. Le Guin, herself the author of some very good novels, puts it like this: 
When we’re done reading, “we may find—if it’s a good novel—that we’re a bit different 
from what we were before we read it, that we have been changed a little, as if by having 
met a new face, crossed a street we never crossed before. But it’s very hard to say just 
what we learned, how we were changed.”65 
In the end, the “enlarged mentality,” or as Arendt also puts it, “going visiting” 
that storytelling makes available is similar to Kearney’s goal of using narrative to 
increase empathy and ethical imagination. Kearney’s fundamental understanding of story 
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as a way to bring meaning to disparate events and define one’s own and one’s communal 
identity, however, is on a different trajectory from his target. A tool that is meant 
primarily to bind the disparate events of our lives into a consistent whole is unlikely to be 
a good way, much less the best way, to break open old habits and ways of being to usher 
in newness. Looking to story’s potential for marginal criticism, which takes its strength 
from its very diversity, provides stronger resources for moving against societal injustice 
than looking to story as a tool for bringing order to fragmented experience. In this way, 
story becomes not merely a device for getting across a message of tolerance, but by its 
very form calls people to walk in each other’s shoes. 
Kearney is in quest for enlarged mentality à la Arendt, but Arendt would consider 
nonsensical his psychological understanding of the way this should work. He wants story 
to provide moral guidance just as Nussbaum does, but he separates the moral from the 
story in a way that Nussbaum considers ineffective and inaccurate. He wants to pay 
attention to specific testimonies as both Arendt and Nussbaum do, but believes these 
cannot be widely shared without generalization, a move both Arendt and Nussbaum 
renounce. The difficulty is not that Kearney’s project is different from Arendt’s and 
Nussbaum’s. Rather, the problem is that his goals are very similar to theirs but the way he 
tries to get to them is not, and I am doubtful of the ability of his process to actually lead 
to his goals. Although I too share many of Kearney’s concerns and goals, I believe the 
comparison between his approach and those of Arendt and Nussbaum demonstrates the 
critical importance for philosophical fiction of the relationship between form and content, 
as well as the key role of particularity. Likewise, this discussion has pointed to the danger 
of seeking for even quasi-universal consensus rather than inclusive conversation in 
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response to questions about ethical interaction with fiction and the ethical insight that 
fiction has to offer. 
 
Plurality and/or particularity? 
 In arguing that Kearney’s approach undermines his goals, I have set him in 
contrast to Nussbaum and Arendt as if they were in complete agreement with each other. 
I summarized above how their approaches to story are both attuned to some of the same 
important themes, but in another respect they have decidedly different emphases. When 
we consider Nussbaum’s focus on particularity and Arendt’s concern for plurality, it may 
seem that there is actually a significant abyss in their common ground. In order to make 
clear how their approaches relate to each other, I summarize the importance of plurality 
for Arendt’s thought and the importance of particularity for Nussbaum. I then compare 
Arendt and Nussbaum, showing that they are both addressing a potential tension between 
particularity and plurality. I go on to discuss how particularity and plurality come 
together differently for the two thinkers largely due to their differing approaches to 
compassion, love, and morality, and in the end, how Arendt’s and Nussbaum’s 
approaches and views on the role of stories might complement each other. 
 Plurality is a guiding theme for Arendt’s thought; she sees it as one of the 
conditions of human life. She enumerates the conditions of human existence as “life 
itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and the earth.”66 Arendt tends to 
speak of the human condition rather than human nature, suggesting that the question of 
human nature is an unanswerable one both psychologically and philosophically, since it 
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would require us to speak about who we are as if it were a what.67 Even the conditions of 
human existence cannot “‘explain’ what we are or answer the question of who we are for 
the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely.”68 This sums up some of the 
basic themes at the background of Arendt’s work: the plural and limited nature of the 
human realm, which yet remains unbounded because of the constant insertion of the new 
into the framework of human institutions.69 
 Plurality is also constitutive for the human mind for Arendt, and particularly for 
the faculty of judgment. Judgment is a term that in this context is closely linked to the 
moral and ethical attunement that I am suggesting storytelling can help develop. 
According to Arendt, human beings are interdependent in their needs and cares, but also 
in their minds.70 Judgment, remarks Arendt, always reflects upon others and takes their 
possible judgments into account.71 Arendt’s understanding of judgment is closely linked 
to her view of impartiality, which, she says, “is obtained by taking the viewpoints of 
others into account; impartiality is not the result of some higher standpoint that would 
then actually settle the dispute by being altogether above the melée.”72 Impartiality, or 
enlarged thought, provides the best basis for principled judgment. The relation of 
plurality to thought in general is somewhat more complex. In various writings Arendt 
refers to the necessity of withdrawal and solitude for thought, and yet the withdrawal is 
not exactly complete, for we can never really withdraw from the web of human affairs. If 
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anything, even in solitude thought demonstrates a form of plurality, for Arendt often 
describes it as an inner dialogue with oneself. 
 For Nussbaum, particularity is the guiding theme. This means that she resists 
summing up the full human life, wanting to be flexible and inclusive, and to let people 
think through and decide for themselves what is most important and deepest in their lives. 
The closest she comes to summing up is her description of the Aristotelian ethical 
position, which she finds the most convincing and generally applicable view of what is 
important in human life. The basic emphases in the Aristotelian view according to 
Nussbaum are, again: the noncommensurability of valuable things, meaning that there is 
no single metric, nor even a small number of metrics, by which the claims of different 
good things can be meaningfully compared; the priority of perception and the particular, 
meaning that moralities based on general rules are ethically crude; the ethical value of 
emotions, meaning that emotions are frequently more reliable and less deceptively 
seductive than intellectual calculations; and the ethical relevance of uncontrolled 
happenings, meaning that a correct understanding of the ways in which human 
aspirations to live well can be checked by uncontrolled events is not a deception but an 
important part of ethical understanding, contra Plato.73 Like Arendt, Nussbaum has a 
sense of both limitedness and limitlessness in human existence, but for Nussbaum the 
limitlessness has more to do with the human quest for excellence, rather than the fact of 
natality: “human striving for excellence involves pushing, in many ways, against the 
limits that constrain human life.”74 But the strongest themes we see in Nussbaum’s 
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writing again and again are the priority of the particular and the importance of emotions 
for thought and judgment. 
 The priority of the particular for judgment comes up in Arendt’s take on the 
matter as well. Following Kant, she describes judgment as “the faculty of thinking the 
particular,” but since thinking for Arendt does involve generalization, judgment is “the 
faculty of mysteriously combining the particular and the general.”75 The best solution for 
this for Arendt is through the exemplar. In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy 
she first describes this as thinking of the best possible example of something to which we 
compare particular examples, which sounds rather different from Nussbaum’s insistence 
on remaining with particulars. But then Arendt goes on to say, “This exemplar is and 
remains a particular that in its very particularity reveals the generality that otherwise 
could not be defined. Courage is like Achilles. Etc.”76 This description sounds much more 
like what Nussbaum is talking about, especially when we notice that Arendt sums up by 
pointing to a story. 
 In Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum sums up her emphasis on compassionate 
attention to the particular in a phrase from Henry James: “finely aware and richly 
responsible.” Drawing from James’s novels, it is Nussbaum’s contention that cutting 
oneself off from emotion and from particular people and situations leads to the possibility 
of terrible acts. Says Nussbaum, “Vividness leads to tenderness, imagination to 
compassion.”77 Compassion is for Nussbaum of political importance. The person who 
goes by the general is the one we should worry about, while the person who truly (and 
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thus compassionately) perceives the particular “will be most deeply and firmly bound to 
human values in choosing political action.”78 
 Nussbaum discusses compassion’s role in public life at length in her book 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions. Situating her discussion on the 
basis of her understanding of compassion’s cognitive structure, as well as on the history 
of the philosophical debate about whether compassion and reason are compatible, she 
asks, “Given that there is reason to think that compassion gives public morality essential 
elements of ethical vision without which any public culture is dangerously rootless and 
hollow, how can we make this compassion do the best work it can in connection with 
liberal and democratic institutions?”79 Seeking to answer her own question, her ideal is 
for laws, institutions, and basic political principles to be designed on the basis of 
compassionate imagination. 
 Again, at first glance this perspective appears in direct opposition to that of 
Arendt, who thinks compassion is apolitical. Arendt discusses compassion in On 
Revolution, where she describes its strength as hinged on the strength of passion, which 
“can comprehend only the particular, but has no notion of the general and no capacity for 
generalization.”80 Compassion is not felt in response to a class or group of people, but to 
the suffering of one person. Like Nussbaum, Arendt sees compassion as directed toward 
the particular. Unlike Nussbaum, however, this characteristic makes compassion for 
Arendt a non-political experience. Arendt says that compassion abolishes the space of the 
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political, and its tendency to be able to only stammer and gesture makes it inappropriate 
to the political speech of persuasion, negotiation, and compromise.81 
 Arendt goes on to develop a distinction between compassion and pity. Pity is a 
perversion of compassion, a sentimentalized compassion, a “talkative compassion.” The 
alternative to pity, says Arendt, is solidarity.82 Here we can see that Arendt’s dramatic 
language of compassion as “irrelevant” to political affairs is only the beginning of the 
matter. The fruits of particular compassion, either pity or solidarity, are both able to reach 
the many. Pity can do this because it keeps a sentimental distance from suffering, but 
pity—which has, says Arendt, more capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself—looks with 
an unequal eye on fortune and misfortune, and indeed glorifies the misfortune upon 
which it is based. Solidarity, on the other hand, while aroused by suffering, is not guided 
by it and can look evenly at the strong and rich as well as the weak and poor. We are 
reminded here of Arendt’s view of impartiality, which seeks to take all relevant 
viewpoints into account. Compassion is the passion that gives rise to either pity—a 
sentiment; or solidarity—a principle.83  
 Interestingly, Nussbaum chooses to avoid using the word “pity” because of some 
of the very connotations that Arendt discusses. She briefly mentions these “nuances of 
condescension and superiority to the sufferer” as a recent development; while admitting 
that there may be more than a terminological difference going on, she chooses to focus on 
“compassion,” which she considers to be synonymous with pity “in its older use” as 
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“associated with the undeserved character of misfortune, and thence with potential issues 
of justice.”84 
Despite the difference in the language and structure of their arguments, then, 
Arendt and Nussbaum may be closer than it first appears. Indeed, the main issue that 
Arendt has with the movement from compassion to pity is pity’s unboundedness; it 
becomes disconnected from the particular persons that gave rise to it in the first place.85 
And it is especially notable that Arendt develops her discussion on the subject via 
philosophical commentary on novels by Melville and Dostoyevsky. It is intriguing to see 
how Arendt seems to have turned instinctively to fiction for the sort of insight for which 
Nussbaum was later to make a theoretical case. 
 Despite Arendt’s repudiation of pity, however, it remains the case that in order for 
a political space to open we must move from the intense involvement of compassion to 
the thinking generality of solidarity. Somehow we must find a balance between the 
goodness of compassion and the necessity of political interaction. So seemingly we still 
find a contrast between Arendt and Nussbaum here. When we take a closer look at 
Nussbaum, however, we find that she has a similar tension in her own thought. Along 
with compassion, the other emotion Nussbaum focuses on is love. Arendt makes the 
connection between compassion and love, pointing out that they both abolish the in-
between of plural human interaction.86 Nussbaum describes this same tension in terms of 
the intensity of romantic and/or erotic love, and the plural outlook of morality.87 Actually, 
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as Nussbaum herself is aware, she is somewhat conflicted on the matter, and has 
defended different positions at different points in her writing. 
 Nussbaum has in fact described three distinct responses to the question of how 
love and morality relate. In the first, she defends the Aristotelian ethical position as 
inclusive enough to include every aspect of the good life, including love. She emphasizes 
the question of how to balance all the elements of a good life. Even though some 
potential effects of love, such as jealousy and the desire for revenge, might be immoral in 
a narrower sense, as long as we retain a larger perspective on what we lose through love’s 
partiality, we remain within the Aristotelian ethical position. In the second of 
Nussbaum’s positions, she sees the relationship between love and morality as a deep and 
pervasive tension. The exclusivity of romantic love is a problem for the Aristotelian 
ethical position, which emphasizes “wide and inclusive attention and the public giving of 
reasons.”88 Thus love, while an important part of the full human life, would have to be 
considered morally subversive.89 The third view that Nussbaum has defended has its 
roots in her reading of David Copperfield. In this view love and morality support and 
inform each other, and each is less than complete without the other.90 Nussbaum expands 
this third position in Upheavals of Thought, in which she sets what she describes as the 
“ascent tradition” (discussed via Plato, Augustine, Dante, Brönte, Mahler, and 
Whitman—although these last two she sees as making praiseworthy efforts towards 
appreciation of bodily reality) against the “transfiguration of everyday life” (exemplified 
by Joyce’s Ulysses). The burden of her argument is “that the root of hatred is not erotic 
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need, as much of the ascent tradition repeatedly argues. It is, rather, the refusal to accept 
erotic neediness and unpredictability as a fact of human life. Saying yes to sexuality is 
saying yes to all in life that defies control—to passivity and surprise, to being one part of 
a very chancy world.”91 Nussbaum suggests that this makes novel-reading if anything 
more important. She gives the novel the task of “constituting its readers as moral 
subjects, according to this new and broader conception of morality. Only now, instead of 
surrendering romantic fantasy before the judgment of judicious perception, instead of 
dispelling the shadowy world by calling in the daylight of judicious spectatorship, the 
reader is encouraged to bring that fantasy and mysterious excitement into the world of 
reality, and to use the energy of fantasy toward a just and generous vision.”92 
 Having read Nussbaum’s essays defending each of these three positions, I find the 
second most convincingly argued. The first, suggesting that some immorality may have a 
place in overall virtue, is singularly implausible, especially in terms of Nussbaum’s 
emphasis on particularity. To drown particular wrongdoing in the soup of the full human 
life belies her belief in the unabating primacy of the particular. The third view is rooted in 
a reading of David Copperfield which is distorted by Nussbaum’s refusal of any form of 
Christian transcendence. This leads her to represent Agnes, David’s “good angel,” as an 
ambivalent death-dealer who symbolizes “cessation of generous outward movement.”93 
Because Steerforth, David’s “bad angel,” is in so many ways contrasted to Agnes, he 
becomes representative of the mobile and volatile morality of Nussbaum’s new view.94 I 
find this reading seriously problematic on various levels, not least of which is the 
                                                
91 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 709. 
92 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 363. 
93 Ibid., 359. 
94 Ibid., 363. 
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identification of wealthy, entitled Steerforth as a symbol of goodness. In any case, neither 
of these views in the end seems to me to vanquish the tension in Nussbaum’s perspective 
between love’s exclusivity and the inclusivity of morality as expressed in the second 
view; both are merely finding a productive tension there instead of a subversive one. 
 This tension echoes the balance in Arendt’s thought between the exclusive 
particularity of compassion and the public nature of political interaction. For Nussbaum, I 
suggest that this tension is based on an inaccurate view of romantic love. The blindness 
and exclusivity she sees in love is based on a model which positions the lovers as facing 
each other and ignoring everything around them. I would suggest that a better and more 
accurate model would position the lovers next to each other, facing the world around 
them—or better, walking through it—hand-in-hand. From this perspective, love actually 
brings about the possibility of broadening the lovers’ perspectives and giving them more 
resources to respond ethically to the world around them. Likewise, Arendt finds a way to 
navigate beyond the tension between attention to particular loved ones and public 
morality through the movement from compassion to solidarity. In this way particularity 
and plurality come together productively. 
 If we look again at how Nussbaum and Arendt see the world, we may see an 
indication of how Arendt is able to make this move to solidarity, while Nussbaum tends 
to remain in tension. As I noted above, Nussbaum sees human striving for excellence as 
involving the need to push against the limits of human life. The possibility of a better (or 
at least different) future is tied to an assault on constraints. For Arendt, in contrast, new 
possibilities are inherent in the human condition, since, though limited, we are 
conditioned by the fact of natality. Newness, though ever unpredictable, always breaks 
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into the human framework. We can relate this also to love between particular people, 
which if directed exclusively inward toward each other as Nussbaum too often assumes, 
takes for granted that nothing will change in the relationship or the parties involved. Yet 
surely love involves and brings about newness. 
 We can see, in fact, by the movements in Nussbaum’s view of the relationship 
between love and morality that she also is not at a standstill, and is involved in and 
committed to change—and perhaps also newness. Indeed, Nussbaum has continued to 
address the connection between the particular and general in an attempt to find a way to 
speak convincingly of inclusive altruism. I suspect that her emphasis on erotic love, 
however, has held her back from a thoroughgoing recognition of plurality. Nussbaum 
continues to view love primarily in erotic terms. Although in her most recent book, 
Political Emotions, she discusses various models for patriotism as a form of love, ranging 
from love of a sports team to love of family members, she most strongly associates 
patriotism with erotic love as being the most particularistic (apparently leaving behind 
sports teams for the moment): “In all its forms, however, patriotic love is particularistic. 
It is modeled on family or personal love of some type, and, in keeping with that origin or 
analogy, it focuses on specifics ….” She goes on in the next paragraph to casually 
reassert her understanding of love focused on specifics as erotic with the phrase “The 
very particularity and eroticism of patriotic love ….”95 Yet it is clear that she wants to 
include more varieties of love in her understanding. In the final chapter of Political 
Emotions, she affirms that political love should be polymorphous, although with common 
features: “a concern for the beloved as an end rather than a mere instrument; respect for 
                                                
95 Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap, 2013), 208–9. 
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the human dignity of the beloved; a willingness to limit one’s own greedy desires in favor 
of the beloved.”96  
Despite this movement toward understanding particularity within the context of 
plurality, however, the tension between love’s exclusivity and the inclusivity of morality 
has remained part of Nussbaum’s framework. Summing up in the final chapter of 
Political Emotions, she says, “we have grappled with the problem that any appeal to love 
in the context of politics makes vivid: how to balance love’s inherent particularism and 
partiality with the need to create and sustain policies that are fair to all.”97 Interestingly, 
she sees art as a kind of “bridge” to help us navigate between particularity and altruism, 
although she is less focused on novels in Political Emotions.98 As her thought continues 
to develop, it may be that her attention to the particulars of love may move her further in 
the direction of an understanding of love which opens the way to plurality. For Arendt, at 
least, an acceptance of plurality includes an appreciation of uniqueness, newness, 
unexpectedness, and even incommensurability. Plurality, and with it, natality, provides a 
necessary framework for Nussbaum’s Aristotelian ethical conception. In the end, perhaps 
plurality is a better framework for appreciating the contribution of the particular than a 
straightforward focus on the particular.  
I suggest that philosophical fiction—fiction that invites philosophical response or 
is experienced philosophically—is an archetype of the complementarity between plurality 
and particularity. Stories, especially thoughtful, thought-provoking stories, provide a 
                                                
96 Ibid., 382. 
97 Ibid., 385–86. 
98 Ibid., 387. 
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plurality of particular voices, made available to a plurality of particular interpretations.99 
In ongoing conversation with stories, each other, and ourselves we may dare to hope that 
our philosophies, too, will be opened anew to answering the question “How should we 
live?” in ways that are attuned to the plurality of particulars that makes up our lives.100 It 
is through the ethical insight and enlarged mentality gained through interaction with 
particular stories, then, that both lived and academic philosophy can seek to better answer 
fundamental ethical questions in a way that avoids reducing the plurality of human life to 
pseudo-individual or pseudo-universal claims.101 
 As I have shown in this chapter, the impulse to seek ethical or interpretive 
consensus, on the other hand, encourages a view of philosophical fiction that separates 
form and content, extracting a generalized “essence of story” out of the stories’ particular 
contexts. Correlatively, if one does not separate form and content, one has to learn in and 
from the particulars in their varied contexts, encouraging interaction with a true plurality 
                                                
99 Interestingly, although Ricoeur shows himself to be puzzled by Arendt’s concept of 
natality, he recognizes the significant connection between plurality and storytelling, as 
well as the way in which plurality offers a context for particularity: “It is only jointly that 
the disclosure of the who and the web of human relationships engenders a process from 
which the unique life story of any newcomer may emerge” (Paul Ricoeur, “Action, Story 
and History: On Re-reading The Human Condition, Salmagundi 60 [Spring-Summer 
1983], 67). 
100 For further discussion of the intrinsic plurality of human life and its implications for 
fiction and philosophy (and vice versa), see Chapter 5. 
101 Ricoeur describes the imaginative possibilities inherent in the interpretation of a text 
as “a distanciation of the real from itself.” He describes these possibilities (in somewhat 
more expansive terms than I am willing to do) as follows: “Through fiction and poetry, 
new possibilities of being-in-the-world are opened up within everyday reality. Fiction and 
poetry intend being, not under the modality of being-given, but under the modality of 
power-to-be. Everyday reality is thereby metamorphosed by what could be called the 
imaginative variations that literature carries out on the real” (Paul Ricoeur, “The 
Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” in From Text to Action: Essays in 
Hermenutics, II, trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson [Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press], 86). I am focusing specifically on the ethical possibilities 
in this sort of imaginative variation. 
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of perspectives. If we accept the inseparability of form and content in well-written 
philosophical fiction, what we learn from a story can never be held apart from a story; 
fiction cannot be truly philosophical without remaining fiction. 
 Le Guin, in an essay on the contemporary relevance of fantasy and young adult 
literature, sums up this inseparability out of her own experience as a writer: 
Story tells human truth, serving human community and spiritual longing. And the 
stories that call most on the imagination work on a deep level of the mind, 
beneath reason (therefore incomprehensible to rationalists), using symbol as 
poetry does to express what can’t be said directly, using imagery to express what 
can’t be perceived directly—using indirection to indicate the truthward direction. 
 And here myth and imaginative fiction run a risk; all fiction does, but it’s 
particularly destructive to fantasy: the risk of being rationalised—interpreted, 
reduced to allegory, read as a message. 
 Such reduction is a nefarious act.102 
 
And yet the impulse to extract and generalize the moral of the story comes from a 
laudable and necessary desire to find sharable criteria in order to find our way to a mutual 
sense of normativity. Somehow, if an author like Le Guin is indeed right, such works of 
the imagination must disclose an awareness of right action that goes beyond the notion of 
pseudo-universal criteria—but without going beyond what is sharable. But how exactly 
that is possible is material for another chapter. 
                                                
102 Ursula K. Le Guin, “The Young Adult in the YA,” in Cheek by Jowl: Talks and 
Essays on How and Why Fantasy Matters (Seattle: Aqueduct Press, 2009), 119. 
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4. Hermeneutical Situation 
I made the case in the previous chapter that (some) fiction can be understood as a 
kind of philosophy, informing people’s lived philosophies and appropriately contributing 
to academic philosophy as well. Martha C. Nussbaum has explicitly articulated an 
important role for philosophical fiction, and the modern realistic novel in particular, for 
ethical development. Hannah Arendt has written a little and implied much about the role 
of telling stories (not necessarily only fictional) in enlarging our perspectives to allow for 
more just and impartial interaction with those around us, perhaps particularly in terms of 
activity that could be broadly called political. These expectations—the ethical insight and 
enlarged mentality that can be gained through interaction with stories—are two 
contributions of storytelling to lived philosophy upon which I focused in the previous 
chapter.  
Both of these contributions, however, focus on the “impact” of storytelling on the 
individual, which may seem to imply a directly causal connection between storytelling 
and lived philosophy. In contrast, Lambert Zuidervaart argues in Artistic Truth that art, 
including literature, is thoroughly hermeneutical. This means that a causal model is not 
capable of successfully framing the relationship between fiction and lived philosophy. 
When we ask how reading books can contribute to our responses to the question “How 
should we live?” we often tend to use language that seems to imply direct cause and 
effect. We say things like, “Reading Many Dimensions by Charles Williams totally 
changed the way I pray.” Or, “I read Lucy Cullyford Babbitt’s The Oval Amulet as a 
teenager, and from then on was convinced that men and women should have equal social 
and political power.” While it is true in one sense that a book can act as a cause leading to 
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an ethical effect in the reader, we can see that a simple causal model is not sufficient 
when we stop to realize that although these books may have informed my life in these 
ways, they cannot be expected to always do the same for others. Every reader’s life 
context and interpretive framework is different, and how we understand the interaction 
between fiction and lived philosophy, in particular, must take into account the fact that 
each reader will therefore read and respond to a book differently. 
A causal model assumes a relatively unilateral, unidirectional, one-dimensional—
even static—relationship between book and reader. In contrast, a hermeneutical model 
emphasizes interaction, reciprocal response, and mutual enrichment. An artwork, such as 
a novel, is not simply an object that affects a subject unilaterally, like an ice cube on your 
skin makes you shiver.1 Rather, it is a voice that speaks and needs to be heard and 
interpreted. Art presents itself in a dynamic, multi-layered way, both suggesting and 
requiring interpretation. 
With this in mind, I examine in this chapter ways in which philosophical fiction 
as an art form contributes to people’s lived philosophies—always by way of 
interpretation—and how it is unique from other art forms. By addressing these issues in 
terms of Zuidervaart’s high-level analysis of the arts’ webs of connection, I hope to 
broaden our sense of story’s contribution, situate it among the many influences at work in 
society, and emphasize the importance of a model that can successfully interpret the 
relationship between story and philosophy. I begin with a discussion of Zuidervaart’s 
conception of imaginative disclosure, showing how this idea provides an important 
setting for art’s contribution to lived philosophy. I examine Zuidervaart’s ideas in some 
                                                
1 I am grateful to John Van Dyk for this metaphor. 
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detail, since they provide a key theoretical framework for the normative interaction 
between philosophical fiction as an art form and lived philosophy at the communal, 
cultural level.  
I then address Nussbaum’s perspective on ethical normativity, placing it in the 
context of Zuidervaart’s hermeneutical model. Nussbaum’s perspective places a 
normative call on academic philosophy as well as addressing fiction’s import for lived 
philosophy at both individual and societal levels. Her emphasis on a revisable, immanent 
normativity places limits on general moral rules, showing that general rules are less able 
to respond to truly universal norms, however we articulate these, than a responsiveness to 
particulars is. By bringing her thoughts on normativity into conversation with Arendt and 
Zuidervaart on ethical responsibility in art and in society, I seek to further elucidate the 
need for a hermeneutical model for the way we interact with the fact of plurality, 
including the plurality available in fiction.  
Finally, I move to a consideration of specific ways in which art, and especially 
philosophical fiction, interacts with lived philosophy in the movement toward the ethical 
and political contribution Nussbaum, Arendt, and Zuidervaart have emphasized. I also 
look at what in their ideas is common to both philosophical fiction and other art forms 
and take note of what makes fiction, and particularly young adult literature, unique 
among art forms in its potential to inform lived philosophy. This sets the stage for the 
following chapter’s discussion of a noncausal model that makes for good reading—both 
in terms of what makes books good and in terms of the good they offer us. 
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Imaginative disclosure 
Lambert Zuidervaart brings together imaginative insight in art and life-giving 
disclosure as a “process of truth” to form the concept of “imaginative disclosure,” 
demonstrating that both the imaginative and disclosive aspects are necessary in order to 
avoid either making art seem irrelevant or frivolous, or expecting it to have a direct effect 
on people that ignores its imaginative character.2 Before we get into the details of 
Zuidervaart’s conception, let us briefly consider the term “imaginative disclosure” itself. 
Disclosure has to do with a revealing of something, so art that is imaginatively disclosive 
will in some way have something to share. But this disclosure is not aggressive or 
mechanical; it is imaginative. There is a sense of creativity and innovation, but in a way 
that is both organic and somehow reaching through and beyond everyday existence. 
Zuidervaart differentiates imaginative disclosure into three concepts: “mediated 
expression,” which has to do with the context in which art is produced; “interpretable 
presentation,” which has to do with the context in which art is used; and “configured 
import,” which has to do with the internal demands of the art itself.3 Mediated expression 
and interpretable presentation help us gain cultural orientation; configured import helps 
to open us to possibilities beyond our current personal and social existences.4 All three of 
these terms point to the thoroughly hermeneutical nature of art and our interaction with 
art—it is mediated, interpretable, and configured. According to Zuidervaart, art that is 
imaginatively disclosive in each of these ways will demonstrate authenticity, 
significance, and integrity. Art will be true with respect to the artist’s intentions 
                                                
2 Lambert Zuidervaart, Artistic Truth: Aesthetics, Discourse, and Imaginative Disclosure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 126. 
3 Ibid., 127. 
4 Ibid., 133. 
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(“authenticity”), true with respect to the audience’s interpretive needs (“significance”), 
and true with respect to the artwork’s internal demands (“integrity”).5 
In regard to authenticity, Zuidervaart points out, we expect art to arise from the 
artist’s own experience or vision, no matter how obscure this might be and whether or not 
we agree on what is worth disclosing.6 In regard to significance, we expect art to be 
worthwhile for one reason or another; Zuidervaart points out that “art serves to bring to 
our attention interpretive needs that might otherwise remain hidden.”7 If it were not 
significant, art could not interact effectively with lived philosophy as it so often does. 
Lived philosophy orients what we want and what we expect; art that is significant can 
give us what we want in ways we don’t expect, leading us to reinterpret our desires and 
expectations. A person’s lived philosophy is not a single, coherent whole; some aspect of 
an artwork may draw a person in, while other aspects may initially feel foreign or 
puzzling. Often a person reads a novel or looks at a work of visual art and is 
unexpectedly moved, saying, “I would not have thought I would like that, but it really 
opened my eyes to ….” Notably, in his discussion of significance Zuidervaart indicates 
the way in which reflexivity is built into art interpretation, so that we simultaneously 
interpret art and our need for what art may offer. This encourages political, moral, and 
religious interpretations—at least, ones that are open to art challenging their self-
interpretations. On the other hand, straightforward readings of some kind of “message” 
tend to backfire, says Zuidervaart.8 
                                                
5 Ibid., 127. 
6 Ibid., 128. 
7 Ibid., 129. 
8 Ibid., 128–29. 
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The matter of integrity is a little more complicated, having to do with the way that 
artworks, as a peculiarly “doubled” kind of aesthetic sign, present themselves in 
presenting something else, and present something else in presenting themselves. For an 
artwork’s import to be true, says Zuidervaart, “the artwork must live up to its own 
internal demands, one of which usually is that it live up to more than its own internal 
demands.”9 This tripartite conception of imaginative disclosure as demonstrating 
authenticity, significance, and integrity is closely linked to artists’ social responsibility, 
Zuidervaart points out in Art in Public, the companion volume to Artistic Truth.10 
Describing social responsibility in contemporary societies as entailing emphases on 
community, collaboration, and commitment, he calls artists to “take on the tasks of 
educator, community builder, and social healer” through “a vision of what needs to be 
learned, where a community is fragile, and how suffering and oppression must be 
countered.”11 With this vision in mind, complementary relationships between both artists’ 
and audiences’ authenticity and social responsibility provide the “normative contours” for 
art in public.12 Many institutions and communities will need to contribute, says 
Zuidervaart, in order to move toward a society in which artists can freely, responsibly, 
and authentically practice imaginative disclosure and social responsibility.13 
Zuidervaart therefore also calls for a culture of dialogue between art and societal 
institutions, in which institutions help to create space for art to contribute to larger 
societal ethics. Ethical art and ethical societies are part of a mutual conversation, and both 
                                                
9 Ibid., 130. 
10 Lambert Zuidervaart, Art in Public: Politics, Economics, and a Democratic Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 259. 
11 Ibid., 258. 
12 Ibid., 263. 
13 Ibid., 266. 
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sides of this conversation are vital: “Properly ethical conduct within the arts requires a 
space for critical and creative dialogue: such dialogue lies at the center of art-ethical 
conduct. Moreover, to contribute to ethical interactions in other domains, whether in 
pursuit of political justice or economic stewardship or social solidarity, the arts need to be 
a vital societal site for imaginative disclosure.”14 
Zuidervaart’s depiction of imagination, which forms part of the basis for his 
discussion of imaginative disclosure, also demands that the integral connection between 
art and the rest of life be taken seriously and that art be recognized as the occasion and 
result of interpretation. Zuidervaart understands imagination to refer to an intersubjective 
process that has three dimensions: exploration, creative interpretation, and presentation. 
Exploration indicates open-ended inquiry; creative interpretation opens up the possibility 
of multiple layers of meaning beyond conventional understandings; and presentation 
provides for the sharing of complex nuances of meaning.15  
Each of these surpasses the standard Western dialectics of play/work, 
entertainment/instruction, and expression/communication, respectively. In each case, 
Zuidervaart’s formulation of the three central aesthetic processes cannot be captured by 
these standard dialectics that go both too far and not far enough. In the play/work 
dialectic, exploration is at risk of either leaving everything outside of art untouched or 
fancying that the rest of life can do without art.16 This calls for a critique of the 
conventional distinction between entertainment and instruction, which needs the 
                                                
14 Lambert Zuidervaart, “Creating a Disturbance: Art, Social Ethics, and Relational 
Autonomy,” The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory 90 (2015): 12. 
15 Zuidervaart, Artistic Truth, 57–61. 
16 Ibid., 58. 
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expansion and interruption brought about by creative interpretation.17 Likewise, 
presentation makes available nuances of meaning “in ways that either exceed or precede 
both idiosyncratic expressions of intent and conventional communications of content.”18 
In contrast to the divisions of the standard dialectics, Zuidervaart seeks to show that 
exploration, creative interpretation, and presentation are essential to human flourishing 
and cannot be merely limited to art. 
In response to the dimensions of artistic truth that we have just taken note of, 
Zuidervaart develops the notion of cultural orientation; that is, “how individuals, 
communities, and organizations find their direction both within and by way of culture.”19 
He works out this concept via three sorts of “worlds” through which we seek cultural 
orientation. The personal world, that of unique individuals, relates to our expectation of 
authenticity, which assumes sufficient similarity between the artist’s world and our own 
that we can learn from his or her experience and vision even while always needing in the 
end to find our own way. The intersubjective or social world of interpersonal relations 
relates to our expectation of significance, which assumes the ability of art to illuminate 
and even transform our shared interpretive needs. The postsubjective world, “of what 
neither is nor is not the case,” relates to our expectation of integrity, in which we open 
ourselves to a world that is more than that of the artist or interpreter. Here again the 
“doubling” of import in artworks (in which they present something else in presenting 
themselves, and present themselves in presenting something else) makes them a special 
                                                
17 Ibid., 59. 
18 Ibid., 60. 
19 Ibid., 132. 
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case of art phenomena in terms of their truth potential, since an artwork that shows 
integrity always addresses and potentially impacts our personal and social worlds.20  
These “worlds” are not simply abstract constructions, but a description of ways 
we interact with our contexts and ourselves. In Art in Public, Zuidervaart discusses in 
more detail the significance of imaginative disclosure for the way art relates to other parts 
of life. He says, “Because the arts are societal sites for imaginative disclosure, reducing 
them to economic, political, psychological, or other factors cannot explain their existence 
and functions. Yet imaginative disclosure does not isolate the arts. Instead, it supports 
individual and communal attempts to find cultural orientation and reorientation, opening 
windows to personal and social worlds and either affirming or disturbing the worlds we 
already inhabit.”21  
Zuidervaart’s insistence on art as a human, social institution, rather than simply a 
collection of things and experiences, gives an important setting for my question about 
ways philosophical fiction—in common with other art forms—can contribute to lived 
philosophy. In order for people to interact meaningfully with art, they need to be involved 
in the places in society—shows, classes, clubs, etc.—where art has a voice and people 
have the space to reflect on it. Art in contemporary societies has the capacity to 
“generate, sustain, and renew dialogue that is both critical and creative in character,” says 
Zuidervaart, but this freedom relies on legal, constitutional, and structural conditions.22 
Art does not “happen” in a vacuum. In North American culture, how art interlinks with 
social institutions, and especially how it relates to the dominant economic and political 
                                                
20 Ibid., 133–34. 
21 Zuidervaart, Art in Public, 227. 
22 Ibid., 229. 
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systems, makes all the difference for whether it can actually inform people’s lives.23 And 
art’s ability to inform lived philosophy hinges as well on its ability to contribute to our 
lives through interpretation, as an artist interprets society’s needs and his or her creative 
insights, and an audience interprets its own needs and the artwork in question.24  
 
Philosophical commentary and normativity 
Martha C. Nussbaum’s recognition of the ethical importance of societal 
institutions’ interconnections is, I suspect, a large part of the reason she wants to 
emphasize art’s (in particular, novels’) place in academic philosophy. One aspect of these 
interconnections is the hermeneutical texture of art and how art informs our lives, 
although she does not appear to explicitly recognize art’s hermeneutical texture. 
                                                
23 Ibid., 233. As Zuidervaart puts it elsewhere, “Given the economic and political 
pressures on not-for-profit organizations and on the public sphere, however, arts 
organizations cannot maintain art’s societal autonomy all on their own. They need to 
form partnerships with other organizations that have similar social-economic and 
communicative profiles, not only in the arts but also in education, research, health care, 
social advocacy, and other areas. Such partnerships do not preclude strategic alliances 
with commercial businesses or selective participation in the delivery of government 
programs. Nevertheless, arts organizations need to be clear about the limits to such 
alliances and participation, in order to avoid a dependency that opens even wider the 
floodgates of hypercommercialization and performance fetishism. Partnerships in civil 
society and the public sphere are a priority if arts organizations are to make art-
appropriate contributions and receive art-appropriate support of an economic or political 
sort.” (Zuidervaart, “Creating a Disturbance,” 10–11.) 
24 Zuidervaart’s discussion of the links between art and social institutions prompts me to 
consider the relationship of these social institutions to philosophical fiction in particular, 
although a thorough discussion of these factors is too much for this context. If we are to 
read books for increased ethical insight and enlarged mentality, where will we read them? 
With whom will we talk about them? Where will we get them, and how will we find 
them? We can see from these questions that philosophical fiction also does not operate in 
a vacuum. Literature classes at various levels, libraries, publishing houses, marketing 
agencies, and book clubs are just a few of the organizations that will potentially be 
involved in the normative reach of philosophical fiction and the philosophical 
commentary that so often serves to make fiction’s normative import explicit. 
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Nussbaum’s emphasis on the place of the novel in academic philosophy goes beyond 
simply making sure that good books are available and that people have a place to read 
and discuss them; the fact that fiction can affect us at a deep philosophical level means 
that books are significant for how we fundamentally and normatively approach the 
structures we form and are formed by. In this section, I show how Zuidervaart’s model 
for engaging art and Nussbaum’s model for ethical life have a strong hermeneutic 
resonance with each other. I situate Nussbaum’s approach in light of Zuidervaart’s 
hermeneutical model of art, then address her perspective on normativity in more detail in 
the following section. 
Much of the significance of philosophical commentary on novels for Nussbaum 
lies in comparison to the way other intellectual disciplines (notably economics) shape the 
public and private life of our culture, including our public policy decisions, our 
understanding of basic rights and freedoms, and our experience of gender. Silence in 
these matters amounts to capitulation to impoverished understandings of these and other 
important aspects of our lives, Nussbaum declares. The alternative, richer concepts of 
rationality and human personhood that we know and love from novels are overlooked and 
even unknown among many people, she says. It is clear that this is at the heart of 
Nussbaum’s motivation for her project: “The hungry will be fed (or not fed) according to 
some idea of the person; patients will be treated; laws and policies will be made—all 
according to some conception or conceptions of human personhood and human 
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rationality. If we do not take a hand in these choices, they will be made by default 
without us.”25 
 Like me, Nussbaum has a sense of people being locked into a way of life and set 
of possibilities to which academic philosophy must respond if it is to be normatively 
responsible. We have seen Nussbaum’s take on philosophy’s normative task in her call 
for philosophical commentary to take its place among other intellectual disciplines in 
affecting culture to allow people alternative conceptions beyond the impoverished ones 
now in place. However, Nussbaum’s normative perspective rejects conventional 
philosophical system-building. She calls academic philosophy to flexibility—flexibility 
in which temporary, tentative position-holding remains feasible. In a sense, she develops 
a program of trying to make all positions available for consideration. 
 What Nussbaum refers to as “sense of life” is for her the background for all 
further reflection. She privileges responsiveness to life and life experience; nothing in our 
responses to life experience is unrevisable, even if everything can’t be revised all at once. 
She renounces the aspiration to any kind of transcendence, except perhaps a kind of 
“immanent transcendence,” as Charles Taylor points out in his discussion of Nussbaum’s 
aversion to “transcending humanity” in his wonderful book A Secular Age. Taylor draws 
                                                
25 Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 192. Nussbaum emphasizes that the ideals she 
holds up for life together (discussed in my project primarily in terms of individual 
interaction with literature) are based on the reality of what human existence is like: “Real 
people are bodily and needy; they have a variety of human frailties and excellences; they 
are, quite simply, human beings, neither machines nor angels. Who can say what 
constitution a nation of angels would make? Who can say what constitution would be 
best suited to a nation of elephants or tigers or whales? The nation we imagine is a nation 
of, and for, human beings (albeit in complex interrelationships with other species), and its 
constitution is a good one only to the extent that it incorporates an understanding of 
human life as it really is. … The ideal, then, is real” (Martha C. Nussbaum, Political 
Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice [Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2013], 384). 
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attention to the fact that Nussbaum wishes to renounce the desire for religious (especially 
Christian) transcendence while maintaining an “internal and human” aspiration to 
transcend “ordinary humanity.”26 For Nussbaum, we are “here,” and this is where we are 
supposed to be; in fact, there is nowhere else beyond or outside where we are. Academic 
philosophy’s task therefore involves making the “here” more thoroughly available, and a 
better place to be. 
 It seems, then, that for Nussbaum academic philosophy (at least moral 
philosophy) should position itself primarily in the service of lived philosophy. Her 
defense of novels as belonging to the canon of moral philosophy reflects Zuidervaart’s 
description of art that is significant: bringing to light a society’s hidden interpretive 
needs. Society’s need for the rich concepts of personhood that Nussbaum values in novels 
calls for a response to the limited philosophical frameworks offered by dominant 
economic and political systems. My feeling is that Nussbaum is attempting to address the 
hermeneutical nature of ethical interaction with art, but has not been able to find her way 
to an articulated noncausal model for the relationship. This lack of articulation may be 
why her emphasis on the integrality of form and content, an insight that points clearly to 
the constitution of art as thoroughly situated in interpretation, has so often been missed 
by her readers. Robert Piercey, for example, claims that Nussbaum speaks “as though 
there is a direct causal link between reading literature and becoming a better person,” and 
that she “speaks as though texts neatly transmit their lessons to readers, without being 
                                                
26 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 627. 
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mediated by interpretation.”27 Similarly, Simon Stow reads Nussbaum as seeming “to 
suggest that there is but one valid interpretation of the text, and one lesson or set of 
lessons to derived [sic] from each novel.”28 While in Piercey’s case these statements may 
be due to willful misreading (he admits in a footnote that Nussbaum presents a more 
nuanced approach in other works), the fact that more than one of her readers has misread 
or read over her fundamental insight about the inseparability of form and content (i.e., 
novel and “message”) demonstrates that something in her framework is not 
communicating appropriately. This miscommunication demonstrates the importance of 
an articulated, thoroughly hermeneutical model for the way art contributes to lived 
philosophy, sidestepping unanswerable questions about direct causal links between art 
and life. 
 Nussbaum’s emphasis on responsiveness to real life situations and the priority of 
the particular means that any general moral conclusions we come to must always be 
revisable in response to new particular contexts. At the same time, she does not hesitate 
to suggest that the guidelines of her Aristotelian ethical position are generally applicable, 
even if they are always available for revision. She values novels for their particularity and 
responsiveness; her commitment to continuous revisability seems to be an articulation of 
her largely inarticulate sense of the thoroughly hermeneutical nature of novels. How 
fiction contributes to people’s lives is always by way of interpretation. If we take 
seriously the inseparability of form and content, as Nussbaum does, and if we further 
                                                
27 Robert Piercey, “Paul Ricoeur on the Ethical Significance of Reading,” Philosophy 
Today 54, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 281, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/754137205?accountid=14771. 
28 Simon Stow, “Reading Our Way to Democracy? Literature and Public Ethics,” 
Philosophy and Literature 30, no. 2 (October 2006): 414, 
http://simplelink.library.utoronto.ca/url.cfm/287332. 
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recognize that this complicates the ethical contribution of fiction to lived philosophy—
disallowing a directly causal connection—we can see that we are left with a normative 
question of how to deal, for example, with encounters with fiction that we would consider 
ethically damaging. 
 
Revisable, immanent normativity 
Nussbaum clearly rejects the kind of transcendent normativity that has often 
traditionally been associated with morality, while at the same time avoiding the 
incoherence of complete relativism. For those of us who are more attuned to 
transcendence, immanent or otherwise, than Nussbaum is, the all-inclusive discussion she 
has in mind may still be a satisfactory method of finding our way to shared norms that 
either exist (although Nussbaum would reject this articulation) or come into some kind of 
existence as we express them.  
The question that must be answered, then, is this: If we are unable to label certain 
books as bad and not worth reading by a set of pre-approved criteria, and if we must pay 
careful hermeneutic attention to form and content before making a judgment, what are we 
to do with those conversation partners who we see as potentially ethically damaging? 
These are the companions that we might wish to weed out with an external, non-
revisable—that is, (pseudo-)universal—standard, and so it is these books that put 
Nussbaum’s approach to the test. To put it simply, does Nussbaum’s implied hermeneutic 
approach only work for good books? Obviously, if we are influenced noncausally by 
what we read, the dangers are heightened: We may not notice the ways in which we are 
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being influenced or the quality of the rapport we are sharing. And yet, if we are truly to 
engage books in a spirit of plurality, that possibility cannot be simplistically avoided. 
To put the question positively: Does Nussbaum’s emphasis on all-inclusive 
discussion give us access to the sort of normativity that, when we engage with a book in 
which the presence of injustice, oppression, and the like is approved, still aids the reader 
in moving toward a sense of shared good? By drawing Arendt and Zuidervaart back into 
the discussion, I clarify and situate Nussbaum’s approach to normativity, indicating the 
strengths of her position as well as some ways it could be further strengthened. 
This revisable, immanent understanding of normativity can perhaps best be 
described as not a generally applicable rule, but a call to which everyone must respond, 
although Nussbaum and I may still disagree about where (or whom) the call comes from. 
Nussbaum’s greatest shortcoming in this discussion may in fact be that she insists so 
strongly on the here and now that she may be tempted to shortchange the kind of 
openness she desires when it appears to be directed toward anything “outside” of human 
existence. Yet so many of us do experience life as being open to something we describe 
as “beyond” ourselves that the experience of transcendence must surely be a part of the 
normative conversation by Nussbaum’s own inclusive agenda. 
 Although she does have a program, so to speak, it is important to remember that 
Nussbaum always remains suspicious of generalization, seeing it as a diminution of 
particularity, something we can make use of if there is not enough time to take into 
account all the details. Generalization, for Nussbaum, “fossilizes or preserves the work of 
perception in a form in which it could be tapped on another occasion as a guide, or a 
substitute should there be no time for full perception. … [T]he intellectual conclusion 
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may well even be a regression or falling off from the fullest knowing or acknowledging 
of the situation, defensible in the way I have indicated, but also dangerous, since 
fossilized partial knowing can too easily become a form of denial unless it is continually 
awakened into perception.”29 Her cautious approach to generalization could be seen as an 
outright rejection of normativity, if we understood normativity to be a general rule 
applicable to all (or at least many) particular situations. However, in Nussbaum’s 
perspective, the claim seems to be that normativity can comprise both the “general rule” 
and an openness to the inevitable deviation that is necessary to engage individual 
situations. The “general rule,” then, should not be a set of propositions applicable to a 
range of situations, but an impetus or beginning place for the examination of a situation 
that (incorporating also what cannot be codified or articulated and what we cannot even 
be properly conscious of) will end in a right response. The key for this understanding of 
normativity is attentive, responsive, particular knowing of which a general rule will 
always be an unsuccessful summary. 
Although convincingly argued, Nussbaum’s defense of the revisable, immanent 
normativity to be found in conversation with fiction does not necessarily satisfy some of 
her colleagues. A common response to Nussbaum’s claims is to say that the kind of 
flexible normativity that she prioritizes can be accepted as a complement to general rules 
of ethics, but does not offer an acceptable primary model.30 Hilary Putnam has voiced 
these concerns in a relatively balanced and articulate manner. As Putnam points out, for 
some, literature is simply a different undertaking from philosophy, and these thinkers will 
                                                
29 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 92. 
30 Hilary Putnam, “Taking Rules Seriously: A Response to Martha Nussbaum,” in 
“Literature and/as Moral Philosophy,” special issue, New Literary History 15, no. 1 
(Autumn 1983): 195, http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/469002. 
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want to maintain the distinction. While accepting the fact that some fiction does offer 
important responses to the question “How should one live?” they do not therefore agree 
that this fiction should be considered philosophy. Commentary on fiction may make the 
cut, but not fiction itself, Putnam argues, since it does not deal with “foundations” or 
“methodologies,” no matter how much ethical insight it displays.31 
It is indeed valuable to recognize that different thinkers will want to draw 
boundaries at different points in the conversation about how literature, philosophy, and 
ethics relate. In fact, these differences demonstrate the very plurality that I am attempting 
to call attention to; my concern is that the willingness to converse with competing views 
is not all on one side. Following Nussbaum, I defend the inclusion of some forms of 
fiction as contributing to the philosophical conversation about how we should live 
because, as I show, they do indeed have something important to contribute. Rather than 
simply insisting that they are not really philosophy because they do not address moral 
foundations and methodologies in a certain traditionally direct style, Putnam would need 
to show that this distinction actually makes the contributions of fiction to the moral 
conversation not appropriately philosophical. If novels offer important alternative moral 
perspectives, not including them in the conversation is a serious philosophical loss. As 
Nussbaum puts it in her response to Putnam, she promotes the study of novels along with 
the study of traditional works of moral philosophy “in order to be sure that we are fair to 
all the alternative conceptions of goodness.”32 
                                                
31 Ibid., 199. 
32 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Reply to Richard Wollheim, Patrick Gardiner, and Hilary 
Putnam,” in “Literature and/as Moral Philosophy,” special issue, New Literary History 
15, no. 1 (Autumn 1983): 204, 
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Like Nussbaum, Arendt is suspicious of a normativity that depends on general 
rules. However, Arendt addresses the inapplicability of general rules to new situations—
or at least the obviousness of the need to think flexibly—as a historical development 
following the breakdown of societal morality in the face of totalitarianism in various 
places in the world over the last century (notably Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia). 
From this perspective, she identifies a difficulty that Nussbaum sometimes seems to gloss 
over (perhaps because she has not articulated a thoroughly noncausal model for ethical 
development): the problem of actually getting people to think flexibly. As Arendt says, 
“Unfortunately, it seems to be much easier to condition human behavior and to make 
people conduct themselves in the most unexpected and outrageous manner, than it is to 
persuade anybody to learn from experience, as the saying goes; that is, to start thinking 
and judging instead of applying categories and formulas which are deeply ingrained in 
our mind, but whose basis of experience has long been forgotten and whose plausibility 
resides in their intellectual consistency rather than in their adequacy to actual events.”33 
Arendt also sees the danger for those who want to apply general rules in that these rules 
have been demonstrated to be changeable “overnight,” leaving people with the habit of 
holding fast to standards that may no longer be ethically defensible. In cases like these, it 
is the skeptics of generality, the ones who are practiced at thinking through particular 
cases, who will be able to respond in an ethically reliable way, she maintains.34 These are 
the people who will be able to address new situations with flexibility and the recognition 
that no general rule will apply fully to the particularity of the new situation. 
                                                
33 Hannah Arendt, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and 
Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 37. 
34 Ibid., 45. 
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 According to Nussbaum, novels are an ideal source for flexible, varied, particular 
knowledge. But can we expect this knowledge to be ethically beneficial? Nussbaum 
speaks in many places about the power of the novel to take hold of us and change us, but 
of course there is no guarantee that this change will automatically be for the better. Being 
ethically impacted does not necessarily entail being ethically improved.35 There are many 
stories of people reading a novel like William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, for example, 
and being inspired to commit horrific acts similar to those recounted in the book. 
However, Nussbaum’s commitment to the Aristotelian dialectical method and the place 
of the novel in philosophy complicates this potential “direct” impact, since she asks us to 
also hold novels up for comparison and evaluation among other contributors to the 
conversation. That we experience and respond to art via interpretation also has normative 
significance, then. As we look, per Nussbaum’s suggestions, for coherence with our web 
of judgment, feeling, perception, and principle, we do so with an eye to the communal 
conversation called for by the Aristotelian dialectical method. Individual interpretation is 
a part of a larger conversation. Once again every individual’s interpretation and 
experience, rather than being generalizable, is a participant in a plurality of particulars. 
We don’t just read novels on our own terms; Nussbaum always insists that our own terms 
be continually brought under scrutiny and be kept open to communal revision. 
As Nussbaum works through what it means to say that nothing is unrevisable, 
how we say it remains of the utmost importance. For her, the indispensability of the novel 
for the question of moral philosophy means that in the end, philosophical commentary 
may have to be silent, for “one must not rule out the possibility that the literary text may 
                                                
35 I address this issue more thoroughly in Chapter 5. 
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contain some elements that lead the reader outside of the dialectical question altogether; 
that, indeed, might be one of its most significant contributions.”36 The implication is that 
philosophical commentary cannot go beyond the dialectic, but fiction can. And yet the 
importance of philosophical commentary is that it can help move the reader to the point 
of being able to hear what is beyond the commentary, to be open to the imaginative 
disclosure available in the medium of philosophical fiction. When I am reading 
Nussbaum’s commentary on Henry James’s The Golden Bowl, I may not only become 
attuned to nuances in the text that I missed in an earlier reading, but I may also become 
attuned to a more nuanced reading of the book in other ways, such as a greater attention 
to underlying themes or to a certain use of language. And that practice may orient and 
open up the way I read other novels in the future as well. 
Zuidervaart’s refusal to limit activities such as art and philosophy to strictly 
demarcated zones that do not influence each other echoes something of the same felt need 
to which Nussbaum and Arendt are responding. In fact, we could apply Zuidervaart’s 
tripartite conception of imagination as exploration, creative interpretation, and 
presentation to the making of Nussbaum-style philosophical commentary as well. 
Responsible philosophical commentary will engage in open-ended inquiry, not simply 
seeking to find a moral or categorize a genre, but exploring a story on its own terms. It 
will seek to creatively interpret what a story presents, opening up and sharing new 
possibilities and layers of meaning beyond a superficial or conventional understanding. It 
may be that Nussbaum’s call for this kind of commentary on literature to take its place in 
academic philosophy is a call for the aesthetic dimension to be more fully realized in 
                                                
36 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 49. 
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academic philosophy as well.37 In that case, she joins Zuidervaart in his contention that 
imagination is vital to human flourishing in all areas of life, not just art.  
And perhaps Zuidervaart’s view of imagination applies not only to how art is 
made, but to how we interact with it. If this is so, the institutions that interlink with the 
arts are again vital as the framework for our response to the arts. Many of our institutions 
tend to encourage us to engage art in terms of dualisms; for example, schools treat 
literature as primarily—if not solely—for instruction, while mainstream movie theatres 
exist to entertain rather than instruct (and to make money, of course). Other institutions 
seem more able to work from the positive content of the dialectics: Libraries and 
alternative movie theaters, for example, offer the opportunity to cut through the 
dialectics, encouraging exploration, creative interpretation, and presentation. 
Again, Zuidervaart does not present norms as “what” (e.g., “this is right 
judgment” or “this is the good”) but norms of “how” (e.g., ways of interacting and 
connecting properly). Nussbaum’s insistence on everything being revisable could be seen 
as precisely the articulation of such a norm; in Zuidervaart’s vocabulary, perhaps this 
would have to do with sensitivity to the connection between authenticity and 
                                                
37 It is interesting to note that both Nussbaum, who rejects transcendent normativity, and 
Calvin Seerveld, who holds transcendent normativity dear, can affirm a similar call. 
Seerveld says, “Literature, like graphic art, poetry, and music, appeals, in my judgment, 
to an order in God’s world, a creational ordinance for suggestion-rich allusivity (as there 
is an order for promise keeping, for generous thrift, for assertoric correctness)—one that 
can be approximately discovered, is historically formulated and re-formulated, and will 
be followed in human acts, poorly or well, that will mark such cultured deeds and 
products typically as artworks …. It would be a mistake to try to take this rich metaphor-
sparking kind of literary/artistic truth telling and force its multi-splendored, winsome, if 
not sometimes whimsical, glory flat to a bare residue of non-imaginative deposits.” 
(Calvin Seerveld, “A Concept of Artistic Truth Prompted by Biblical Wisdom 
Literature,” in Truth Matters: Knowledge, Politics, Ethics, Religion, ed. Lambert 
Zuidervaart, Allyson Carr, Matthew Klaassen, and Ronnie Shuker [Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2013], 301). 
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significance, for example. If norms are understood to be related to “how” rather than 
“what,” it becomes clear that they are not necessarily static. As a context changes and a 
person in that context changes, what it means to be authentic, for example, may change, 
too. In this way, Zuidervaart deepens Nussbaum’s emphasis on revisability by giving it 
another dimension; a norm that is provisional and situated is even further away from the 
idea of a static rule that attempts to approximate the norm that is always in motion, so to 
speak. While principles such as justice or solidarity may always be relevant societal 
norms, how they look in different contexts will differ as well. 
As we have seen, Zuidervaart’s depiction of imagination demonstrates that the 
result of artistic interaction can be a movement toward aesthetic normativity across the 
board, not restricted to the realm of art. He argues that culture orientation—finding our 
way in and as a society—needs aesthetic as well as moral and epistemic processes in 
order to address the difficulty of its “multidimensional, complex, and unending task.”38 
Similarly, in both Nussbaum and Arendt we see a movement toward some kind of larger 
normativity as a result of interaction with art. Nussbaum’s desire for a normative 
conversation that is responsive to our “sense of life” and inclusive of fictional voices 
echoes Zuidervaart’s understanding of aesthetic validity, or “imaginative cogency,” 
which he insists is relevant to wider questions of validity.39 Like Nussbaum, he describes 
aesthetic standards as not universally binding, extending this description to other 
standards as well: “Each one can be contested, moved, or replaced. Yet the very process 
of contesting a standard requires that people appeal to some notion of validity.”40 
                                                
38 Zuidervaart, Artistic Truth, 66. 
39 Ibid., 62. 
40 Ibid., 64. 
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Imagination, with its open-ended inquiry and attentiveness to complex, multiple, yet 
sharable layers of meaning is precisely what we need as we face the complexities of our 
lives that too often leave us paralyzed. The rich potential available in imagination is the 
reason that Nussbaum and Arendt—and I, too—turn to art for normative orientation and 
the reason that we believe art is relevant to all of life. 
 
Noncausal interactions 
The role of art in general as a potential agent for increased ethical insight and 
enlarged mentality is obvious to those who have experienced it. But in what ways does 
this happen, specifically? Can we answer this question without resorting to a causal 
model for the interaction between fiction and ethical development? And is there anything 
unique about philosophical fiction as an agent for ethical change? Questions about how 
and why books affect us have been the subject of much research, yet the topic does not 
lend itself to clear answers of a certain kind. For example, the relationship of book and 
reader has been analyzed from social, psychological, and behavioral angles. In Jèmeljan 
Hakemulder’s wide-ranging study of the subject, he sums up the results by telling us 
what most of us already know: that there is evidence that literature affects us, but little 
clarity on what it is about it that makes this happen.41  
Still, however, Hakemulder argues for a definite connection between reading and 
ethical adequacy. He sees ethical adequacy as being made up of insight into human 
character (ability to imagine other people's emotions, thoughts, and goals) and moral self-
                                                
41 Jèmeljan Hakemulder, The Moral Laboratory: Experiments Examining the Effects of 
Reading Literature on Social Perception and Moral Self-Concept (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000), 147. 
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knowledge (knowing where one stands on moral matters).42 This means that reading is 
ethically significant when it expands readers’ capacities for empathy and self-knowledge. 
Starting from a social research perspective, his conclusions echo those of Nussbaum on 
the subject: 
If reading narratives affects self-knowledge, this has direct implications 
for social perception. Research suggests that well-developed domains of 
our self-concept equip us with the ability to recognize similar 
characteristics in other persons. Furthermore, reading a lot of diverse 
stories presumably increases our range of abstract memory structures 
(‘scenarios’). These represent plausible combinations of situations, goals, 
emotions, and their probable causal relationships. The more scenarios we 
have at our disposal, the more successful we will be at interpreting other 
people’s behavior. Finally, repetitively taking the roles of character can be 
expected to result in a habitual empathic attitude toward fellow humans.43  
 
Recent research affirms the importance of the way we “take on the roles” of characters 
we read about in the effect literature has on us.44  
It is nice that research affirms what so many of us already know, but much of the 
discussion about the specific mechanism of how literature affects the reader is beside the 
point. Arguing about the details of why and how we can be changed by what we read 
often still assumes a causal model, leaving us with a mechanistic perspective on literature 
despite the best intentions of the researchers, and making literature again appear to be 
primarily a tool for ethical formation. The cause-and-effect model simply cannot do 
justice to a thoroughly hermeneutical sphere.  
                                                
42 Ibid., 149. 
43 Ibid., 154. 
44 Geoff F. Kaufman and Lisa K. Libby, “Changing Beliefs and Behavior Through 
Experience-Taking,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 103, no. 1 (July 
2012): 1–19. 
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In contrast, a hermeneutical approach can help us think deeply about how the 
books we interact with inform us on a philosophical—not just psychological or 
behavioral—level, although of course psychological and behavioral considerations will 
be part of our interpretive interaction with books as well. The development throughout 
our lives of our lived philosophies is something that needs to be seen from a whole-life 
perspective. This is part of why the questions and issues that Zuidervaart raises about the 
integrality of different aspects of life provide an important framework for my discussion 
of these same questions about the specifics of art’s potential for making an ethical 
contribution. With these thoughts in mind, let us take a look at the specific ways in which 
art can contribute to our lived philosophies: by offering cultural critique, sparking 
reflection, giving enjoyment, saying what cannot be said less metaphorically, negotiating 
between the concealed and the revealed, encouraging the compassionate attention that 
promotes ethical insight and enlarged mentality, having relevance to the audience, and 
finally, inviting the audience to co-create with the artist. Let us look briefly at examples 
of each of these in turn, with special consideration for the case of philosophical fiction—
especially young adult literature—and what sets it apart from other art forms. 
One of the most obvious contributions of art to lived philosophy, especially in 
light of Zuidervaart’s conception of cultural orientation, is the possibility for it to offer 
cultural critique. Art often calls into question everyday habits and systems by either direct 
presentation and critique or through thought experiments about our communal trajectories 
or possible alternatives. This is true of most if not all art forms, and it is certainly very 
often true of philosophical fiction. The writings of George Orwell, most famously Animal 
Farm and 1984, are prime examples of this kind of cultural critique.
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Similarly, philosophical fiction, among other art forms, sparks reflection. This is 
related to the general capacity we see in art to reorient and sensitize those who interact 
with it. Reading E.M. Forster’s Maurice prompts the reader to ponder the legal, 
emotional, and relational implications of homosexuality past and present. Herman 
Melville’s Moby Dick gives rise to questions about satire and persuasion, race and 
friendship, sanity and goodness. Even reading books by Agatha Christie will likely 
occasion reflection on issues of class and societal changes brought about by the World 
Wars. The way in which fiction sparks reflection, although not necessarily always leading 
to an improvement in either ethical insight or enlarged mentality in the way that 
Nussbaum’s compassionate attention or Arendt’s “going visiting” do, is part of the 
process that makes them possible.  
Take one of the books that I will address more thoroughly in Chapter 6: Ursula K. 
Le Guin’s novel Tehanu, with its depiction of a thoughtful, middle-aged woman who has 
given up great power to live an “ordinary” life, and the scarred and abused child she 
adopts who has great power yet to be discovered. Reading this book sensitized me to—
among other things—ways in which power and powerlessness combine, and thereby 
helped change the way I experience the power of those around me. Or take Pompeo 
Girolamo Batoni’s 1776 painting Peace and War, which I once saw exhibited at the Art 
Institute of Chicago. I found this painting strangely impressive, although it is anything 
but unusual in style or subject. “War” and “Peace” look into each other’s eyes in 
something of a lovers’ embrace, War protectively raising his shield over Peace, while she 
gently restrains his sword hand as she holds up an olive branch between them. This 
painting permanently affected my understanding of the relationship between war and 
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peace, leading me to wonder whether war and peace are mutually necessary, mutually 
exclusive, or have some other relationship to each other. My responses to these works of 
art were not simply a straightforward assimilation of what was presented, but gave rise to 
the sort of unavoidable internal reflection that reorients and sensitizes one in new ways to 
the ethical implications of aspects of life. We could think of examples from every genre 
of art that have some sort of similar re-orienting effect. 
Another way in which philosophical fiction among other art forms can contribute 
to lived philosophy is its capacity to give enjoyment and delight. More than just making 
people happy, this helps get past people’s defenses and opens them up to further 
understanding. Just as we tend to listen more sympathetically to a perspective expressed 
by a friend we enjoy being with than to the pronouncements of an abrasive acquaintance, 
we are more likely to give art that we enjoy a chance to speak to us than art that does not 
draw us in and gain our considerate attention. Although true of many art forms, this 
aspect is one that is particularly true of philosophical fiction. (After all, it has to sell—
perhaps a more undisputable connection with the masses than many other art forms have 
these days!)  
I have heard it rumored that when Richard Kearney wrote his book On Stories: 
Thinking in Action, he hoped that it would be widely accessible to the general lay reader, 
and in fact formatted it with the footnotes in the back in order to keep the academic 
aspect from “getting in the way” of such a reading. And though it may indeed have been 
more widely read than much of published academic philosophy, it cannot even begin to 
compare in popularity to a novel addressing philosophical themes (even one that is 
questionably well written), such as Jostein Gaarder’s Sophie’s World. This comparison 
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demonstrates what might be considered an advantage that philosophical fiction has over 
“normal” philosophical writing: It tends to have a greater immediate relevance for 
people’s lived philosophies simply because it reaches a wider audience. 
Nussbaum, Arendt, and other thinkers who value stories for their ethical relevance 
point to a deeper reason that philosophical fiction has a philosophical role to play: Fiction 
is able to say what sometimes cannot be said in less metaphorical language. Again, this 
aspect is closely related to the importance of form-content indivisibility. As Le Guin puts 
it, “with genuine works of literature … it is a grave error to teach or review them as mere 
vehicles for ideas, not seeing them as works of art. Art frees us; and the art of words can 
take us beyond anything we can say in words.”45 
Art also negotiates between what is concealed and what is revealed. The way in 
which philosophical fiction does this with words makes it stand out particularly among 
narrative forms of art. Reading any Jane Austen book is a paradigm exercise of this 
negotiation, demonstrating that what is said may be saying something other than what is 
being said. In this way, we learn to better negotiate the concealment and revelation we 
stumble across in life outside the book.  
This advantage is closely connected to a further aspect of philosophical fiction. 
Reading philosophical fiction encourages the attitude of compassionate attention that 
Nussbaum espouses for development of ethical insight, and the need to put ourselves in 
the shoes of the characters we read about that we gather from Arendt. The idea is, of 
course, that this type of engagement with fiction tends to stimulate these attitudes to spill 
over into our “real” lives. The promotion of ethical insight and enlarged mentality are 
                                                
45 Ursula K. Le Guin, “A Message about Messages,” in Cheek by Jowl: Talks and Essays 
on How and Why Fantasy Matters (Seattle: Aqueduct Press, 2009), 128–29. 
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perhaps less obvious in other art forms, although we certainly see something similar in 
areas such as theater and the visual arts, and especially other narrative forms such as 
biography, memoir, essay, and many forms of poetry. But if we back off for more of a 
bird’s-eye view we can see more clearly some similarities between the ways that fiction 
and other art forms can contribute to our lived philosophies. Both the ethical insight and 
the enlarged mentality we can gain from philosophical fiction are ways of expanding our 
horizons of understanding. When we interact with art we gain new experience and find 
ourselves able to align ourselves in new ways.46 Surely these responses are common to 
art forms of quality in all their variety.  
Still, however, there is something unique about philosophical fiction in the way it 
informs lived philosophy. Nussbaum briefly addresses the question of what she sees as 
special about novels in the introduction to Love’s Knowledge, and at more length in 
Poetic Justice. She mentions reasons such as the way in which the structure of the 
                                                
46 One could say that in a sense, the ability to align ourselves in new ways that arises 
from our interaction with art is a mirror of art’s ability to re-align itself to each new 
reader’s unique context. As Ricoeur has said, “An essential characteristic of a literary 
work, and of a work of art in general, is that it transcends its own psychosociological 
conditions of production and thereby opens itself to an unlimited series of readings, 
themselves situated in different sociocultural conditions. In short, the text must be able, 
from the sociological as well as the psychological point of view, to ‘decontextualize’ 
itself in such a way that it can be ‘recontextualized’ in a new situation—as accomplished, 
precisely, by the act of reading” (Ricoeur, “The Hermenutic Function of Distanciation,” 
in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermenutics, II, trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. 
Thompson [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press], 83). The ability to 
decontextualize itself in a way that it can be recontextualized—at the same time 
maintaining the significance of its original context—is, I think, what enables art to 
become “classic.” As Gadamer has said, “[T]he classical preserves itself precisely 
because it is significant in itself and interprets itself; i.e., it speaks in such a way that it is 
not a statement about what is past—documentary evidence that still needs to be 
interpreted—rather, it says something to the present as if it were said specifically to it. … 
This is just what the word ‘classical’ means: that the duration of a work’s power to speak 
directly is fundamentally unlimited” (Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2d, rev. ed., trans. rev. 
by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall [New York: Continuum, 2004], 290). 
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interaction between reader and novel, as presenting persistent forms of human need and 
desire in different specific social situations, “invites the reader to see how the mutable 
features of society and circumstance bear on the realization of shared hopes and desires—
and also, in fact, on their very structure.”47 She also talks about the novel’s concreteness 
and its interest in the ordinary. And, of course, there is her contention that the novel is “a 
living form and in fact still the central morally serious yet popularly engaging fictional 
form of our culture.”48 When it comes specifically to works of art, it remains the case that 
other than films and recorded music (relatively little of which can count as serious), 
novels have the widest reach in North American culture. This is part of why Nussbaum 
sees them as so important.  
There is one final point about all philosophical fiction that I would like to 
mention. In any interaction with art, the audience is somehow a co-creator with the artist, 
but there is something unique about this co-creation in forms of art that make use 
exclusively of the written word. In reading, while the reader is transported outside him- 
or herself through the characters he or she reads about, the interaction and images evoked 
take place uniquely in the reader’s own head.49 This is part of what sets literature apart 
from serious plays and films, which otherwise might arguably fulfill all the functions of a 
book. This, I think, is connected to one of the most important things that set philosophical 
fiction apart in its contribution to lived philosophy: In reading, we are actually training 
                                                
47 Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 7. 
48 Ibid., 6. 
49 This experience may have a physical dimension as well. I am sure I am not the only 
person who has been called back to earth from a book thinking that I could not walk or 
speak, for example, when I had been reading about a person who could not walk or 
speak. This experience of “alternate reality” can feel very real. 
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for, not just learning about, the ethical insight and enlarged mentality which I, with 
Nussbaum and Arendt, believe inform our lives wholly. The unique way in which we 
experience written stories within ourselves calls for a correspondingly unique approach to 
understanding their contributions to philosophy. If reading a good book is a form of 
normative training, perhaps the practice of philosophical commentary on books is the 
warm-up exercise that allows us to position ourselves for the training. Philosophical 
fiction is one art form among many that inform our lived philosophies, and yet—like 
every other art form, I suspect—it does so uniquely.  
Nussbaum has chosen realistic novels as the focus of her argument both because 
they are ideal for her purposes and because they are culturally relevant. I would suggest 
that these reasons are even more true of young adult literature. Young adult literature is 
one of those easily recognizable yet difficult-to-define categories. The field marks by 
which we can identify young adult literature will always leave out books here and there 
that should obviously be included, but young adult fiction tends to center on teenage 
protagonists and display strong plot and character development. 
All of the reasons Nussbaum holds up for the value of novels apply to young adult 
literature, I suggest. Young adult literature addresses persistent human concerns in 
specific, concrete situations; it engages with serious moral issues; and it has a wide reach 
in North American culture. But young adult literature goes even further in that in most 
quality books in this genre, at least one of the major characters undergoes some kind of 
transformation or development of self-awareness. This characteristic, I suggest, is one of 
the main reasons “young adult” literature is so popular with adults as well as young 
adults. North American culture seems to assume that adults want to change almost every 
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aspect of themselves (as can be seen in the prevalence of self-help books—another genre 
with wide reach, if not moral seriousness). Most of the adults I know who are self-
proclaimed readers continue to enjoy young adult literature, and I believe this is at least 
partly due to the development in self-awareness and ethical change that much young 
adult literature explores. 
Zuidervaart approaches issues of art and normativity from both a theoretical and a 
sociocultural angle, always insisting that art informs life by way of interpretation and that 
it arises from interpretation. His concern for the integrality of art and life for the 
development of a truly imaginative, normative perspective provides a framework for a 
hermeneutical model for the normative interaction of fiction and philosophy. Nussbaum’s 
express concern in turning to philosophical fiction is certainly a normative one. “How 
should one live?” is the question with which she frames her whole project. Although in 
one sense her understanding of this question as a matter of normativity might be 
somewhat nebulous (since any sense of normativity for her must be immanent and 
flexible), on the other hand her hope for fiction’s influence on philosophy is an explicitly 
moral one. Arendt’s more political focus provides a stance for resistance against 
assumptions about knowledge that privilege abstraction at the expense of particularity, 
thereby misplacing the position of impartiality and, by creating blind spots in the 
available information, forgoing the possibility of truly discerning better and worse. This 
approach, like Zuidervaart’s, embodies a resistance to limiting oneself to the options one 
is given, enabling instead the possibility of envisioning newness.  
Stories, and philosophical fiction in particular, uniquely offer us the possibility of 
envisioning something new, but this possibility is not entirely straightforward: As 
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Nussbaum shows, tapping into the full import of the novel’s context-defying integrity 
may take the assistance of philosophical commentary, in one form or another, in order to 
be properly positioned. But once that is achieved, the integrity of the novel as a work of 
art that takes shape within the reader’s mind enables the reader to not merely witness but 
to take part in its creation. Each person who interacts with a story becomes a particular 
possibility of newness. As Zuidervaart shows, this is not simply a matter of cause and 
effect, but a network of interpretation. As we converse about these interactions through 
philosophical commentary and in communal conversation, the contribution of fiction that 
we experience in our own lived philosophies has the potential to make a larger normative 
contribution as well. 
Some questions remain, however. How can we provide for the possibility of 
normative interaction with philosophical fiction while still avoiding treating it simply as a 
tool for ethical improvement? What positive metaphor can we find for the way we relate 
to stories, and for the way they affect us? What makes for a good book, and what makes 
for good reading? We will navigate these questions in the following chapter. 
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5. Narrative Friendship 
How to measure quality in literature is always a difficult question. Even when 
there is general agreement among its readers that a certain book is better or worse than 
others, there will always be those who disagree, and often for recognizably valid reasons. 
How can we construct or discover criteria for good books and good reading while still 
allowing for inevitable variation in taste and context? And how might reading books 
influence us? This second question is similarly difficult. Even if we agree that books 
contribute to and affect our lives in some way, this contribution remains far from simple 
and very hard to prove. One way into these matters is to find a metaphor that can open up 
for us a way of approaching the evaluation—and especially, the ethical criticism—of 
books, how we interact with them, and how they affect us, ethically or otherwise. 
When I was a child, my mother often repeated to me the saying “Books are your 
friends; treat them as such.” For the most part, she said this to remind me not to throw 
books, sit on them, or leave them open face-down. As a reader herself, however, I suspect 
that part of the reason she was fond of the phrase was that it points to something true 
about how many readers experience books. A good book does indeed feel like a good 
friend. 
The metaphor of books as potential friends is the wide-ranging, effective, and 
illuminating model Wayne C. Booth uses in his own fine book The Company We Keep: 
An Ethics of Fiction. This model allows him to find an approach to literary ethical 
criticism that avoids the problems of either pretending that books don’t affect people 
(clearly not true) or focusing on direct causal links (inaccurate and very difficult to prove 
even if it were accurate). Instead of asking whether a narrative will have a good or bad 
 124  
effect on us after we read it, Booth begins by asking what kind of company it offers us 
during the time we spend with it. This is exactly the kind of noncausal metaphor that we 
are looking for. It addresses our real-life experience with books and how they affect us, 
while at the same time creating space to consider the ethical implications of that 
relationship. 
Speaking to the great classics of literature, Booth says: 
 
You lead me first to practice ways of living that are more 
profound, more sensitive, more intense, and in a curious way more fully 
generous than I am likely to meet anywhere else in the world. You correct 
my faults, rebuke my insensitivities. You mold me into patterns of longing 
and fulfillment that make my ordinary dreams seem petty and absurd. You 
finally show what life can be, not just to a coterie, a saved and saving 
remnant looking down on the fools, slobs, and knaves, but to anyone who 
is willing to work to earn the title of equal and true friend.1  
 
 We ended the previous chapter with a question about what makes for good books 
and good reading, and the chapter before that with a question about how to find criteria 
that are sharable while going beyond an insistence on pseudo-universality. In this chapter, 
I explore these questions with the assistance of Booth’s conception of narrative friendship 
as described in The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction. With the metaphor of 
narrative friendship as a guide, I address Booth’s criteria for judging the quality of books 
and how spending time with books may affect their readers. I then explore Booth’s 
suggestions about the relationship between friendship and character. 
 Next, I question some of Booth’s vocabulary choices and how they affect the 
narrative friendship metaphor as a whole. To clarify some of these issues, I bring Martha 
C. Nussbaum back into the conversation, addressing a number of criticisms she directs 
                                                
1 Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 223. 
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toward the ideas she finds in Booth’s book. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about 
the strength of Booth’s model to confront issues of quality and ethical criticism, which is 
Booth’s term for the same question we have been addressing in previous chapters: How 
should we live? 
 
Narrative friendship 
Booth suggests that every story can be considered an offer of friendship, and in 
particular, a gift proffered by the “implied author” of a narrative. Booth distinguishes 
between the implied author, who represents the generally coherent perspective within a 
specific narrative; the actual, flesh-and-blood writer; and any explicit narrator(s) of a 
story.2 Although he does not provide an explicit definition for the term, the “implied 
author” seems to be the way Booth gives a narrative its metaphorical personality and 
intention as a friend; it is, in a sense, the work of art treated as a person. The implied 
author is also therefore the representative and source of the world-and-life-view in which 
a narrative asks us to participate, a view which is generally more coherent and delineated 
than the flesh-and-blood writer’s real-life view of things. In The Rhetoric of Fiction, the 
book that introduced the term, Booth variously describes the implied author as the 
narrative’s “official scribe” (following Jessamyn West), the author’s “second self” 
(following Kathleen Tillotson, who was following Edward Dowden3), “different versions, 
                                                
2 Ibid., 125. 
3 The fact that Tillotson was bringing attention to Dowden’s concept is pointed out in 
Tom Kindt and Hans-Harald Müller, The Implied Author: Concept and Controversy, 
trans. Alastair Matthews (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 80. 
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different ideal combinations of norms,”4 “the intuitive apprehension of a completed 
artistic whole” (73), “the core of norms and choices” (74), “an ideal, literary, created 
version of the real [author],” and “the sum of [the author’s] own choices” (75). 
That the implied author gives a work a sense of unified (metaphorical) intention 
distinct from that of the flesh-and-blood author is made humorously clear in Booth’s 
essay, “Why Ethical Criticism Can Never Be Simple.”5 There, Booth talks about part of 
the process of making art as the gradual elimination of “rival selves” as subsequent drafts 
of a work become focused on a certain range of choices. He illustrates this point by 
quoting a brief conversation with Saul Bellow, in which he asks Bellow what he is 
actually doing as he spends hours each day revising a novel. “Oh, just cutting out those 
parts of myself that I don’t like,” responds Bellow. Booth points out that in this process 
of revision, Bellow “was changing the text’s intentions, which slowly became a different 
thing from the flesh-and-blood author’s original muddied intentions as he wrote many 
earlier drafts: a new, and presumably superior, self was created.”6 
The idea of the implied author is an inventive way of getting around the 
sometimes shocking abyss that readers may experience when they meet the writer of a 
                                                
4 Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1983), 71. Quotes and the parenthetical page numbers in the rest of this paragraph 
are from this text. 
5 Booth, “Why Ethical Criticism Can Never Be Simple,” in Mapping the Ethical Turn: A 
Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory, ed. Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack 
(Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 2001), 16–29. 
6 Ibid., 22. Elsewhere, Booth says, “One major act in the creation of any great text is the 
writer’s successful effort to slough off mediocrity. Authors often report their surprise in 
discovering a new, superior self. Some writers in fact attempt to elevate their lives to live 
up to their invented second selves …, but the gap inevitably remains large. No human 
being was ever as witty and mature and generous-spirited as the imagined geniuses who 
give us the works of Shakespeare or Jane Austen or Flaubert or Henry James.” (Wayne 
C. Booth, Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979], 275.) 
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well-loved book. How can there be such a gap, we wonder, between an inspired, inspiring 
literary work and a flesh-and-blood writer who may come across as trite and arrogant, or 
even as a cynical nihilist? The implied author seems to come into existence somewhere in 
between the actual author and the reader. It is the writer’s invention and skill that bring a 
book into basic existence, but a book does not come alive until it is read—and when that 
happens, it often seems to take on a life of its own. It is this new creature, the voice that 
speaks to the reader through the words of the writer, that is described by Booth’s term 
“implied author.” It is, in a sense, the experiment that the flesh-and-blood writer is 
making with the particular words that make up a particular story. It is also, in a sense, the 
author imagined by the reader in the reading of a book. In fact, one of the quotations with 
which Booth heads Part II of The Company We Keep is a quote from Herman Melville to 
this very effect: “No man can read a fine author, and relish him to his very bones, while 
he reads, without subsequently fancying to himself some ideal image of the man and his 
mind. And if you rightly look for it, you will almost always find that the author himself 
has somewhere furnished you with his own picture.”7 And in fact, the implied author as 
the author imagined by the reader is further complicated by the common habit of 
referring to a work of art by the name of its artist. (This is true of many forms of art, not 
just literature; when you hear someone refer to “a Van Gogh,” you know that an artwork 
by Van Gogh is what is usually being referred to.) When I talk about “Cynthia Voigt” or 
“Ursula Le Guin,” discussing their offers of friendship with human friends, I am using 
the name of the writer to talk about my experience of an implied author. It is apparent 
that the implied author is very difficult to pin down. Not only does a flesh-and-blood 
                                                
7 Herman Melville, quoted in Booth, The Company We Keep, 157. I’m sure this idea can 
be applied to female readers and writers as well. 
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writer potentially create a different implied author in every written work, but every reader 
may understand a work to have a different implied author as well. 
However, that the implied author is difficult to pin down does not make it useless 
as a metaphor. I find that the idea of the implied author makes so much sense intuitively 
that I did not realize at first that Booth never either explicitly defines or specifically 
defends the concept. The closest he comes to a definition is a rephrasing of a term, such 
as “a given fiction—which is to say, a given implied author”8 or “the core of norms and 
choices which I am calling the implied author”9 or “the implied author, the creating 
person who is implied by the totality of a given work when it is offered to the world”10 or 
“‘The writer’s responsibility to the work’ can thus be translated as ‘the writer’s 
responsibility to the implied author.’”11 Interestingly, in Booth’s fullest discussion of the 
concept, which comes as part of a discussion of whether authors can or should be neutral, 
he bemoans the “curious fact that we have no terms either for this created ‘second self’ or 
for our relationship with him. None of our terms for various aspects of the narrator is 
quite accurate.”12  
Although Booth did not apparently realize it at the time, he had hit upon a term 
that is sufficiently accurate to have become the standard term for the concept in the 
discussion of literature. The Rhetoric of Fiction was recognized as a landmark text almost 
immediately upon its publication, garnering widespread approval.13 The concept of 
implied author was soon recognized as not just part of a rhetorical approach to literature, 
                                                
8 Booth, The Company We Keep, 91. 
9 Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 74. 
10 Booth, Critical Understanding, 269. 
11 Booth, The Company We Keep, 128. 
12 Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 73. 
13 Kindt and Müller, The Implied Author: Concept and Controversy, 69. 
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but an important concept with implications for the wider discussion of textual 
interpretation and narrative theory.14 It also very quickly became a subject of debate—a 
debate which has continued to the present day.15  
Although a full discussion of the concept is outside the scope of my project, 
Booth’s idea of the implied author offers a helpful path toward a conversation on how we 
relate to books philosophically.16 In my view, the term seems to do the work he asks of it 
even without an explicit theoretical foundation.17 For my own purposes, then, I find it 
                                                
14 Ibid., 74. John Killham’s essay “The ‘Second Self’ in Novel Criticism” (The British 
Journal of Aesthetics [1966] 6[3]: 272–90. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/6.3.272) began the 
discussion of the concept as applicable to debates beyond a rhetorical approach to 
literature. 
15 Interlocutors in the overarching debate can be widely grouped into three main 
categories: (1) those who emphasize that the implied author is a streamlined version of 
the real author; (2) those who emphasize that the implied author is constructed by the 
reader and/or identified with the text; (3) those who believe that the concept of implied 
author is incoherent (largely because in its original form it appears to encompass both 
positions 1 and 2) and/or unnecessary (largely because the work it does can be done by 
other terms). James Phelan is the best-known name in the first category; Brian 
Richardson, Seymour Chatman, and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (who suggests “inferred 
author” as a preferable term) are representatives of the second category; Mieke Bal, 
Gérard Genette, and Ansgar Nünning are significant proponents of the third category. 
16 For a detailed description of the history and reception of the “implied author” concept, 
see Kindt and Müller, The Implied Author: Concept and Controversy. 
17 This lack of explicit definition is often a self-conscious approach on Booth’s part. For 
example, in introducing his concept of methodological pluralism in his book Critical 
Understanding, Booth says, “My way among ways charting ways is—I think 
fortunately—not of the kind that can be cleanly defined at the beginning. It is more a way 
of living with variety than of subduing it. … Here at the beginning I can only suggest 
how the pluralist attitude toward diverse acts of critical understanding differs from other 
attitudes, and I may make it seem like a mere expression of undefended and unarguable 
faith. I can only hope that by the end, though it will still not be ‘proved’ by the standards 
of some epistemologies, it will have been proved in that honorable and traditional sense: 
tested, explored, and found adequate to (and in the service of) our actual experience of 
literature and our ways of talking about it” (Booth, Critical Understanding, 3). As I hope 
is made clear throughout this dissertation, I follow Booth in the conviction that the 
approach of living with variety rather than subduing it is often more appropriate, 
accurate, and helpful than the fabricated clarity that sometimes comes with an attempt at 
strict definitions, especially when the topic at hand is as unruly as fiction. 
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sufficient to treat the implied author as a useful metaphor.18 Simply put, when we think of 
the fact that a single author sometimes writes books representing quite different views of 
the world—and that this sense of perspective can be distinct from any one narrating 
character, as well—we can see that it is helpful to have some way to refer to this 
perspective apart from the actual author and the fictional(ized) characters. Whether 
“fictional or historical, elevated or vulgar, welcoming or hostile on the surface,” every 
implied author invites us to spend time in friendship, says Booth. “As soon as someone 
takes the trouble to get my attention, by publishing or by talking to me, the offer of some 
benefit or pleasure or companionship is undeniable.”19  
 
                                                
18 Those who criticize the term tend to do so on technical grounds, based on their specific 
articulations of various assumed or defended norms for how we should speak about texts 
and authors. For example, one of the earliest commentators on the topic, Peter Swiggart, 
complains that Booth should not conceive of the implied author “in moral terms that are 
appropriate only to human individuals and not to their artistic creations” (Swiggart 1963, 
143, quoted in Kindt and Müller, The Implied Author: Concept and Controversy, 73). 
Similarly, Killham argues that it is inappropriate to use a single concept to discuss both 
an author’s action on a text and the composition of the work as a whole (Killham, “The 
‘Second Self’ in Novel Criticism,” 288). Clearly, the determination of what is an 
appropriate or inappropriate way to speak about books in the field of literary criticism is 
part of a larger conversation that is outside of the scope of this project. However, 
Swiggart’s and Killham’s declarations are examples of the kind of statement that Booth 
frequently draws attention to, pointing out that these are normative claims which 
themselves need to be defended rather than assumed. For an excellent example of 
Booth’s approach to this kind of “hidden” normative framework, see his assessment of 
Richard Posner’s rejection of ethical criticism (Wayne C. Booth, “Why Banning Ethical 
Criticism is a Serious Mistake,” Philosophy and Literature 22, no. 2 [October 1998], 
366–93). In this article, Booth points out with exceptional clarity the way in which 
Posner repeatedly violates his own rejection of ethical criticism by engaging in ethical 
criticism under various disguises. This is a point that Booth makes frequently throughout 
his writings. 
19 Booth, The Company We Keep, 174. 
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Criteria for quality 
It is immediately apparent from the friendship metaphor that we need to 
distinguish between different kinds of friendships. Booth looks to the ancient tradition of 
inquiry into friendship to discern three basic categories of friendship: friendship based on 
the giving and receiving of pleasure, friendship based on the giving and receiving of 
immediate gain, and full friendship, which is worthwhile simply because of the quality of 
life the friends experience while together.20 Every implied author, claims Booth, offers 
one of these kinds of friendship to the reader. Of course, not every friendship is healthy, 
and not every offer of friendship has the same value. Booth reminds us that one important 
question is: Does a narrative work invite rich inquiry, or merely tolerate it?21 When we 
make choices among offers of friendship, we are making ethical decisions that affect who 
we will be while with the friends we choose; we are formed by the company we keep. 
And trying to determine whether an offer is from a true friend or a fraud is no easier in 
literature than in life, says Booth.22 When we pick up a book, we are making an 
acquaintance; whether or not we will allow this acquaintance to ripen into friendship 
depends on whether the implied author can convince us, so to speak, to spend the time 
doing so. If we find that the implied author’s offer of friendship does not seem worth our 
time—whether because we find the potential friend boring, preachy, offensive, or simply 
incomprehensible—we will reject the offer. 
What will keep us conversing with a narrative? Booth presents a set of seven 
“spectrums of quality” that will vary in every friendship, narrative or human. These 
spectrums are as follows: quantity of invitations offered; degree of responsibility or 
                                                
20 Ibid., 173. 
21 Ibid., 220. 
22 Ibid., 178. 
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reciprocity asked of us; degree of intimacy; intensity of engagement; coherence of 
proffered world; distance between narrative world and ours (“otherness”); and kind or 
range of kinds of activities suggested, invited, or demanded.23 Different readers will 
prefer different points on each spectrum, but all will shy away from all of the extremes of 
the spectrums, Booth contends. Even those who argue for one extreme or another will 
reach a limit of tolerance at some point along the continuum.24 
If we consider examples toward either end of each scale, we can see more clearly 
what Booth is getting at. In terms of quantity, compare a single immense work like James 
Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake to a short story by Flannery O’Connor, which, although it may 
offer many invitations, is still simply quantitatively smaller than a much larger work. In 
terms of reciprocity, compare James Joyce’s tone of learned genius to the comradely 
Ogden Nash. In terms of intimacy, compare the full disclosure of characters’ thoughts 
and feelings in Kathryn Stockett’s The Help to the external view of characters presented 
in the writings of Nathaniel Hawthorne. In terms of intensity, compare the simple 
recounting of Aesop’s fables to the gripping horror of Suzanne Collins’s The Hunger 
Games. In terms of coherence, compare Lewis Carroll’s delightful inconsistencies with 
Henry James’s quest for fictional harmony. In terms of otherness, compare the multiple 
strangenesses of Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children with the significance of the 
everyday brought to the fore in the stories of Jean Little. And finally, in terms of range, 
compare the stylized simplicity of Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Ugly Duckling” with 
the complex scope of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. We can see that on 
any of these scales, going too far to an extreme will turn every reader off. If we consider 
                                                
23 Ibid., 179–80. 
24 Ibid., 181. 
 133  
the scale of distance between the narrative world and ours, for example, complete 
otherness would be unintelligible, whereas complete familiarity would be monotonous. 
These seven scales offer a helpful basis for considering the relative quality of the 
books we read. This is not to say that there is a certain place on each scale, or even a 
particular balance among all the scales, that would be the ideal for all books, or even for 
all the readers of one book. We may be tempted to think that because we are talking 
about criteria and quality, there must be an ideal somewhere. Here we find ourselves once 
again faced with the specter of pseudo-universality—the desire to gather particulars into 
generalities that can be normatively universalized. Rather, Booth’s spectrums offer us 
reference points when we compare literary works to each other and when we discuss 
them with each other. Considering a book I have read with these spectrums in mind, I can 
say something like “The Greater Trumps by Charles Williams maintains a powerful 
intensity and intimacy while remaining sometimes both a little too cosmic in range and a 
little too limited in the kinds of invitations it offers.” Booth’s vocabulary offers me a way 
to think about the book that helps me to identify its strengths and weaknesses as I 
experienced them, and discuss my interpretation in terms of sharable criteria. In this way, 
we can have discussions regarding quality without requiring universally applicable 
standards. 
Along the same lines, another advantage—and one that Booth is certainly not 
unaware of—is that these seven scales allow for variety in taste and context. Not every 
good book needs to have the same balance of virtues, but a book that is in some way too 
far to the extremes on a variety of these scales is much less likely to be worth spending 
much time with. I suspect that not every quality has the same ethical relevance, either. In 
 134  
contemporary, highly partisan North American culture, for example, a healthy dose of 
“otherness” is recognizably significant for a reader’s ethical development, at least when 
the implied author treats otherness in a generous way. Sheer quantity, on the other hand, 
may not be as ethically relevant to this culture at this time.  
 
Becoming like our friends 
Booth addresses the question of what kind of company a narrative offers us while 
we are reading or listening to it through a consideration of how it affects “who we are.” 
When we spend time with a narrative or human companion, who we are is impacted in 
some way by who we are with, says Booth. The way that Booth describes this impact is 
that stories of any kind will only work as stories if the reader wants to spend time 
listening to them for some reason; in other words, they create “patterns of desire.” While 
reading, the reader becomes involved in desiring some kind of future fulfillment.25 Again, 
if we had no desire to be fulfilled, whether simply for the conclusion of the story or even 
for some kind of aesthetic completion of form, we would simply stop reading or listening. 
This patterning of desires is the basis and reason for ethical criticism. Specifically, 
ethical criticism for Booth has to do with appraising and judging, but also with character 
and habit. It addresses issues both normative and practical. When we enter into a 
narrative friendship, we are allowing our desires to be formed by the company we keep. 
Says Booth, “We may not want to call this patterning of desires (by no means confined to 
narrowly moral domains) a practical effect, but it does have one obvious and inescapable 
effect on the reader’s practice: it determines who he or she is to be for the duration of the 
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experience.”26 Booth demonstrates the ethical importance of how spending time with a 
narrative affects who we are through an examination of how the first few pages of Peter 
Benchley’s thriller Jaws fits on his seven spectrums of quality. He concludes that 
especially on the scales of otherness and range, this book makes a bad friend: It narrows 
the world into a place of stereotyped villains and heroes where anything that is not 
understood is automatically to be shunned, and where physical survival and pleasure are 
the only important goals.27 Booth takes it as self-evident—and I agree—that the ethical 
narrowness the book displays on these scales is not a good thing.  
The example of Jaws demonstrates how when we read a story, it tries—
metaphorically speaking—to mold us into the shapes the author has built into its 
structure. Entering a narrative world unavoidably gives us practice in being “that kind of 
desirer”—wanting, fearing, loving, or laughing according to the shape of the story—
unless, Booth suggests, we practice some kind of ethical criticism in response.28 This 
approach of considering what kind of character we are practicing when we immerse 
ourselves in a story allows for a nuanced assessment of the ethical quality of various 
narratives. Booth points out the subtlety available in ethical criticism that pays attention 
to the time we spend with a narrative as a friend: “Our interest here is in how we are 
shaped, far more than in what any seeming spokesman for the author may do or say at 
particular moments. Obviously when we think in this way, some of the most piously 
intended, openly moralistic works will reveal themselves as ethically shoddy, and some 
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works with aggressive surface teachings of ‘the wrong kind’ might well prove, through 
the quality of the journey, ethically admirable.”29 
 
Evaluating friendships 
Besides Booth’s seven spectrums of quality, how we experience a narrative 
ethically depends on a number of other factors that are visible within the metaphor of 
friendship. Booth contends that how we talk about what a work does for us depends on 
what it claims to do, how we experience what it does, what we know about what the 
original readers were expected to bring to it, and what we infer about its intention 
(whether it is meant to be serious or satirical, and so on). When our expectations change, 
our opinion of a work’s formal and ethical worth changes as well.30 And, of course, 
different readers have different biases and skills, and so will experience the same work 
differently. Just as we don’t all choose the same human friends, we choose different 
narrative friends as well. At the same time, it is evident that some friends have more to 
offer than others.  
Booth is very clear about the fact that he is calling for conversation, not 
consensus, in the appraisals we make of literary friends. This conversation will 
necessarily be multi-dimensional, since the choices we make about which literary friends 
we will spend time with are not simple. We balance gifts against deficiencies, which 
makes sense, since none of the qualities we look for in a narrative friend are desirable if 
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they are limitless. Pushing any one quality too far at the expense of the others will 
destroy any friendship, says Booth.31  
Booth emphasizes that differences in evaluation are vital to this project; without 
them, he admits that his metaphor would be useless or outright dangerous. Trying to 
determine a fixed point at which we can say that a certain narrative is so completely 
lacking on all of the spectrums of quality that it is not worth reading is the mistake of 
censors.32 Who can say that something is irredeemable in every life context? A story that 
might be useless or damaging to one person might open up new worlds for another. 
Perhaps even Jaws might be the first step for a “reluctant reader” on a journey that could 
lead to the greatest classics. And in literature, as in life, we judge relative quality but 
don’t associate only with the best. As Booth says, “we can and do embrace many kinds 
and levels, with no assurance that we can finally discover that they are in harmony.”33 
Booth’s desire for both criteria and conversation is very much in line with the 
perspective of principled plurality that I have been presenting throughout this 
dissertation. The impulse to ask the question “How should we live?” makes the search for 
criteria desirable, while the fact of human plurality calls for flexibility and a recognition 
of both the always-partial and the poly-storied nature of our ethical judgments. 
 
The characters we are 
An integral part of Booth’s friendship metaphor is his emphasis on the reader’s 
character, and he claims that, until recently, it was assumed that it is possible to 
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distinguish good from bad character, and that the point of talking about character is to 
improve it.34 As I have suggested, this is his way of expressing the same question I have 
taken up from Nussbaum as humanity’s central ethical question: How should one live? 
Everyone who has read much “knows” that narratives influence behavior, Booth points 
out, and yet our culture—while flooded with projects for self-improvement—generally 
ignores the role of literary company in the formation of character.35 Part of what Booth 
identifies as a widespread suspicion toward ethical criticism of stories is that since the 
Enlightenment, people have increasingly thought of character not as something built or 
formed through experience but as something individual and indivisible within, found by 
probing inward for the “the real me.” Yet when we attempt to peel off the layers of 
“inauthentic” influences, such as church, family, politics, and so on, we find emptiness 
rather than bedrock.36 Many thinkers have tried to point out that an isolated individual 
self does not and cannot exist, Booth recounts, but the idea of the self as a private 
individual has resisted attempts to dethrone it in North American culture.37  
Despite this resistance, however, Booth casts his vote—and his powerfully 
persuasive rhetoric—on the side of the dissenters: “to attempt to go it alone is to destroy a 
‘self’ that one never ‘possessed’ in the first place. To break off from my ‘others’ is to 
break off parts of my self.”38 Part of the reason for the persistence of individualism, 
explains Booth, is in reaction to excessive conformisms. We see this in modern literature 
as well as in the political sphere. Booth points out that our literary heroes are often those 
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who hold out against some dangerous group pressure. Ironically, these heroes of 
individualism would certainly be immune to the literary influences that have helped 
shape the way we think of the ideal individual as isolated and combatively resistant to 
conformity.39 
Booth’s conception of character, then, is of a complex, multi-layered phenomenon 
that involves the taking on and trying out of various roles and characteristics over time.40 
When we read, the patterning of our desires that we experience is a way of practicing 
character, and the more we practice, the more we will develop the characteristics and 
skills we find in the narrative. According to Booth, the more we become involved in a 
narrative, the more we become like our picture of the implied author, as we see, feel, 
love, or mock what he or she sees, feels, loves, or mocks.41 That we become more 
discriminating as we mature does not mean that being mature means not “succumbing” at 
all. Our character, which Booth also describes “in the larger sense of the range of choices 
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40 We can hear echoes here of Ricoeur’s concept of “understanding oneself in front of the 
text”: “It is not a question of imposing on the text our finite capacity for understanding, 
but of exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarged self, which would 
be the proposed existence corresponding in the most suitable way to the world proposed.” 
Likewise, although again in terms more expansive than I am willing to use, “just as the 
world of the text is real only insofar as it is imaginary, so too it must be said that the 
subjectivity of the reader comes to itself only insofar as it is placed in suspense, 
unrealized, potentialized. In other words, if fiction is a fundamental dimension of the 
reference of the text, it is no less a fundamental dimension of the subjectivity of the 
reader. As reader, I find myself only by losing myself. Reading introduces me into the 
imaginative variations of the ego.” (Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of 
Distanciation,” in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermenutics, II, trans. Kathleen 
Blamey and John B. Thompson [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press], 88.) Like 
Booth, however, I am interested in this interaction specifically in terms of ethical 
character rather than overall self-identity. 
41 Booth, The Company We Keep, 256. 
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and habits of choice available to us,” is, he claims, largely affected by what we feed our 
imaginations.42  
Comparing Booth’s claims about character and the way it is influenced by the 
narratives we immerse ourselves in with my own claims about how the books we read 
contribute to our responses to the question of how we should live, one can see that we are 
using slightly different vocabularies to discuss similar themes. Booth’s anti-individualist 
emphasis allows us to avoid the individualist’s need for rules and formulas. We can try 
on any role for size, Booth contends, since we need not be anxious about preserving a 
unique core apart from the connections we are a part of.43  
Booth identifies three possible ways for a reader to interact with a narrative: 
uncritical surrender, unchanged distance, or surrender plus ethical criticism, which can 
take the form of either supplementing a narrative with other narratives or discussing it 
with other people.44 “Just as anyone who limits all friendship to one person risks 
becoming a partner in a folie-à-deux, a reader who becomes wholly absorbed with one 
author or one kind of narrative risks becoming grossly misshapen or, at best, frozen in 
one spot,” so Booth prescribes a varied narrative diet for all readers: “Powerful narratives 
provide our best criticism of other powerful narratives, our best antidote against any one 
thoughtlessly adopted role.”45 We practice ethical criticism whenever we surrender to a 
narrative that does not simply reinforce our current fixed norms. This surrender is not a 
simple capitulation that sweeps away the reader’s own normative framework; however, 
Booth truly believes that when we let a story “in,” so to speak, we open ourselves to an 
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alternate perspective that becomes part of our own internal ethical conversation.46 This in 
itself is an act of ethical criticism, Booth insists. Like Nussbaum, though, Booth values an 
overt, non-narrative, critical appreciation of a narrative as an important form of ethical 
criticism, while recognizing that this form can never take the place of narratives 
themselves.47 
One key insight to be gained from Booth’s emphasis on multiple perspectives and 
character roles among people and within ourselves is that it is not only okay, but 
beneficial that readers will not always agree in their ethically critical discussions. As we 
listen to each other’s responses to the stories we have spent time with, we will bring our 
own contexts and judgments to bear on the conversation. Perhaps praise is especially 
worth taking note of, since we can see from the friendship metaphor that enjoyment is 
tied to understanding. In a sense, what we like about a story could be considered 
normatively prior to what we dislike. After all, to really understand a book well enough 
to reject it, we must have spent time with it as a friend. 
 
                                                
46 Booth’s understanding of the way a text “enters into” the reader is reminiscent of 
Gadamer’s description of a conversation with a text, in which “one partner in the 
hermeneutical conversation, the text, speaks only through the other partner, the 
interpreter. Only through him are the written marks changed back into meaning. 
Nevertheless, in being changed back by understanding, the subject matter of which the 
text speaks itself finds expression. It is like a real conversation in that the common 
subject matter is what binds the two partners, the text and the interpreter, to each other. 
When a translator interprets a conversation, he can make mutual understanding possible 
only if he participates in the subject under discussion; so also in relation to a text it is 
indispensable that the interpreter participate in its meaning” (Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, 2d, rev. ed., trans. rev. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall [New 
York: Continuum, 2004], 389). From this perspective as well, it makes sense to think of a 
story as somehow becoming part of the reader, since it is only through participating in the 
story through the act of reading (and therefore interpreting) that a story exists as other 
than print on a page. 
47 Booth, The Company We Keep, 285. 
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Worlds  
Toward the end of The Company We Keep, Booth expands his metaphor of 
friendship into a metaphor of worlds, since he feels that the vocabulary of friendship 
cannot quite sufficiently address the “metaphoric worlds” that some authors offer. These 
authors insist that the picture of the world they are presenting really is the way the world 
is, not just the way it seems. Choosing between imaginative worlds can sometimes be 
more like choosing between religions than choosing which friend to spend the day with, 
says Booth.48 Booth appears to make this move partly because some of the examples he 
works with in this section are more insistent about the way the world is and how we must 
respond to it; responding to Norman Mailer by saying “Good to see you; I hope we can 
chat again soon” would indicate that we have totally missed what he is saying. 
Actually, though, I think the friendship metaphor does not need to be expanded in 
this way. Perhaps Booth feels this move is necessary because of his authentic sense of 
how huge and mysterious our interaction with metaphor is. But human friends, too, live 
in different metaphoric worlds, and we can certainly spend time with different people 
without having to make a religious choice to fully imbibe their worldviews. And human 
friends, too, can be very insistent about the way the world is and how we must respond to 
it, but again that does not mean that we must fully enter into their perspectives in order to 
communicate with them. Booth’s emphasis on metaphor actually demonstrates this very 
point: “Even when an author explicitly claims to represent the one true world, everyone 
who is not totally converted to that one view can see that it is at best a metaphor, an 
abstraction torn from the heart of an ever-elusive and impenetrable mystery: the whole of 
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things.”49 The vocabulary of worlds, in fact, makes it more difficult for Booth to 
communicate his own ideas to thinkers like Nussbaum, as we will see later. 
Notably, Booth does not make use of the term “implied author” during his 
discussion of metaphorical worlds, and this makes his use of the term “author” somewhat 
nebulous, since the intentions of the actual writer would not necessarily be of foremost 
importance. In my reading of this section, I take Booth’s “author” to mean “implied 
author.” It may be that in these cases of an author insisting that a certain perspective 
represents the one true world, the writer is attempting to assimilate the implied author, so 
to speak, rather than letting the work speak for itself. 
The overt discussion of metaphor is very important to Booth’s argument for 
polyphonic truth. He insists that in order to take seriously contradictory metaphors while 
avoiding absurd contradictions, we must recognize that metaphoric statements cannot be 
treated as direct propositions that conflict logically with each other.50 Booth’s response to 
the question of how to deal with contradictory metaphors is to acknowledge that all 
statements of truth are partial, and to embrace the resulting plurality: “At any one 
moment we have a relatively small collection of worlds that we take together as a pretty 
good summary of the ‘real.’ But each new encounter with a powerful narrative throws a 
critical light on our previous collection. We can embrace its additions and negations 
vigorously, so long as we remember that like all the others, this is a metaphoric 
construction: a partial structure that stands in place of, or ‘is carried over from,’ whatever 
Reality may be.”51 Like me, Booth claims, then, to treat narratives and philosophies as 
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rivals not because they are all “fictions” but because they are all philosophical. And he 
insists that we recognize that we cannot harmonize all the different narratives we imbibe 
or even all that we appreciate. According to Booth, “Human life is inherently, 
inescapably multivalent, poly-storied, pluri-mythic.”52 He points to the disasters that have 
resulted from insistently mono-mythic endeavors, arguing that skepticism too is a result 
of the attempt to find one correct myth or grand narrative. He therefore holds to the 
assumptions that every “going” myth has some truth to it or it would have been 
discarded, that no one myth can give any culture all it needs, and that although mono-
myths may occasionally seem to serve better, at this point in history we are so entwined 
in rival myths that we need a scrupulously pluralistic ethical criticism to make sense of 
things.53 As I see it, these assumptions show a recognition of the intrinsic plurality of 
human life, as well as the positive side of the complexity that arises from that plurality. 
They also point to our inability to articulate all that is of ethical significance; we cannot 
simply lay out different ethical perspectives and decide between them. Mono-myths are 
not the bridges between myths that they pretend to be. Stories, on the other hand, make 
very good bridges, or at least trampolines. 
One of the reasons that Booth values the differences among grand narratives is 
that no one metaphoric construction can easily address some aspects of life that other 
grand narratives address effectively. Each rival metaphoric world perspective can profit 
from comparison to and criticism by others. Booth goes so far as to claim that every 
event is inescapably plural as it occurs, since each participant will experience it 
differently. The only way around this would be if everyone involved could reach a single 
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rational judgment about it; however, Booth claims, the surest sign that people are not 
reasoning together is if they totally agree. Thus we must not just tolerate different 
viewpoints, but actively seek them out. If we do not find them, “we must suspect 
collusion or coercion.”54 
A plurality of perspectives that are not easily reconciled is the very aspect that 
makes the work of many well-known authors so appealing. That many disparate elements 
can converse with each other in and through story both reveals and responds to the 
complexities of our own lives. As Michael Cadden writes in his book about author Ursula 
K. Le Guin, “Dialogue, while concerned with interdependence, does not insist upon a 
synthesized or reconciled position but revels in simultaneous, separate, and equally 
powerful positions in concert with each other.”55  
 
Friend, lover, or companion? 
These thoughts should sound familiar to anyone who has been introduced to 
Hannah Arendt’s insistence on the intrinsically plural nature of human life. Nussbaum, 
however, is not satisfied with this kind of talk. In her lengthy review of The Company We 
Keep, published as an essay in Love’s Knowledge, she makes a number of interesting 
points. She summarizes and lauds Booth’s call for reflection on the literary friendships 
we take part in. Booth’s idea of “coduction”—a kind of communal, conversational 
process of judgment—also lines up well with Nussbaum’s call for a conversation to come 
to always-revisable judgments. But Nussbaum draws back from the possibility of outright 
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contradiction—from the concert of irreconcilable positions referred to by Cadden. 
Nussbaum is drawn to a certain kind of dialogue, and a certain kind of friend; despite her 
commitment to inclusive conversation, she is uncomfortable with the possibility of real 
internal contradiction at a fundamental level. 
In fact, Nussbaum is not entirely satisfied with Booth’s project on several counts. 
For one, she wishes that he would have said more about how novels are unique. 
Nussbaum says that novels “offer a distinctive patterning of desire and thought, in virtue 
of the ways in which they ask readers to care about particulars, and to feel for those 
particulars a distinctive combination of sympathy and excitement.”56 Of course, this is 
Nussbaum’s pet project, but a significant point nonetheless. Booth has made a very 
general argument for the metaphor of narrative friendship. In retrospect, the only 
exception to the applicability of his argument I can think of that he mentions explicitly, if 
somewhat tongue-in-cheek, is a “required reading” list. He addresses numerous examples 
throughout the book, ranging from advertising ditties to various forms of poetry to 
massive novels to cheap escape literature. In a sense, then, the question of how each 
narrative form is unique is beyond the scope of his project. But the question remains as to 
whether certain forms—as opposed to simply better quality within any form—have more 
to offer, ethically speaking. 
Nussbaum’s next complaint is a bit more complex. She suggests first of all that 
Booth elides between the language of friendship and the language of seduction. She 
classes his use of terms such as “succumb” and “surrender” as erotic, and opposed to 
Booth’s self-confessed adherence to the ideal of Aristotelian friendship, which, says 
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Nussbaum, has the friends maintain independence and critical autonomy. This is the point 
at which Nussbaum would like to assert distinctions among genres. Philosophical texts, 
she asserts, unlike novels, generally “do not invite the reader to fall in love.”57 
However, I think Booth’s metaphor holds up here. Although Booth does insist 
that if we are really to spend time in friendship with a narrative, we must in some sense 
come to it trustingly, there is no sense that we therefore lose our independence or critical 
autonomy. Indeed, if a text tries to go “too far,” we will almost inevitably either reject it 
or become inadvertently distanced from it even as we read. This is as true for 
philosophical texts (insofar as they can be called narrative) as it is for novels. And it 
appears that Nussbaum does recognize this to a certain extent. In the paragraph following 
her claim that philosophical texts ask readers to be wary and distrustful, she 
acknowledges that some do offer friendship. And just a few paragraphs later she goes 
even further, saying, “For philosophy, too, has its seductive power, its power to lure the 
reader away from the richly textured world of particulars to the lofty heights of 
abstraction.”58  
It seems that Nussbaum’s recognition of the novel’s special power leads her to 
attempt distinctions that she doesn’t actually follow through. Perhaps she is simply trying 
to emphasize that some friendships are healthier than others. Booth’s friendship metaphor 
never denies that some friendships are better and offer more than others, however, and I 
don’t think it rules out the occasional seduction, either. I suspect that Nussbaum actually 
wants to compare alternatives within the Aristotelian perspective, while Booth wants to 
let alternatives, including the Aristotelian perspective, criticize each other. 
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Still, though, Nussbaum’s question does point to something: Are all those we 
spend time with really our friends? Booth talks about different kinds and levels of 
friendship, but perhaps that is still sometimes too strong of a word. When we are 
following metaphors through, the choice of words we make is vital, since a different 
word choice can change the import of the entire metaphor. We can spend at least some 
time with, and therefore be impacted by, people or books who might be better described 
by a word other than “friend.” Some books, like some people, are simply companions, I 
suggest. We spend time with them, and are at least somewhat patterned by their patterns 
of desire, but without the commitment that a friendship entails. With a difference in 
degree, I suspect, comes a difference in kind.  
Does my choice of a different word for some cases affect the central import of 
Booth’s model? I don’t believe so. Our characters are still responsive to the company we 
keep, whether we keep company with friends or companions. Nussbaum’s desire to 
extend the metaphor in the opposite direction, so to speak, demonstrates its strength. Her 
suggestion that some books seduce us, rather than offering friendship, leads her to 
suggest as well that we can treat books in a way we couldn’t ethically treat human 
beings—by using them to mindlessly numb our worries.59 She hopes, then, that though 
hiring a prostitute is ethically damaging, crashing on the couch with a Dick Francis novel 
is not doing anyone any harm.  
Yet according to Booth’s metaphor—and I think he is accurate about this—
Nussbaum is still “harming” herself when she chooses to spend time with this 
companion. She is for that time fitting herself into a world of gratuitous violence and 
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“strong yet sensitive” machismo. (Yes, I occasionally read Dick Francis books too, but 
always with a sense that they are not doing me any good!) Even though Nussbaum’s 
worldview is very likely opposed to much of the implied author’s in any Dick Francis 
book, while she is reading it she does somehow submit to the fixed norms therein, 
becoming “that kind of desirer,” as Booth puts it, unless she is actively engaged in ethical 
criticism as she reads—which, if she is looking for mindless escape from the stresses of 
essay-writing, is probably not the case.  
 
Belief and metaphor 
Nussbaum’s most serious concern comes, I believe, from a misreading on her part 
and an unnecessary metaphorical extension on Booth’s. She is concerned about Booth’s 
pluralism when it comes to what she considers to be contradictory “world-versions.” This 
is her interpretation of Booth’s discussion of metaphoric worlds that I briefly addressed 
earlier. She seems to have been alerted to this potential problem by her standard 
oversensitivity to religious overtones; the first specific “contradiction” she refers to 
comes from a footnote on page 173, where Booth appears to support both the Aristotelian 
rational idea of friendship and the Christian command to love our enemies, which 
Nussbaum cannot reconcile. However, this is simply one example of a basic 
misunderstanding on her part. She states that “Booth explicitly urges the reader to take in, 
and to believe, a collection of cosmic myths” that are incoherent and contradictory.60  
However, when we look at the text she is referring to, we can see that Nussbaum 
has added a significant word, and therefore a significant concept, to what Booth is saying. 
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He does indeed say that “the total collection of cosmic myths that any one person can 
take in will always be to some degree incoherent and self-contradictory,” but nowhere 
does he say that we need to “believe” these myths. To “take in,” as I understand it, simply 
means to listen sympathetically to someone’s perspective, while to “believe” entails 
making that perspective one’s own. In the section referenced by Nussbaum, Booth is 
referring to the fact that, for example, Burke, Mailer, Tolstoy, Austen, Sophocles, Plato, 
Spinoza, Kant, and Saint Matthew all offer us a different perspective on what the world is 
really like.61 But Nussbaum is reading “cosmic myths” in a religious sense, apparently 
forgetting that Booth is talking about the metaphorical world that an implied author 
presents. These “myths” do not need to be “believed.” 
This misunderstanding is, I believe, evidence that Booth’s move from literary 
friendship to metaphorical world in his discussion of what an implied author offers the 
reader was a mistaken move. In an effort to make clear the sweeping presence of 
narrative metaphor, he has actually made it more difficult for readers like Nussbaum to 
follow his argument. Nussbaum notices the effort, but hasn’t been able to make sense of 
it. She says, “This more sweeping and problematic pluralism does not seem to be an 
easily eliminable feature in the book, since Booth makes such assertions often, as if they 
had some importance.”62 Indeed these assertions do have importance—they are central to 
Booth’s entire project of pointing out that “[h]uman life is inherently, inescapably 
multivalent, poly-storied, plurimythic.”63  
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This is where the metaphor of literary friendship is so helpful. Surely it is not only 
possible, but healthy, to have a wide variety of friendships and to participate in 
discussions with friends who have many different perspectives. The fact that I have been 
close friends since my first year in college with a conservative, politically right-leaning 
woman who believes that women should be subordinate to men—all perspectives to 
which I am strongly opposed—makes it impossible for me to doubt this. This friend and I 
share an earthy interest in the practical side of things, as well as a strong commitment to 
the inseparability of lifestyle and religion, even though our understandings of that 
religion are widely different at certain points. However, what we share has been enough 
to keep us friends through her diagnosis of diabetes, the breaking up and new formation 
of committed relationships, moves to different parts of the continent, the birth of my 
children, and her inability to have biological children and subsequent choices to foster 
and adopt at-risk babies. I have maintained friendships with books, too, that display 
perspectives I consider seriously problematic. A paradigmatic example would be Richard 
Adams’s Watership Down, a book that I have loved for many years. Its scope and power, 
and its deeply imagined rabbit culture, have allowed me to retain it as a friend despite its 
blatant, scientifically inaccurate male supremacism and militarism.64 Because it is so well 
written, I still find it worth spending time with even as I criticize its very serious 
shortcomings. That we are made up of incoherent, overlapping selves is what carries 
Booth’s entire argument; disconnects at certain points do not necessarily mean no 
connection is possible. 
                                                
64 Ursula K. Le Guin has written a brief but telling commentary on Watership Down in 
Cheek by Jowl: Talks and Essays on How and Why Fantasy Matters (Seattle: Aqueduct 
Press, 2009), 79–82. 
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The evidence of my own experience, then, demonstrates that as long as you and I 
have some point of significant connection, we can have a lasting, meaningful friendship 
even though we may passionately hold widely different viewpoints in other areas. And 
even if some of these friends do demand that we convert to their religion, or insist that 
they have the only true perspective, we can still see that it is possible to have other 
friends with other perspectives as well. But once we begin to talk about “cosmic myths,” 
it becomes more difficult to remember that conversation among different worldviews—
the most important form of ethical criticism in Booth’s discussion—is even possible.  
This demonstrates once again, I believe, that the metaphors of narrative friendship 
and companionship create an ideal space for ethical criticism and communal judgment. 
To put this to the test, I turn in the next chapter to an experiment of philosophical 
commentary on some of my own narrative friends, addressing as well the potentially 
companionable relationship between philosophy and fiction. 
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6.	Philosophical	Stories	
Many of us can name specific stories, told by others or in book form, that 
profoundly influenced the way we see the world—and thus, our lived philosophies. I 
have argued that a significant aspect of philosophical fiction’s—and, in particular, young 
adult fiction’s—valuable contribution to both lived and academic philosophy is its 
imaginative power to enlarge perspectives, criticize from the margins, and galvanize 
readers to engage with injustice in the context of the widespread tendencies toward 
pseudo-universality and pseudo-individuality that I described in Chapter 1.  
After explicating the distinction between lived and academic philosophy and 
situating my project among other conversations (Chapter 2), I argued for the 
philosophical and ethical significance of philosophical interaction with story (Chapter 3). 
I drew together the themes of the integrality of form and content, the ability of 
storytelling to act as critical thinking in context, and the key role of particularity in the 
context of plurality to point to the need for a way to approach fiction in its intrinsic 
plurality without losing the possibility of shared criteria. To address this need, I 
highlighted the inability of a causal model to sufficiently describe our interaction with 
fiction and discussed the reality that art both suggests and requires interpretation, arguing 
that fiction’s ethical contribution to philosophy needs to be understood as thoroughly 
hermeneutical (Chapter 4).  
In quest of a noncausal metaphor for interaction with fiction, I settled on narrative 
companionship, a variation of Wayne C. Booth’s metaphor of stories as friends (explored 
in Chapter 5), to show that it indeed makes sense that we feel varied influences when 
reading varied books, just as we do when we step out in companionship with varied 
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people. In this final chapter, I seek to demonstrate the fruitfulness of this metaphor. There 
are many ways of looking at stories other than treating them as companions, of course. 
As I indicated in Chapter 1, academic philosophy has tended to see stories as tools rather 
than companions. In this chapter, I consider these two basic approaches in terms of 
several stories that have informed my own lived philosophy. I seek to demonstrate 
through philosophical commentary that these stories have more to offer philosophically 
when they are approached as companions than when they are treated as tools.	
I address three stories, each of which I have experienced as a worthy companion 
in its own way. I demonstrate my understanding of Nussbaumian philosophical 
commentary by practicing it on each of these stories, summing up each discussion with a 
review of where the story stands in terms of Booth’s spectrums of quality: quantity of 
invitations offered, degree of responsibility or reciprocity asked of us, degree of intimacy, 
intensity of engagement, coherence of proffered world, distance between narrative world 
and ours (“otherness”), and kind or range of kinds of activities suggested, invited, or 
demanded. In seeking to demonstrate interactions with stories as companions, I do not 
approach the individual stories as if it were possible to determine a structure for the 
philosophical commentary before getting to know the story, as if a universalizable 
systematic analysis were my goal. Rather, I approach each story as a unique friend, 
seeking to make explicit some of what it has to offer to a philosophical engagement while 
respecting its unique integrality of form and content—what the story has to say and how 
it says it.	
In making my own attempt at philosophical commentary, I address two young 
adult novels and a contrasting short story to illustrate the two ways story is often used as 
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a philosophical tool: story-as-hammer and story-as-example. As I suggested in Chapter 1, 
these are the most common roles we find for fiction in philosophy, and they do have their 
uses. I note the usefulness inherent in these approaches, but also the limitations that a 
different way of reading gets beyond. In this way, I hope to throw into relief the kind of 
philosophical commentary that Nussbaum suggests will make more explicit the 
contributions of these works. Nussbaum’s call is a lofty one: 	
In order to be an ally of literature, and to direct the reader to that variety 
and complexity, rather than away from it, this Aristotelian style itself will 
have to differ greatly from much philosophical writing that we commonly 
encounter: for it will have to be non-reductive, and also self-conscious 
about its own lack of completeness, gesturing toward experience and 
toward the literary texts, as spheres in which a greater completeness 
should be sought. But it will need to differ from the novels as well, if it is 
going to show the distinctive features of the novels in a way that contrasts 
them with features of other conceptions. Both the literary works and the 
“philosophical criticism”	that presents them are essential parts of the 
overall philosophical task.1		
In line with my suggestion in the previous chapter that books are potential companions, I 
call this alliance story-as-companion. 	
 By bringing into the discussion Booth’s spectrums of quality, I hope to articulate 
the reader’s engagement with the story in a way that clarifies the differences between 
approaching stories as examples, hammers, or companions. Applying Booth's categories 
is, in a sense, a practice of orienting oneself to the particular companion one wants to 
engage in conversation. It is helpful to have some sense of a companion’s characteristics, 
knee-jerk reactions, taboo subjects, and so on, in order to have fruitful conversation. In 
this way, Booth’s spectrums make conversation more possible, more fruitful, although 
they aren’t themselves all that is necessary for conversation to happen, of course. With 
                                                
1 Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 49. 
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each story, then, I ask: How do Booth’s spectrums of quality help illumine the way in 
which treating stories as philosophical companions deals with the stories more fully than 
does treating them simply as tools?	
All of the stories I have chosen to discuss as philosophical fiction are centered 
around female protagonists. Reading these stories has played a part in the development of 
my own approach to the world, deepening my understanding of how the apparently 
negative events that occur in our lives contribute to our sense of self and increasing my 
self-awareness in regard to gender relations. They also do a particularly good job of 
exploring themes of ethical insight and enlarged mentality, and working them out in 
concrete, if imaginary, situations. While not necessarily addressing the question “How 
should we live?”	directly, the stories uniquely work to encourage a movement in the 
perspective of the reader which is likely to contribute to the reader’s lived philosophy as 
well.		
Example, hammer, and companion 
The first story I explore is Cynthia Voigt’s Izzy, Willy-Nilly,2 which addresses the 
ubiquitous issue of finding one’s place in the world through the story of a teenage girl 
facing up to the challenge of responding to an unexpected, difficult situation—in 
particular, the loss of her leg in a car accident caused by a drunk driver. Through my 
discussion of this book, I seek to make manifest its philosophical character and 
demonstrate the limitations of treating it as a philosophical example. To emphasize the 
difference between the story-as-example and story-as-companion, I address C.L. Moore’s 
                                                
2 Cynthia Voigt, Izzy, Willy-Nilly (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986). 
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“No Woman Born,”3 a science fictional short story that highlights issues of how the 
human mind and body interact through the story of a woman who receives a metal body 
when her human body dies. The other book-length work I have chosen is set in the 
fantastical world of Earthsea; Ursula K. Le Guin’s Tehanu4 is simply one of the best 
published works of feminist philosophy that I have ever come across. Through my 
exploration of how this book can be seen as feminist philosophy, I more thoroughly 
examine the issue of a story-as-hammer.	
As I indicated above, I identify two main approaches to philosophical fiction: 
story-as-tool and story-as-companion. The story-as-tool approach is further divided into 
two sub-categories: story-as-example and story-as-hammer. At the heart of the story-as-
example is that the reader recognizes a philosophical idea in a story, and uses the story to 
illustrate this idea in his or her commentary. The story is not seen to contribute anything 
new except in that its form may make the idea more clear, potent, or memorable. The 
goal of using the story-as-example is to clarify something. At the heart of the story-as-
hammer, on the other hand, is that an author has a philosophical idea and aims to express 
it through a story. The story is written for a predetermined end, to make a certain point. 
There is little question about what the message of the story is. The goal of using the 
story-as-hammer is to change someone.	
The story-as-example is a tool in service of philosophy; it is generally first of all 
an approach from the reader’s side, though some stories invite being used as examples 
more than others. This, of course, may be due to the philosophical climate and current 
                                                
3 C. L. Moore, “No Woman Born,” in Feminist Philosophy And Science Fiction: Utopias 
And Dystopias, ed. Judith A. Little (Potsdam, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 47–90. 
4 Ursula K. Le Guin, Tehanu (New York: Simon Pulse Paperbacks, 1990). 
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fads as much as to the stories themselves. Like the story-as-example, the story-as-
hammer is a tool in the service of philosophy; it is generally first of all an approach from 
the side of the author, although stories can certainly be experienced, read, or used as 
hammers when they were not intended as such. For example, when the reader finds the 
reality being presented in a story altogether too alien, he or she may experience the story 
as a hammer even though it was not intentionally written as such—coming face to face 
with too alternate of a reality can easily lead to defensiveness. 
A helpful way to see the distinction between the story-as-example and the story-
as-hammer is by considering where the weight of intentionality lies, so to speak. In the 
story-as-example, it is the reader’s intention to seize the story as an illustration of the 
reader’s own philosophical idea, whereas in the story-as-hammer, it is the author’s (or 
teacher’s or philosopher’s) intention to impact and change the reader with a philosophical 
idea. A spatial metaphor may be helpful here: In the story-as-example, the reader moves 
forward to act upon the text, while in the story-as-hammer, the reader is knocked 
backward by the force of the text. Again, this distinction is a matter of approach and 
experience, not a hard-and-fast characteristic of a certain story, although some stories 
clearly do invite one experience more than the other.  
Let me clarify that the distinction between whose intention is dominant is not 
meant to indicate that the story-as-example is only a matter of reader approach, or that the 
story-as-hammer is only dependent on the author. An author may also write a story to 
work through a thought experiment; this could easily constitute approaching the story as 
an example. Likewise, a reader can approach a story as a hammer by either taking a 
defensive stance toward it from the start or by seeking to use it as a hammer toward other 
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readers. In both the story-as-example and the story-as-hammer, the “point” of the story is 
in a sense separable from the story itself; it is a tool to be used either to clarify or to 
change.  
In contrast to the story-as-example and story-as-hammer, at the heart of story-as-
companion is philosophy and story working together, rather than making use of each 
other. In companionship with a story, philosophical commentary can make more explicit 
the contributions a story has to make philosophically. This is again primarily an approach 
on the side of the reader, although again some stories invite this kind of companionship 
more than others; it seems likely that these stories were approached as companions by 
their authors as well, although this is by no means necessary. 	
The distinct relationships to a story that I have identified as story-as-example, 
story-as-hammer, and story-as-companion are of course not as distinct as my 
identification makes them sound. There are gradations and variations from each to the 
others, and many commentaries	will contain elements of more than one. Also, as I 
mentioned above, stories can be approached in these ways by the author as well as by the 
reader, making them more or less available to various ways of reading. However, each of 
these categories does have a distinguishable kernel at its heart which, I think, makes the 
distinctions worthwhile and useful. Since my project focuses on philosophical 
commentary, I primarily address the way we approach stories as readers; making 
recommendations to authors is outside of my scope. 
We can see from the way I have expressed the distinctions between story-as-
example, story-as-hammer, and story-as-companion that the commentator, reader, and 
(implied) author all factor in to some extent. The intent of an author (or, perhaps more 
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relevant here, the metaphorical intent of an implied author), how we experience a story, 
and how we approach a story philosophically all interact with each other, in keeping with 
the thoroughly hermeneutical texture of philosophical fiction as an art form. Let’s turn to 
my area of focus, young adult fiction, beginning with Izzy, Willy-Nilly by Cynthia Voigt. 
This book has been an estimable companion on my own philosophical journey and a 
book I have returned to many times over the years.		
Izzy, Willy-Nilly 
Meet Izzy Lingard, a nice but normal upper-middle-class high school sophomore 
somewhere in the United States, sometime in the last few decades. Not someone you’d be 
especially interested in getting to know, but someone nice to have around when you do. 
Her family is nice and law-abiding—“we Lingards were nice people,” 5	she says early on 
in the book—intelligent but unimaginative. Izzy herself is somewhat eclipsed by very 
energetic older twin brothers and a moody and demanding younger sister, but she doesn’t 
think in depth about her place in the family, or much of anything else, for that matter. B 
student, plenty of friends, Izzy in the middle slips along through her life, normal enough 
to fight with her parents and nice enough to not do it too often. Nice. Normal.	
On the first page of Voigt’s Izzy, Willy-Nilly we meet Izzy in a state of semi-
consciousness as she is about to have her right leg amputated below the knee. The doctors 
call her by her full name, Isobel, which troubles her because nobody calls her that in her 
normal life. Through a brief but artistic series of flashbacks we follow Izzy through the 
lack of healing of her seriously damaged leg, and then further back to the cause of the 
                                                
5 Cynthia Voigt, Izzy, Willy-Nilly, 58. In the following discussion, all parenthetical page 
numbers refer to this book. 
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catastrophe: a normal date to an after-game party, until her drunk escort, Marco, insists 
on driving her home and instead drives her into a tree. From the amputation of her leg, 
we follow Izzy in her gradual transformation toward Isobel; she changes from a nice, 
normal nobody into a person who has developed depth and a sense of selfhood. Like 
many works of young adult fiction, Izzy, Willy-Nilly’s strong focus on character makes 
highly available the reader’s opportunity to step into someone’s shoes as the character 
changes. The reader can, in Booth’s terms, “try on” the character’s enlarging perspective.6 
More than this, we see—and, in a sense, experience—how something beyond the scope 
of a person’s possibilities can widen that person’s sense of what is possible.	
Because we meet Izzy at the moment of transition, so to speak, we have to take 
her word for it when she describes her past self. It is evident that her judgment is 
accurate, however, both from the way we see others respond to her and from the way she 
herself responds to what has happened. Her first question to herself when she wakes up in 
the hospital is, “What is a nice girl like me doing in a place like this?”	Her identity up 
until this point has been pretty much summed up by niceness: “A nice girl—that’s just 
exactly what I was. Am. Most of the people I know don’t want to be just nice. They want 
to be interesting, or exciting, romantic, terrific—something special. I don’t think I ever 
wanted to be more than nice. Nice suited me”	(2). As she slips into depression following 
abandonment by the friends, Suzy, Lisa, and Lauren, that she had assumed would stay 
around her, she articulates her first understanding of the change she has undergone: “I 
was supposed to be nice, that’s what I was, a nice girl.”	And then, “Not any more, that 
wasn’t what I was. Now I was a cripple”	(59). It is clear that Izzy’s nice, normal life has 
                                                
6 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this idea. 
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not prepared her for what seems to her to be total catastrophe: with the loss of her leg she 
sees the loss of her status, her freedom, her friends. Loss and limitation are everywhere 
she looks. She has taken for granted a life of privilege up to this point, a life which made 
assumptions about bodily wholeness and generally privileged treatment that can no 
longer be made.	
As the days in the hospital stretch on and her family and former friends appear to 
go on with their lives, Izzy’s depression deepens. We see the change in how she is 
experiencing her surroundings highlighted in her description of the hospital food. When 
she first wakes up after the amputation and eats real food instead of being fed through an 
IV, she feels that she has forgotten how to eat and is amazed by how good food tastes: “I 
started with the eggs. Scrambled eggs are the only kind I really like, usually, but these 
eggs—with the rich yolk mixed in over the silky whites, with salt and pepper and just a 
touch of butter—I had never before realized how good eggs could taste. I’d never noticed 
how the different flavors of different foods filled up my mouth”	(24). 	
Later, when she has realized that people—including her friends—will now see her 
as a cripple, her feelings toward food have changed dramatically. “The afternoon dragged 
by. I had a snack of peanut butter, crackers and an apple, but it wasn’t crunchy peanut 
butter so I didn’t eat it, and the apple wasn’t at all crisp. Dinner came in, but I wasn’t 
hungry. I ate the mashed potatoes, because the gravy was OK, but left the two thin slices 
of meat and the limp salad and the lumpy pudding and the peas. I never eat peas”	(68). In 
both descriptions we see a glimpse of the former Izzy’s classic likes and dislikes 
(“Scrambled eggs are the only kind I really like, usually; I never eat peas”), but this is 
merely the frame for an expression of intense emotion, and of a dramatic emotional shift. 
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Izzy’s “niceness”	is not enough to keep her from the depression that convinces her that 
looking at her makes her former friends feel sick (which is unfortunately not totally 
untrue, if not in exactly the sense she means), and that her family is happy to have her off 
in the hospital and doesn’t even want her to come home (which is fortunately not at all 
true).	
It is hard to say where Izzy’s depression would have led her; perhaps she would 
eventually have come to a place of self-acceptance in any case. Enter a catalyst, however, 
in the form of Rosamunde Webber. Rosamunde is a girl that the former Izzy had always 
felt sorry for and looked down on because she is overweight, not well off, badly dressed, 
and socially inept. From Izzy’s former privileged perspective, all these characteristics had 
seemed difficult burdens to bear, since looks, money, style, and niceness formed the 
boundaries of her world. But Rosamunde has humor and intelligence, as well as the 
ability—or social ineptitude—to be honest with Izzy, to push her toward regaining her 
independence, and most importantly, to see and enjoy Izzy for who she is and not just 
what she has become. Rosamunde—unlike Izzy’s “friends”—visits Izzy faithfully for the 
rest of her hospital stay, loaning her items to brighten up her room and games to play, and 
bringing tasty homemade treats that reawaken Izzy’s appetite, figuratively as well as 
literally. It is Rosamunde who first forces Izzy beyond a simple understanding of herself 
as crippled and therefore worthless. Since according to Izzy’s former standards, she has 
nothing to offer Rosamunde, Rosamunde’s attention points to the fact that there is much 
more to Izzy, at least potentially, than Izzy herself had ever realized.	
The effect that Rosamunde has on Izzy is nearly instantaneous. During her first, 
brief visit, Rosamunde says a lot more about the accident and Izzy’s new handicap than 
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anyone has yet said to her, and Izzy doesn’t enjoy it. When Rosamunde leaves, Izzy sums 
up the visit for herself: “Weird, it was definitely weird, she was really weird. What was 
Rosamunde Webber doing coming to see me in the hospital anyway? I was almost 
amused by the visit, now that it was over”	(84–85). But Izzy’s mother walks in a few 
minutes later and tells her she just saw a girl in the front of the elevators sobbing as if “all 
the troubles in the world were on her shoulders,”	and in her description Izzy recognizes 
Rosamunde. When we see Izzy trying to make sense of this, she is already moving 
toward a new independence of thought: “It wasn’t as if we were friends, Rosamunde and 
I, and she certainly hadn’t looked upset when she left the room. I thought about asking 
my mother about it, but then I thought that I didn’t want to hear what she thought until I 
knew what I thought. If I didn’t know what I thought first, I’d probably just take her ideas 
for my own”	(85–86). 	
Up to this point in the story Izzy’s self-identity has been centered around 
understanding the change from “normal”	to “crippled.”	With the entrance of Rosamunde 
into her life, however, the movement becomes more distinctly positive: We begin to see 
how the unexpected, in the form of Rosamunde as well as in the more drastic 
unexpectedness of the amputation, can actually work to deepen a person’s selfhood. The 
possibilities that exist for Izzy are expanding as she begins, perhaps for the first time 
ever, to really think for herself and to specifically choose to think for herself.	
A few minutes after leaving Izzy’s room Rosamunde calls from the pay phone 
downstairs to apologize for upsetting Izzy and to tell her that she had planned to come 
cheer her up with jokes, like “What’s a nice girl like you doing in a place like this?”	Izzy 
is utterly surprised that Rosamunde thought of that too. But at the end of the 
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conversation, already beginning to push Izzy toward a new identity, Rosamunde says, 
“The trouble with you, Isobel Lingard, is that you’re so nice, I can’t even tell when 
you’re being nice and when you mean what you’re saying”	(88). Rosamunde’s use of 
Izzy’s full name, as well as the complaint that she makes, point ahead to the changing 
identity that Izzy is already beginning to move toward.	
In fact, Rosamunde has always seen more in Izzy than Izzy has seen in herself. 
On Rosamunde’s second visit, when she brings “some stuff”	for Izzy in a borrowed 
carrier, we see the foundation of what will clearly build into a solid friendship. The 
importance of the scene in revealing the interrelation between Izzy and Rosamunde 
merits a lengthy quotation:		
“Why don’t you stay anyway?”	I said. Actually, I mumbled it, 
because I knew it was what I should say, and I sort of wanted her to stay, 
but I also wanted her to go.	
“No, listen, it’s OK, I understand,”	she said. “I mean, I know I 
always say these stupid things, but I’m pretty smart.”	She sort of smiled 
and jammed her hands into the pockets of her windbreaker. “I can 
understand that you want me to go, and you’re too nice to say so, but it’s 
OK, really, it doesn’t bother me—”	
“I wouldn’t mind,”	I interrupted her, because she was rattling on 
like Suzy. “It can’t hurt, can it?”	
“Yes,”	she answered. “Yes, it could. That’s what worries me, about 
hurting your feelings, or something. Inadvertently.”	
I didn’t know what to answer.	
“And besides—”	She hesitated.	
“I’d like you to,”	I said. “At least, I think I would, if you want the 
exact truth. If you want the exact truth, it gets pretty depressing, 
sometimes.”	
“Really? Boy, I’m glad to hear that.”	Rosamunde took off her 
jacket and draped it on the visitor’s chair. She folded up the carrier and 
rested it against the wall. “I don’t know why she’s so fussy about that, it 
couldn’t have cost her more than a dollar-fifty at a yard sale, the way it’s 
rusted up. Because I was afraid you were some sort of supergirl, you 
know? Or, maybe, you were being brave and everything, and you’d 
probably go crazy if you were making those impossible demands on 
yourself. Or, I guess you could be too stupid to figure out how bad it is.”	
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I just sat there in the hospital bed. You didn’t say things like that. 
Rosamunde looked at my face and then put her hand up over her eyes. I 
guessed she knew all right that you didn’t say things like that, only she 
never knew it until after she’d said them.	
On the other hand, I guessed what she said was true.	
“You know,”	I admitted, “I think it’s a little bit of all three of 
those.”	
Rosamunde uncovered her eyes. “I knew I wasn’t wrong. About 
you.”	Her voice rang, almost like music. “I wasn’t sure, but I knew it”	
(103–4).		
As Izzy makes the transition from hospital to home, her friendship with 
Rosamunde continues to develop. Two of Izzy’s former friends, Suzy and Lisa, stop by 
briefly a couple of times, but their visits are awkward and full of things not said. Izzy 
begins to realize that Suzy’s friendship is not worth trying to keep, and although Lisa 
would be willing to make an effort, she follows where Suzy leads. Izzy’s mother is 
concerned that Izzy is seeing so much of Rosamunde and not her former friends, 
especially Lisa. She doesn’t want Izzy to drop Lisa’s friendship while in “this period of 
adjustment.”	Izzy thinks in response: “I wanted to tell her that I didn’t think it was a 
period of adjustment, but a change. A big change. But I didn’t want to upset her. It must 
have been hard enough on her, acting calm and collected and grown up because that was 
what I needed her to be. I knew sort of what she wanted for me, in my life, what she 
thought was important. I agreed with her, too; I wanted the same things for me. But I 
didn’t think I could get them, not any more; certainly not in the old easy way. And I 
wondered, too, if there weren’t other things I might want, not instead of, but along with 
what the old Izzy would have wanted”	(211). This is perhaps the first indication that Izzy 
herself is becoming aware that the changes she is undergoing have a positive side as well 
as the more obvious negative side. 	
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One of the most surprisingly powerful tactics Voigt uses to keep us in tune with 
the inner Izzy is introduced as soon as we know the basic events up to the amputation of 
her leg. After Izzy wakes up, clearheaded for the first time in quite a while, she describes 
how she feels: “Inside my head, I saw this little person, a miniature Izzy in a leotard, kind 
of smoky blue, to match my eyes. The little Izzy raised her hands over her head and did a 
back flip, landing with her arms stretched out and her back arched, like Mary Lou Retton. 
That was a joke because I couldn’t do a back flip to save my life, I couldn’t even do a 
good back dive off of a board—but it was just exactly how I felt”	(22–23). This little Izzy 
in her head gradually becomes a fixture during the rest of the book, enabling us to see 
into Izzy’s deepest feelings at any moment. Surprisingly, this never becomes trite or 
tedious. Voigt has managed to tap into a way of experiencing the world that both rings 
true and allows the reader impossible access to a character’s sense of self without having 
her come across as self-absorbed or even unusually self-aware. The new self-awareness 
we see in Izzy comes rather through the way she thinks about herself and those around 
her, and through the choices she makes.	
Izzy becomes aware of her new identity as “crippled”	when her friends visit her 
for the first time and act awkward and uncomfortable. After they leave, “It was as if the 
little Izzy was running around and around in circles, some frantic wind-up Izzy, 
screeching No, no, no”	(49). After Suzy and Lisa stop by again briefly more than a week 
later, “the miniature Izzy in my head just stood there, hanging onto a walker, all drooped 
over it. They’d been forced to come. They hadn’t even ever asked about what had 
happened to me. ‘How are you?’	they asked and I said, ‘Fine,’	and they took that for the 
truth. Gray water rose up over the miniature Izzy’s bent head”	(72). The miniature Izzy is 
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not always simply an expression of how the full-size Izzy feels, however. Toward the 
beginning, the little Izzy can be downright uncooperative, doing back flips when the real 
Izzy is feeling far from happy, and particularly when she is finding things especially hard 
to accept. This happens, for example, after Izzy has looked at her amputated leg for the 
first time: “Inside my head that stupid little Izzy in her leotard still did back flips, but it 
was hard and heavy going for her and I felt like reaching my hand into my imagination 
and knocking her over”	(96). This mechanism, then, is not intended merely to illustrate a 
point—to show Izzy’s feelings. Rather, it is in a sense uncooperative, revealing more and 
different things than we’d expect it to reveal. As art does, the story is asking of the reader 
not merely comprehension, but interpretation.	
Not long after she has settled in at home, Izzy receives a visit from Tony and 
Deborah, two of the “big”	students at the high school. Tony is the “king of the roost,”	as 
Rosamunde calls him, the boy all the girls (except the ones like Rosamunde, who have 
further life ambitions) have a bit of a crush on. Tony had been at the party, and had 
offered to take Izzy home when he saw how drunk Marco was, but didn’t insist. Tony and 
Deborah come to ask Izzy to work on the school newspaper; being on the paper was “a 
select crowd of people, about the best people in the school …	the ones who were smart 
but not weird, the most interesting people”	(189). Izzy says no, because she knows that 
they’re asking her out of guilt, and would never have considered her if the accident 
hadn’t happened. 		“For God’s sake, Izzy,”	Tony said. “Look, of course it’s because 
we feel guilty. I mean, who wouldn’t? I should have gone ahead and taken 
you home, I should have had the guts. And the brains too. And it’s 
because I feel sorry for you, too, if you must have the truth.”		
I didn’t feel any need for the truth, frankly. 	
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“And I thought this would be easy,”	Tony said to Deborah. “Once I 
nerved myself to do it. We underestimated you, Izzy.”		
I didn’t know what to say. 	
“But I really want you to try it, and I think you ought to, for your 
own sake.”	He stood in front of me, waiting for my answer. “If it makes 
any difference, I’d feel a hell of a lot better about myself if you’d agree to 
try it”	(190).		
Deborah reminds Tony not to rush Izzy, and they leave her with time to decide. In 
fact, by this time Izzy’s concern is outdated, we might say. She is right about their 
motivations in asking her, but she is wrong—as Tony realizes when she initially 
refuses—in thinking that the fact that they would not have asked her before the accident 
means that she is not worth being asked now. 	
Eventually Izzy has to face up to going back to school. She has been putting it off 
partly because she is naturally afraid of the kind of attention and pity she’ll get, and 
partly because she isn’t sure how she will respond to Marco. He has never called to 
apologize or contacted her in any way. When Rosamunde brings up the topic of going 
back to school, reminding her that she can’t hide away forever, Izzy tells her how she 
feels: “‘I’ll tell you what really scares me,’	I admitted. The little Izzy inside my head had 
her hands over her face and her words were muffled. ‘I’m not too eager to see Marco 
Griggers’”	(227). And when Rosamunde asks what Izzy would say to him, she says, 
“‘Nothing. I don’t ever want to see him again. I don’t want to have to see him,’	I said. I 
heard the anger in my voice. ‘So I don’t want to go back to school.’	After a long time, 
Rosamunde said, ‘That just lets him make a bigger mess of your life’”	(228).	
At the same time that Rosamunde convinces Izzy that it is time to go back to 
school, she convinces Izzy to join the paper. As usual, she has more confidence in Izzy’s 
abilities than Izzy herself does. Izzy finds that she enjoys working on the paper, and fits 
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in well enough without having a definite job. The newspaper gives her something to look 
forward to, and she likes seeing so much of Tony. “I liked seeing how he made decisions, 
and how he stood back to let the whole staff decide something. I liked knowing him 
better. He was always thoughtful about me. He always remembered to bring my crutches 
when it was time to go, doing it as naturally as he handed Deborah a blue pencil and told 
her to cut a piece by fifty words”	(235–36). It is Rosamunde, though, who really helps 
Izzy through the adjustment to being back at school. She keeps an eye on Izzy, and she is 
there when the thing that Izzy has been dreading happens: Someone cuts too close behind 
her and knocks one of her crutches away, leaving Izzy to fall on her face. Rosamunde 
helps Izzy make a joke of it to the crowd that gathers, and then goes with Izzy to the 
bathroom to let her cry it out.	
Izzy has started to realize, though, that some of the many differences in herself 
and her life are improvements. She sees and understands people, perhaps especially her 
family, in a new and deeper way. Even more importantly, she recognizes the difference in 
herself. Most of the differences are not improvements, however, and “Whenever I saw 
the little Izzy in my head, she was lying flat on her face with her crutches knocked away 
from under her and her jean leg pinned back with a stupid diaper pin—like a warning”	
(244). At the same time, though, we can see that Izzy is well on her way to becoming a 
person with depth and thoughtfulness that she had never dreamed of back when she was 
“normal.”	
Her own adjustment is accompanied by the adjustment of those around her. 
Gradually, Izzy comes to realize that even though most people will see her first of all as a 
cripple, they won’t necessarily continue to see her that way. As exams come nearer, Izzy 
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helps out more and more with the school paper, doing whatever needs to be done. One 
afternoon when she stays late to help, she sees that Tony has put her name on the editorial 
staff list: Izzy Lingard. After looking at it for a minute, she crosses out Izzy and writes in 
Isobel. When Tony asks about it, she tells him that it is her name sometimes, and more 
and more as she gets older. Then Tony leaves to bring the paper to the printer, and Izzy 
gets ready to leave too: “That was when I noticed that Tony had forgotten my crutches, 
that they stood leaning against the far wall, down the whole length of the room. I was 
glad I was alone as I stood up on my one leg and started hopping over to where the 
crutches were. When I had them under my arms, I suddenly realized—Tony Marcel had 
forgotten my crutches. Inside my head, the little Izzy gathered herself up and did an 
impossible backflip, and then another and another. I knew how she felt”	(258). As we can 
see, Tony forgetting Izzy’s crutches demonstrates that he no longer sees her as an 
instance of a general category, “crippled,” but as a unique individual.	
Voigt brings Izzy’s development, not to a conclusion, but to the point where we 
can see that she is well on her way in a certain direction. The final scene of the book 
brings Izzy and Marco face to face for the first time since the accident. Izzy happens on 
Marco as he is flirting with a freshman girl, Georgie, who is flattered to be asked out by a 
senior. Izzy recognizes what is happening and is angry. Pretending to be friendly, she 
approaches the pair and reminds Georgie that she, Izzy, went out with Marco once and it 
was “quite an experience.”	She smilingly warns Georgie: “‘You have to look out for 
Marco,’	I told Georgie, as if I was making a joke. ‘You know his reputation.’	After a long 
minute, I added, ‘Marco’s such a flirt, everybody knows that’”	(260).	
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As the bell rings and Marco and Georgie go their separate ways, furious and 
puzzled, respectively, Izzy realizes two things. She sees how lovely it is to be young and 
perfect, and that she can’t help but be depressed sometimes; she can’t expect herself not 
to wish for her own perfection back. And she also realizes that she saw Marco and 
Georgie and did something about it, which nobody had done for her.		“Oh, wow,”	I thought. It was the richness of it, the richness in me; 
there was so much more than before. Better, too, I had to admit it, 
although if I could have gone back and changed things I wouldn’t have 
hesitated for one minute to do that. 	
I didn’t know what to think, but I wanted to stand there, for 
another minute or five, just being myself. Inside my head I saw the little 
Izzy. She was standing alone, without crutches. She wore her black velvet 
skirt and a silky white blouse. Her hair was feathered gold all around her 
head. Her arms were spread out slightly. She looked like she was about to 
dance, but really her arms were out for balance. I knew, because it was 
true even though it didn’t show, that underneath the long skirt one of the 
legs was flesh and the other was a fake. The little Izzy balanced there 
briefly and then took a hesitant step forward—ready to fall, ready not to 
fall”	(261–62).		
Although Voigt has chosen a rather typical mainstream context for the story, Izzy, 
Willy-Nilly is a distinctly counter-cultural book. North American culture in general 
prefers to believe that we direct our destinies, that success comes through fair play and 
hard work, and that people get what they deserve. The idea that limitations can actually 
expand our possibilities, that unexpected, and especially that unwelcome events can make 
us better people, strikes at the core of these assumptions. These ideas also strike to the 
heart of many who read this book and find that it rings more true to them than the culture 
they live in. 	
Stories about characters facing unwelcome events are not uncommon in popular 
culture (as seen in movies, for example), of course, but in most of these popular stories I 
see a more mainstream North American approach: Characters struggle through events 
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while maintaining their own identities; changes that they experience tend to be superficial 
improvements of relationship and circumstance. An example that highlights this 
distinction is the difference between the young adult novel The Hunger Games by 
Suzanne Collins and the movie made from the book. In both the book and the movie, 
there is a scene in which two of the main characters have a conversation the night before 
heading into an arena to fight to the death with two dozen other young people. In the 
book, the boy expresses a desire to show those in charge that he is more than just part of 
their game. The girl does not understand at all what he is saying at the time, but later 
comes to see what he meant and to feel the same way.7 In the movie version of this scene, 
the boy has most of the same lines, but the girl immediately understands him and agrees.8 
This difference exemplifies the way that North American young adult fiction tends to 
deal with change and development of identity and self-understanding, while popular 
movies—even those based on young adult novels—tend to portray a fixed identity 
struggling through difficulty. The underlying assumption is that, although we can learn 
and improve on a certain level, our “true”	identity is static. In contrast, Izzy, Willy-Nilly 
recounts a less communicable and more fundamental development along with the easy-
to-see changes that Izzy undergoes. 
Much of the philosophical power of this book comes, I think, from the excellent 
integration between the form of the young adult novel and the content. Themes of 
unexpectedness and new possibilities on the horizon work well in fiction, and particularly 
well in young adult fiction. Young adults, the ostensible audience of this book, are the 
                                                
7 Suzanne Collins, The Hunger Games (New York: Scholastic, 2008), 141–42, 236. 
8 The Hunger Games, directed by Gary Ross (Santa Monica, CA: Lionsgate, 2012), 
DVD. 
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one group in our culture who are at least somewhat expected to be growing and changing 
in ways they did not foresee. The fact that young adult fiction continues to be enjoyed by 
many adults points to the reality of growth and change in unexpected directions 
throughout life, even though cultural expectations regard adults as fully self-directing.	
At the core of my reading of Izzy, Willy-Nilly is the question of what it means to 
step out of a sense of inevitability. I don’t mean this as a message to be mined from the 
content of the book, of course. Rather, my experience has been that in the interaction 
between the reader and the book, the story encourages the reader to step out of a passive 
internalization of any narrative that may have played a dominant role in his or her 
understanding of life. In my reading, the movement away from inevitability comes 
through most strongly in the development of Izzy’s relationships, and especially her 
relationship to her family. As I emphasized earlier, Izzy’s family can no longer expect her 
to do and want the same things as she did before the accident. Before, the general scope 
of her life was laid out in front of her as North American culture indeed expects of its 
members. At the end of the book, Izzy is stepping out into the unknown, ready to fall or 
not to fall. Having followed Izzy in her journey to this point, I and others I know who 
have read the book find ourselves reflecting on our own lived philosophies—pondering 
our own similar placement in relation to the unknown. 	
In my attempt at extended philosophical commentary—in which I have 
endeavored to remain aware of the concerns of both academic and lived philosophy—I 
have sought a balance between trying to let the book speak for itself and making explicit 
some of its contributions to the philosophical conversation through explanation and 
commentary. Izzy, Willy-Nilly invites companionable commentary and is well-written and 
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complex enough that it would be difficult to use as a philosophical example without 
finding that it keeps having more to say. Even the themes that I have attempted to make 
more explicit only reach part of this rich work. My interpretation should not be taken as 
an exhaustive description of the plurality of the book’s themes and potential reader 
interpretations. But I hope that my particular interaction with the book gives a sense of 
the possibilities available within it.	
To get a clearer sense of why Izzy, Willy-Nilly is more fruitfully approached as a 
philosophical companion than an example, a clearer understanding of the particular shape 
of this story’s character is needed.9 This is where Booth’s spectrums of quality may be 
usefully applied. In terms of quantity, the book is relatively limited in setting and focus; 
the cast of characters is not large, the book is not lengthy, and most of the action takes 
place in a hospital room, a house, and a school hallway. In terms of responsibility, the 
implied author requests significant empathy, as well as effort to follow Izzy's growth in 
character, but the reader doesn't have to do extra work to follow the story; the book treats 
the reader as an equal. In terms of intimacy, Izzy, Willy-Nilly is on the very intimate side 
of the spectrum, as we follow closely with Izzy and what she is thinking and feeling; the 
“little Izzy”	in Izzy’s head is the device which draws the reader into the heart of the story 
without introducing a sense of exploitation. In terms of intensity, this story is toward the 
intense side of the spectrum, as we are dealing with a teenager undergoing significant 
trauma. In terms of coherence, the story is also far to one side of the spectrum; it presents 
a very coherent, real world. In terms of otherness, the distance is between the reader and 
a high school girl in a certain family, which is a more significant distance than it appears, 
                                                
9 This move is in keeping with Nussbaum’s emphasis on the particular; it is the unique 
character of a specific situation or person that teaches us and to which we respond. 
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perhaps. Finally, in terms of range, the size of the topics addressed is larger than it may 
first appear, but it is still limited, as the story is quite focused. 	
What kind of conversation do these characteristics invite? With regard to Booth’s 
metaphor of friendship, Izzy, Willy-Nilly is an easy friend to meet. As my summary of 
where it fits on Booth’s spectrums of quality shows, this story meets us as an equal. 
Likewise, most of us have experienced the basics of high school existence in the real 
world, so we do not have to travel that far in imagination to meet this potential friend. 
Yet we are stretched in the reading, as its intimacy, intensity, and focus draw us toward 
contemplation of larger philosophical themes. This is the kind of friend that empowers us 
by treating us as equals, but doesn’t leave us where it found us. We find insight here, and 
yet the insight is somehow our own; it is not handed down to us from above. It is the 
balance of all these qualities that make this book uniquely powerful. And as is always the 
case with good books, you have to read it for yourself to appreciate its full worth. 	
I find it hard to imagine using this story as a story-as-example partly because in 
my own attempt at commentary I found myself repeatedly forced to include more of the 
book than I had intended to in my discussion. In order for my commentary to make sense, 
I had to keep returning to the book itself for what it has to say even while I sought to 
highlight its contribution in my own words. To take an extreme version of story-as-
example in contrast: If we consider the possibility of using the book simply as a moral 
example, we can see how limited—even misleading—this would be. The story-as-
example can see certain of the book’s qualities, but misses the full range; the power of its 
intimacy and intensity, for example, could be seen to bring home the disastrous 
consequences of drunk driving, but this view elides both the book’s reciprocity with the 
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reader and the subtle otherness that are some of its major strengths. This limitation of a 
story-as-example may be a major part of the reason many readers find the back-cover 
summaries and accolades on their favorite books so annoying. On the back of my copy of 
Izzy, Willy-Nilly, for example, there is a quote from The Boston Globe that treats the 
whole book as simply a moral example: “Give this book to every teenager you know who 
has a driver’s license. It’s a riveting story about driving drunk and the devastating 
consequences it can wreak.”	The assumption is both that there is no distance between the 
book and the reader, and that the book is in the position of a teacher—not companion—to 
the reader. But if one wanted to use the book simply as a warning against drunk driving, 
the whole positive aspect of Izzy’s development would have to be purposefully muffled. 
Likewise, if one wanted to use it as an example of how suffering builds character—a 
legitimate theme—Izzy’s development would be sadly incomplete and unbalanced. 
Unlike some stories that can be quite easily and helpfully used to illustrate a point, Izzy, 
Willy-Nilly insists on being a primary contributor to the conversation. 		
No Woman Born 
For a more explicit contrast between story-as-example and story-as-companion, 
let’s take a look at a very good short story, “No Woman Born”	by C.L. Moore. I found 
the story as part of the anthology Feminist Philosophy and Science Fiction: Utopias and 
Dystopias. This anthology is an excellent source for my purposes both because its 
philosophical introductory material approaches the included stories and excerpts as 
examples and because many of the stories themselves are distinctly of the hammer type.	
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The book is set up as a series of philosophical questions with one or more stories 
as responses. “No Woman Born”	is given as a response to the question, “What does it 
mean to be human?”	In particular, the introduction states, it “asks us to reconsider the 
necessity of biology to what it means to be human.”10 In the context of this feminist 
anthology, of course, the focus of the question is closely related to gender. The story has 
three characters: Deirdre, a beautiful and beloved singer and dancer whose brain was 
preserved at the moment of her death while her body perished; Maltzer, the creator of a 
new metal body to house Deirdre’s mind; and John Harris, her former manager who more 
or less plays the role of audience for the interactions of the other two.	
The story is basically that of the struggle between Deirdre and Maltzer both to 
define who she now is and to define who controls her. Maltzer has created a metal body 
for Deirdre out of a series of rings working through electromagnetic currents directly 
from her brain. She retains a basically human form. Deirdre feels very much herself and 
intends to go back to the stage, but Maltzer considers her much too fragile, and indeed, 
no longer truly human. Deirdre retains her mind and her mortality, but has a metal body. 
She and John both seem to think she is still herself. Maltzer is not convinced. Because 
she has lost three of the five human senses, and because she no longer has a “female”	
body, he cannot but consider her subhuman. As the introduction states, he cannot accept 
her as human “because the sexless body contains the brain of a woman and sexuality is 
what makes a female human.”11	
                                                
10 Judith A. Little, “Introduction,” in Feminist Philosophy and Science Fiction: Utopias 
and Dystopias (Potsdam, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 40. 
11 Ibid. 
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Deirdre, however, realizes that if anything she is now superhuman. Since her 
body no longer has the limitations of a human body and can respond directly to her mind, 
her speed, strength, and flexibility are practically unlimited. She has other powers, such 
as unlimited vocal range and volume—to the point of being able to destroy buildings 
through sound alone—and perhaps more abilities yet to be discovered. Besides this, she 
can present herself with human gesture and presence to the point of compelling those 
around her to forget her nonhuman body. 	
In this story we see exemplified the inability of a man to understand a woman 
apart from her sexuality. Because Deirdre no longer has a female body, Maltzer cannot 
accept her as human. He says several times that she’s a “freak”	and an “abstraction.”12 
Maltzer considers himself Frankenstein, and cannot hear her when she reminds him that 
he is not her creator, but merely her preserver. He also insists on her absolute fragility. If 
the subject of the experiment had been a man, would Maltzer have been less worried 
about the man’s fragility? When she finally demonstrates that she is anything but fragile, 
he is still not convinced that she does not feel “inadequate.”13 She tries to tell him that she 
is not unhappy, merely lonely because there is no one else like her and she does not want 
her powers to draw her away from normal human beings. His last words, though, are still: 
“Then I am Frankenstein, after all.”14 He is so set in his belief that she is not human that 
he cannot even see loneliness as a normal human condition. She is still an abstraction to 
him, a freak.	
                                                
12 Moore, “No Woman Born,” 66, 68. 
13 Ibid., 84. 
14 Ibid., 89. 
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Thus far the example. As we can see, the story does indeed provide an excellent 
example of the point which the introductory material claims for it. Actually, though, I 
think there is more to the story than that. In terms of what it means to be human, this 
story certainly does drive home the questions: What does it mean to be human—mind or 
body? What does it mean for a woman to be human? Is Deirdre still female? Apparently 
so, since her mind is that of a formerly female body. Or is she something else entirely, 
since she is now, according to her, “superhuman”? 	
But one of the most important remaining questions is how having a metal body 
will impact her humanity over time. Although the story does make a good example of the 
point made in the introduction, that it may be difficult for (some) men to see a female as 
human apart from her sexuality, I see the story as going further, asking the broader 
question of how important a human body is to our humanity in general. Deirdre sees 
herself as imprinting her personality on her metal body, changing it. Her former manager, 
John, wonders if—and the author seems to imply in the ending that—the reverse will also 
be true. Because mind and body are mutual to human life, having a metal body will in 
some sense imprint itself on Deirdre’s mind as well. Does this mean that Deirdre is 
indeed un-human, or will become more so? The central question of the story, then, might 
be not so much simply about gender as about material existence itself.	
How does the shape of this story’s character influence our interaction with it? 
Turning again to Booth’s seven spectrums of quality, we can see that in terms of quantity, 
the story is short and has few characters, but offers the potential for huge conversation 
over the subjects addressed; this is not unusual for a short story. In terms of 
responsibility, “No Woman Born” invites significant reciprocal engagement as the reader 
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thinks through possibilities along with the author, yet the reader is left with the feeling 
that the author has not put all her cards on the table; the questions raised are not only 
unanswered, but may be unanswerable. In terms of intimacy, the story is certainly 
intimate in terms of dealing with the meaning of self, but since the self under discussion 
is strange, some distance remains; likewise, the reader follows John’s thoughts and 
reactions in response to Deirdre, but the question of her humanity continues to introduce 
distance into their otherwise intimate relationship. In terms of intensity, “No Woman 
Born” is quite intense, as short stories often are, although the intensity is relatively 
cerebral; while it grips the emotions, this intensity always feels that it is in the service of 
making the reader think. In terms of coherence, it appears to have a coherent focus, but 
the science fiction aspect breaks this coherence open; what is normal and what is human 
appears obvious and yet is continually questioned. Finally, its otherness is significant, as 
the main character is science fictional and it is this otherness that is the focus of the story. 
In terms of range, it is limited as to topic, but the few topics involved are big ones.	
What kind of conversation do these characteristics invite? The different aspects 
come together to describe a story that is focused and intense, but has a constant 
strangeness that invites the reader to continually ponder the underlying assumptions, 
motivations, and capabilities of the characters. Approaching the story as an example 
focused on gender emphasizes a certain aspect of the otherness that is threaded 
throughout, but does not take into account the subtle strangeness of Deirdre’s power over 
human imagination and materiality that breaks open the coherence of the story. 	
We can see that the story-as-example has both benefits and limitations. Examples 
help to make a point more explicit and acceptable by engaging the readers’	imaginations 
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and encouraging a certain perspective on an issue to be the main imaginative framework 
for discussion. Rather than simply saying “(some) men cannot see women as human apart 
from their sexuality,”	pointing to a story like “No Woman Born”	makes the idea more 
plausible by demonstrating it in a concrete form. This is an important role for story both 
philosophically and practically. Without examples and analogies, it is difficult for 
interlocutors to work through differences in language use and assumed metaphor.	
Taking a story simply as the illustration of a point, however, can easily miss what 
else the story might have to say. If the reader approaches the story as only a particular 
instance of a general theme (such as gender inequality), then the interpretive possibilities 
it contains for the reader may be limited. If, however, the reader approaches it as an 
individual in its own right, the conditions of possibility are greatly increased. In the case 
of “No Woman Born”	as part of a feminist anthology, the focus on gender does not 
encourage the full power of the story to come to the fore. The story is presented as a tool 
to make a philosophical point rather than a companion on a philosophical journey. 
Because the focus of the discussion is directed so specifically to one idea, anything else 
the story may have to say is by default pushed to the background. The focus on analysis 
of a story’s “message”	can be a significant limitation to the way a story is written, the 
way we read it, and the way we talk about it. It also tends to blind the reader to what else 
the story might have to say. Yet a really good story like “No Woman Born” is not content 
to be thus constrained; it sticks with the reader and keeps the reader wondering about it. 		
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Tehanu 
My final story of focus, Tehanu by Ursula K. Le Guin, demonstrates that not all 
really good books can be easily approached as simply an example, hammer, or 
companion. A brief look at reviews of the book on Amazon.com is enough to show that 
while many people experience it as a deeply meaningful story and true philosophical 
companion, others do experience it definitively as a hammer and treat it as such in their 
responses. Part of this is no doubt due to the distance between some of the readers’	
perspectives and the way of thinking presented in the book, but I think part of it is also 
due to Le Guin occasionally slipping up and striking an actual hammer stroke.	
With Le Guin’s Tehanu, we start not at the beginning but in the middle. Tehanu, 
although it can certainly stand on its own, is the fourth book in what has become a series 
of six. In order to clarify a few of the events from Tehanu that are linked to earlier events, 
I very briefly summarize the three preceding books in the series. The first book, A Wizard 
of Earthsea,15 follows a young man named Ged in his journey as he learns to become a 
powerful wizard in the imaginary land of Earthsea, first as a student of the great mage 
Ogion and later at the wizard school at Roke; he then must come to terms with the results 
of his pride. The second book, The Tombs of Atuan,16 is about a young girl named Tenar 
from Earthsea’s “barbarian”	civilization of Atuan. She is the high priestess of the powers 
of darkness, and when Ged arrives in search of part of a ring long prophesied to bring 
peace to Earthsea, Tenar and Ged help each other escape the darkness and bring the ring 
to the capitol of Earthsea. Ged, now the Archmage of Earthsea, is again one of the main 
                                                
15 Ursula K. Le Guin, A Wizard of Earthsea (Berkeley: Parnassus Press, 1968). 
16 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Tombs of Atuan (New York: Bantam Books, 1970). 
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characters in the third novel, The Farthest Shore,17 in which he is accompanied by a 
young man, Lebannen, who is to become the first king that Earthsea has had for many 
years. At the end of the book Ged loses his wizard’s power in sealing up a tear in the 
fabric of the world between life and death. 	
Tehanu, the book I discuss here, takes up again the story of Tenar, the heroine of 
The Tombs of Atuan. At the end of that book, we left Tenar as a young girl from the 
foreign land of Atuan, newly arrived in the land of Earthsea with the promise of great 
power, wearing the ring of peace. At the beginning of Tehanu, we find her now to be a 
middle-aged woman, having given up a life of power to experience the life of a normal 
woman in a foreign culture.	
The pace and plot of Tehanu are unusual; the story is mostly made up of arrivals 
and departures woven through the context of Tenar’s thoughts, until a sudden shift of 
perspective and stunningly climactic ending. The story begins right after the death of 
Tenar’s husband, a quiet farmer on an island called Gont. Soon after being widowed, 
Tenar adopts a tramps’	child who was abused, raped, severely burned, and then 
abandoned. Tenar calls her Therru, a word in her native language which means the 
flaming of fire. After little Therru is healed of her physical hurts, barring the scars which 
deform half her face and one hand, Tenar receives a message from Ogion, the mage who 
had been her teacher before she gave up the study of power to become a farmer’s wife. 
Tenar and Therru go to Ogion’s home to be with him when he dies. 	
Tenar and Therru stay on at his house afterward, per his instruction to “wait.”	
After Ogion’s death, when some local wizards come to do him honor, Tenar meets 
                                                
17 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Farthest Shore (New York: Bantam Books, 1972). 
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Aspen, who is technically the villain of the book, although we don’t actually see much of 
him and he is a very limited and one-dimensional character. A clearly all-around bad guy, 
Aspen is the personal wizard of a local lord, whom he is keeping alive by draining the life 
from the lord’s grandson. Aspen adds to his general evilness an extremely offensive, 
over-the-top hatred and abhorrence of everything female. His general dislike for Tenar as 
a woman is increased by her importance in the history of Earthsea as the bringer of the 
ring of peace.	
Not long after Ogion’s death, Tenar is looking out over the sea when a dragon 
comes flying from the west with a man, Ged, on his back. The previous book, The 
Farthest Shore, ended with Ged the Archmage flying off on the back of the dragon, 
Kalessin; now we see that Kalessin brings him to Gont to rest and heal. Tenar takes care 
of Ged as he heals from his physical wounds, but can do nothing about his depression 
over the loss of his power. When the young king Lebannen sends men to look for Ged to 
come to his crowning, Ged feels he cannot face them, and Tenar sends him back to her 
late husband’s farm to work there.	
Aspen, the bad guy, then takes it into his head to curse Tenar, taking from her the 
power of sensible speech in the local language, although she is still able to think in her 
native tongue. By her own power, which is definite if nebulous, she recognizes what is 
going on and takes Therru back to her home farm to flee the curse. This is mostly 
successful, although from then on Tenar finds it difficult to think or remember anything 
about the time at Ogion’s house.	
Throughout the story we watch as the child Therru slowly gains courage and 
confidence, having setbacks a few times when they come across one of the men who had 
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abused her. At this point in the story the tramps, having killed Therru’s biological 
mother, come back to the farm and try to get at Tenar and Therru in the farm house. Ged 
comes back from the healing solitude of goat-herding at just the right moment and helps 
Tenar run them off. The men are captured in the next few days and sent off to be judged 
and hung. This is freeing for little Therru in that she no longer has to fear these specific 
people. However, the question has long been growing in the book as to her true nature. 
Tenar, blinded by (and often blind to) her own power perhaps, does not see that Therru 
has power of her own which those who have eyes to see it are afraid of. Tenar sees her 
only as an abused child, and does not see that the strangeness people fear goes deeper 
than her scarred appearance.	
Up to this point the book has been less plot driven than driven by several 
interwoven themes. At the forefront are questions of gender, and especially the question 
of men’s and women’s power. This is connected with the issue of the power structure of 
Earthsea itself, which has been traditionally dominated by male mages. Woven 
throughout these themes is the question of what dragons are, and how they differ in 
nature from humans. Both dragons and humans are intelligent and linguistic species, and 
there gradually develops in the story the apparent fact that once they were one species 
which at some point in the past chose to develop differently: the dragons chose freedom 
and flight, while the humans chose building and study. Throughout the book Tenar 
dreams of the dragon Kalessin and of the star which in her own language is called 
Tehanu.	
Now at the end of the book the plot suddenly picks up in pace. Tenar’s son comes 
home from the sea and decides to settle at the farm, which is his by law as the male 
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descendent. Tenar, although happy to see him again, is so distressed by his thoughtlessly 
typical sexism that she finds she cannot stay. As she and Ged consider moving back to 
Ogion’s house, they receive a message from Moss, a witch who had been Ogion’s 
neighbor, and that Tenar and Therru had become friends with. The message says that 
Moss is sick and wants to see them again. Tenar, Ged, and Therru set out, unaware that 
the message is actually a plot of Aspen’s to entrap and destroy them.	
Tenar and Ged fall under Aspen’s spell as they come closer to their destination, 
and instead of taking the way to Moss’s house, they turn toward the path that brings them 
to Aspen. As Aspen, having gained control over them, mocks and abuses them, it 
becomes apparent that he is a disciple of the villain in the previous book, who had 
attempted to make himself immortal by tearing open the barrier between death and life. 
This disclosure gives Aspen some motivation for his villainy besides obsessive 
misogyny.	
At this point we leave Tenar and Ged and for the first time enter Therru’s 
perspective. Her power is suddenly revealed in that she does not fall under Aspen’s curse, 
but can see right through it, and indeed, right through him. Leaving Tenar and Ged as 
they insist on going the wrong way, she runs to the cliff and calls for Kalessin. Kalessin 
comes just when Aspen has brought Tenar and Ged to the cliff to send them over, 
casually burns Aspen and his cohorts to a crisp, and asks for Therru by her “true name,”	
Tehanu. Tehanu speaks to Kalessin in “the language of the Making,”	the language which 
only mages learn among humans, but which is the native language of the dragons. Thus it 
is revealed that Tehanu is one of the few who are still born both human and dragon. 
Tehanu chooses to stay with Tenar and Ged for the time being, understanding that she has 
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something yet to do among humans before she goes to join the dragons in the west. The 
book then ends on a quiet note—as they decide to live in Ogion’s house and plan what to 
plant in the garden—but with the promise of great things yet to come.	
What is it that makes this unusual story such a good work of feminist philosophy? 
As I mentioned earlier, the book is structured much more by theme than by plot. This 
form contrasts with Izzy, Willy-Nilly, which invites the reader to respond strongly to the 
chronological development of the main character. In Tehanu, the form of the book seems 
to me to call the reader to interact with it at a thematic level. In response to this call, I 
identify three main themes in the book that are field marks of effective feminist works. 
The first is the representation of a character as “other”	in her (or his) context, allowing 
her (or him) to question barriers and borders that others assume. The second is the 
revelation of power where there had seemed to be none. The third, closely related to the 
second, is the realistic juxtaposition of typically sexist perspectives with women of great 
power, demonstrating both the inaccuracy and the tenacity of sexist points of view. I 
discuss each of these themes as they appear in the book.	
A large part of the answer to the question of why Tehanu is a powerful work of 
feminist philosophy lies in Tenar’s character and her position as “other”	in her context. In 
The Tombs of Atuan Tenar was a child priestess, the Eaten One, who served the powers 
of the nameless dark. Living only among women and eunuchs until Ged came looking for 
the ring of peace and they escaped together, Tenar had no way of imbibing and 
internalizing the gender stereotypes common to Earthsea. When she chooses to marry a 
Gontian farmer, she has no way of knowing what parts of the role she assumes are 
understood to be particularly female, and what is just part of being Gontian. Everything is 
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foreign to her. This context allows her the freedom to question the stereotypes and power 
structures that those around her take for granted. After her husband’s and Ogion’s deaths, 
Tenar’s interaction with the obsessively sexist Aspen and the fact of Therru’s abused past 
start her asking these questions more thoroughly.	
This is made explicit quite early in the book, after Tenar and Therru have moved 
into Ogion’s house and are making the acquaintance of Moss, the witch. Ged has been 
brought back by Kalessin, and is lying ill. Tenar and Moss sit together and split reeds for 
basket making, and their conversation turns to the difference between men and women 
and their relationships to power. Moss has told Tenar that Ged has no power anymore, 
but Tenar has trouble believing it. Moss describes men as like nuts, all full of themselves 
and nothing else inside their hard shells; a wizard, she says, is all power inside because 
his power is himself. But Tenar asks,	
“And a woman, then?”	
“Oh, well, dearie, a woman’s a different thing entirely. Who knows 
where a woman begins and ends? Listen, mistress, I have roots, I have 
roots deeper than this island. Deeper than the sea, older than the raising of 
the lands. I go back into the dark.”	Moss’s eyes shone with a weird 
brightness in their red rims and her voice sang like an instrument. “I go 
back into the dark! Before the moon I was. No one knows, no one knows, 
no one can say what I am, what a woman is, a woman of power, a 
woman’s power, deeper than the roots of trees, deeper than the roots of 
islands, older than the Making, older than the moon. Who dares ask 
questions of the dark? Who’ll ask the dark its name?”	
The old woman was rocking, chanting, lost in her incantation; but 
Tenar sat upright, and split a reed down the center with her thumbnail.	
“I will,”	she said.	
She split another reed.	
“I lived long enough in the dark,”	she said.18		
Unlike those around her who have grown up learning that men and women are deeply 
different, Tenar is both able and willing to question the differences that others assume. In 
                                                
18 Le Guin, Tehanu, 63–64. 
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a later conversation with Moss, Tenar learns that wizards are celibate, perhaps in 
exchange for their power or perhaps in order to keep their power to themselves. 
Pondering this, Tenar asks Moss, 	
“When you had a man, Moss, did you have to give up your 
power?”	
“Not a bit of it,”	the witch said, complacent.	
“But you said you don’t get unless you give. Is it different, then, 
for men and for women?”	
“What isn’t, dearie?”	
“I don’t know,”	Tenar said. “It seems to me we make up most of 
the differences, and then complain about ‘em. I don’t see why the Art 
Magic, why power, should be different for a man witch and a woman 
witch. Unless the power itself is different. Or the art.”	
“A man gives out, dearie. A woman takes in.”	
Tenar sat silent but unsatisfied.19		
When it comes to gender stereotyping, whether in Earthsea or on Earth, the 
strength of the assumptions made is necessarily based on an inability to see the reality of 
other options. If you know for a fact that different assumptions are made in a different 
context, it becomes much more difficult to maintain your belief that your stereotypes are 
based on innate, unchanging realities. Moss justifies the difference between men’s and 
women’s power by the statement that a man gives out and woman takes in. She does not 
see, however, that this justification is not self-evident, especially in the face of her earlier 
statement that “You don’t get without you give as much. That’s true for all, surely.”20 
Tenar, able to see the disjunction between these two ways of looking at humanity, is 
unsatisfied by a simple, unquestionable division between male and female.	
The question of uncrossable borders is echoed in the problem of Therru/Tehanu’s 
nature. Rather than merely questioning or crossing the border, Tehanu actually 
                                                
19 Ibid., 122. 
20 Ibid., 120. 
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encompasses both sides of the divide between dragon and human. The status and 
discovery of Tehanu and her power throughout is another of the themes that make the 
book such a good work of feminist philosophy. Since we see Tehanu first from Tenar’s 
perspective, we are introduced to her as simply a helpless, abused child. As the story 
continues we see hints that she may see the world differently through the eye that has 
been burned away than through her human eye, and in the final revelation of her dragon 
being we see that the scars which left one hand like a claw and half of her face hard and 
scale-like are a partial revelation of her literal nature. In the shift of perspective that 
brings us into Tehanu’s point of view after Tenar and Ged have been captured by Aspen, 
we see that Tehanu does indeed have two eyes: 	
She ran as fast as she could across the fields, past Aunty Moss’s 
house, past Ogion’s house and the goats’	house, onto the path along the 
cliff and to the edge of the cliff, where she was not to go because she 
could see it only with one eye. She was careful. She looked carefully with 
that eye. She stood on the edge. The water was far below, and the sun was 
setting far away. She looked into the west with the other eye, and called 
with the other voice the name she had heard in her mother’s dream.21		
A change in perspective which allows us to see as powerful a character we had 
formerly seen as powerless is a not uncommon device in feminist fiction, and can be very 
compelling, as in Tehanu’s case. The juxtaposition of perspectives is a form of another of 
the themes that make this book a work of feminist philosophy: the interaction of typically 
sexist characters with specially powerful women (who are not necessarily aware of their 
power). 	
This type of juxtaposition is revealing in several ways. One of the most simple 
and obvious is that when assumptions are made by sexist characters about powerful 
                                                
21 Ibid., 272–73. 
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women, the assumptions are so obviously untrue as to be revealed as ridiculous. Perhaps 
even more compelling, though, is the realism of many of these encounters. The 
interactions of Tenar with many of the male characters in the story show the peculiar 
deafness that is the hallmark of sexism. Aspen’s extreme misogyny is atypical. Most 
forms of sexism are exhibited by well-intentioned people who simply cannot see that 
there is a problem. Le Guin demonstrates this much more widespread kind of sexism 
through a prophecy that has been made by the Master Patterner, one of the Council of the 
Wise on the island of Roke, the most important and far-seeing wizards in Earthsea. When 
the Masters of Roke gather together to figure out what to do about the fact that Ged, who 
was the archmage, has lost his powers, what they are seeking is really a new archmage. 
However, there seems to be no answer to their questions. Instead, the Master Patterner 
gives them an answer to an unasked question, and the answer is simply: “A woman on 
Gont.”	
When Tenar hears this story from the young king Lebannen and Master Windkey, 
another of the Council of the Wise, it quickly becomes clear that the wizards can think of 
no question that would have this answer except the possibility that a woman on Gont 
might lead them to a man on Gont. Master Windkey says to Tenar, “So, you see, it 
seemed we should come to Gont. But for what? Seeking whom? ‘A woman’—not much 
to go on! Evidently this woman is to guide us, show us the way, somehow, to our 
archmage. And at once, as you may think, my lady, you were spoken of—for what other 
woman on Gont had we ever heard of? It is no great island, but yours is a great fame.”22 
But when Master Windkey asks her if she knows of any woman who might be a sister, 
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mother, or even teacher of a man of power, Tenar can think of nothing to say: “His 
deafness silenced her. She could not even tell him he was deaf.”23	
Tenar does try to hint at the possibility of a great and fundamental change that is 
taking place in Earthsea, but to no avail.	
The Windkey looked at her as if he saw a very distant storm cloud 
on the uttermost horizon. He even raised his right hand in the hint, the first 
sketch, of a windbinding spell, and then lowered it again. He smiled. 
“Don’t be afraid, my lady,”	he said. “Roke, and the Art Magic, will 
endure. Our treasure is well guarded!”	
“Tell Kalessin that,”	she said, suddenly unable to endure the utter 
unconsciousness of his disrespect. It made him stare, of course. He heard 
the dragon’s name. But it did not make him hear her. How could he, who 
had never listened to a woman since his mother sang him his last cradle 
song, hear her?	
“Indeed,”	said Lebannen, “Kalessin came to Roke, which is said to 
be defended utterly from dragons; and not through any spell of my lord’s, 
for he had no magery then. …	But I don’t think, Master Windkey, that 
Lady Tenar was afraid for herself.”	
The mage made an earnest effort to amend his offense. “I’m sorry, 
my lady,”	he said, “I spoke as to an ordinary woman.”	
She almost laughed. She could have shaken him. She said only, 
indifferently, “My fears are ordinary fears.”	It was no use; he could not 
hear her.	
But the young king was silent, listening.24		
After Master Windkey has left, Tenar makes one more effort to communicate 
with Lebannen: “‘I wanted to say—but there was no use—but couldn’t it be that there’s a 
woman on Gont, I don’t know who, I have no idea, but it could be that there is, or will be, 
or may be a woman, and that they seek—that they need—her. Is it impossible?’	He 
listened. He was not deaf. But he frowned, intent, as if trying to understand a foreign 
language. And he said only, under his breath, ‘It may be.’”25	
                                                
23 Ibid., 178. 
24 Ibid., 179–80. 
25 Ibid., 181. 
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Le Guin is walking a difficult line here, trying to make explicit the deafness of 
sexism without overbalancing into mere shouting at deaf ears. This is especially difficult, 
of course, because the line may well be in different places for different members of her 
wide-ranging audience. When I look back at my initial reaction to many of the stories in 
the Feminist Philosophy and Science Fiction collection, I find that the feminist hammer 
tends to be most felt when a story seems first of all to be concerned with making explicit 
the oppression of women, rather than being first of all concerned with telling a story. The 
story becomes an illustration. This is again a rather nebulous distinction, however, since 
every story could be seen on a continuum somewhere between the illustration of an idea, 
a thought experiment, and a “really good story.” Tehanu, I think, can be identified with 
each of these at some point, although I obviously identify it overwhelmingly as a really 
good story. The hammer stroke, then, comes when the reader gets too much of a feeling 
that the thought experiment is no longer experimental, or that the really good story is 
being shoved aside for the sake of making a point, either by the (implied) author or by 
someone who has requested or required that the book be read.26	
What makes Tehanu so powerfully liberating for many readers, though, is again 
its challenge to inevitability. We can see this in each of the reasons I gave for identifying 
the book as a work of feminist philosophy. Tenar’s character as “other”	in her context 
allows her to question the inevitability of cultural gender divisions. The status and 
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specifically about authors with a personal grievance to air, but in my opinion the 
description is more widely applicable—including to stories whose authors are airing a 
philosophical grievance in the form of a story-as-hammer. 
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discovery of Tehanu and her power question the inevitability both of an abused child’s 
permanent status as victim and the helplessness of a small girl in general. Likewise, the 
juxtaposition of sexist characters with powerful women calls into question the assumed 
relative powerlessness of women as individuals.	
Let’s turn once more to Booth’s spectrums of quality for another perspective on 
what gives this book its unique character. With Tehanu, we find that in terms of quantity, 
the book is on the longer side, but has relatively few characters and a very focused topic; 
in fact, the length of the book only increases the focus of the topic. In terms of 
reciprocity, the story is a bit aggressive, which invites the reader to respond strongly, 
leading to either defensiveness or inspiration; the (implied) author seeks to lead the 
reader on a journey, but assumes that the reader has the intelligence and capability to 
reach or perhaps even go beyond the author’s intended destination. In terms of intimacy, 
it is very intimate, as it happens very much inside Tenar's, and then Tehanu's, head; 
nearly all of the story is told through Tenar’s thoughts and feelings. In terms of intensity, 
it is extremely intense, with a number of very suspenseful moments, which crescendo as 
the book goes on; both the strength of the topic and the life-or-death (or at least safety-or-
harm) nature of many of the events contribute to this intensity. In terms of coherence, 
with its “in the head” style, it would not be described as heavily coherent, as it follows 
thoughts and themes rather than a direct plot; however, Tenar’s perspective does end up 
being a very coherent one. In terms of otherness, it is toward the extreme, both in being a 
fantasy and in dealing with otherness head on through the topics of both gender and the 
nature of humans and dragons. Finally, in terms of range it has a very focused topic and 
perspective, but the topic is again a big one; this focus is also broken open at the end of 
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the story with the shift to Tehanu’s perspective and the beginning of an understanding of 
the larger changes to come.	
What kind of conversation do these characteristics invite? As we can see, this 
book tends toward more of the unusual extremes on Booth’s spectrums than Izzy, Willy-
Nilly and “No Woman Born”	do. Its aggressive tendency means that the reader may not 
take ownership of the ideas presented, and indeed may experience it as a hammer. The 
book is making a strong push with its otherness, intensity, focus, and sense of the author 
pulling or pushing the reader along, but this is softened by its lack of straightforward 
coherence and by its intimacy. Tehanu is not the kind of easygoing acquaintance that 
anyone can get along with, but is potentially a companion who can push us to go beyond 
our current assumptions and habits into something that we will end up feeling is much 
more worthwhile. 	
With this story, as with many friendships, what we get out of it is related to what 
we put in. If we approach it as mere entertainment—a cheap friend, so to speak—we may 
be disappointed or repulsed. But if we expect it to be the sort of friend with whom we can 
share some of our deepest thoughts—and not that only, but the sort of friend we expect to 
push us further in directions we need to go—then our interaction with the story is likely 
to be more positive, and potentially powerfully so. Of course, we don’t know what sort of 
companion a story will be before we try it. Some stories introduce themselves more 
gently; Izzy, Willy-Nilly, for example, we might start to read for entertainment, then end 
up getting a lot more out of the relationship.  
Even the previous three books in the Earthsea series, though, don’t quite prepare 
the reader for the sort of companionship invited by Tehanu, as is obvious by some 
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people’s comments on the book (along the lines of	“I really liked the first three, but Le 
Guin’s lost it here”). Or perhaps it does offer the same kind of companionship, but the 
issues confronted in this book are more difficult for many readers—its “otherness” is too 
far from their comfort zone. The way that Tehanu encompasses the border between story-
as-hammer and story-as-companion demonstrates the complex, hermeneutical nature of 
our relationships with stories. The character of the story itself interacts with the 
experience and context of the reader in a thoroughly hermeneutic way; the selfsame story 
can be experienced very differently by different readers or by the same reader at different 
times, and yet it is the same characteristics that initiate these different experiences.	
When we interact with a story as a companion, we can be deeply invested in it 
while preserving the possibility of disagreement. In contrast, when we interact with a 
story as an example, we prioritize (or the story invites) analysis; when we interact with a 
story as a hammer, we prioritize (or the story invites) a relatively uncritical but definitive 
presentation or acceptance. A story-as-example tends to pull the reader out of the story by 
interesting the reader more in the message than in the story. If it is done well, this means 
the reader will become interested in the message; if the story is done badly, the reader 
will find them both equally boring or not worth thinking about. A story-as-hammer, on 
the other hand, will produce an “ouch!”	as the reader cringes out of the story. If it is a 
well-written hammer, the cringe can be instructive, breaking open inflexible ways of 
thinking; if it is badly done, it will likely simply be uncomfortable or even cause the 
reader to rebound defensively away from the intended impact. 	
How an author writes a story, how readers experience stories in their various life 
contexts, and how commentators approach stories with various philosophical 
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commitments all factor into the mix. Both story-as-hammer and story-as-example can do 
good work, but they remain tools, missing the deep life-changing possibilities that come 
from a story in which the story’s form and content meld in unity and the story itself (not 
an extractable principle or a single behavior change) speaks to the reader. 	
Hammer, example, or companion: By contrasting these different ways that we 
interact with how stories present themselves, I have sought to show concretely that story 
has more to offer philosophically than simply as a tool. Every book we read is a potential 
companion in the conversation about how we should live our lives, and the more we read 
them, the more opportunity we have to engage ethically and imaginatively with our 
world.	
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Conclusion 
I began this dissertation with a question about the way books can bridge gaps 
between disparate people and perspectives. Building on a strong personal belief that 
reading good books can inform our lives in positive ways, I began to map out the terrain 
for this dissertation by identifying a prevalent issue in my culture to which I believe a 
certain kind of fiction offers a normative response. This issue is the inattention to and 
undervaluation of plurality, exemplified in two apparently contradictory trends: the 
tendency to take as normative what can be generalized, and the tendency to deny 
universally applicable normativity. I have suggested that both of these trends are rooted 
in a form of reductionism that neglects plurality while seeking after pseudo-universality 
and pseudo-individuality. 
This reductionism can be identified in a number of symptoms that are widespread 
in North American culture. One of the most common is the faith people put in scientific 
studies to guide their life choices, indicating a desire to take statistical averages as 
universal norms. This faith in statistics, I suggested, results in a sense of inevitability and 
a suspicion of outliers. I hold out hope that our culture’s love of stories can enable us to 
imagine new possibilities and learn from those who are different from ourselves, 
combating the oppressive urge toward pseudo-universality and pseudo-individuality. 
In order to clarify the potentially beneficial contribution of books to our lives, I 
introduced a distinction between academic philosophy and lived philosophy, suggesting 
that stories have something to offer both categories. I argued that philosophy has 
traditionally approached story as a tool, either understanding story as a hammer to make a 
point or treating it as an example out of which to distill a point. In contrast to these 
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approaches, I suggested an alternative, treating story as a companion, in which story and 
philosophy partner with each other, recognizing the unique value of each. Story can 
address philosophical questions in a way academic philosophy cannot, while 
philosophical commentary on story assists to bring to light story’s philosophical import. 
In this way, philosophy and story in companionship promote appropriate plurality rather 
than a misguided quest for pseudo-universality that leaves out fictional voices, and they 
advocate genuine interaction rather than the mere spouting of opinions under the guise of 
pseudo-individuality. 
In Chapter 2, I clarified my distinction between lived philosophy and academic 
philosophy by way of Herman Dooyeweerd’s concepts of theoretical thought and naïve 
experience, as well as Sander Griffioen’s reflections on worldview. I then situated my 
project in the larger philosophical discussion through a brief introduction of various 
philosophers’ approaches to the relationship between philosophy and fiction, which I 
categorized into three families based on their fields of interest, broadly construed: the 
cognitive/analytic, the historical/narrative, and the moral/political. I identified my own 
project’s location on this map at the intersection of moral philosophy, literary criticism, 
and ethics, with a specifically cultural focus on the philosophical interaction of 
individuals with literary works. This placement also offered a rationale for my choice of 
main interlocutors. 
In Chapter 3 I began to lay out a foundation for an understanding of story as a 
philosophical contributor in partnership with the kind of commentary that Martha C. 
Nussbaum espouses. Nussbaum has argued that a certain kind of novel belongs in the 
canon of philosophy that seeks to answer the question “How should one live?” A look at 
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the philosophical work that has been done on the question of how literature and ethics 
relate shows that Nussbaum is an original and key thinker in the field. Almost everyone 
who discusses the topic nowadays addresses her work. However, despite the broad reach 
that her work has enjoyed, several of the most important aspects of her approach are 
frequently missed or misunderstood. Most significantly, her emphasis on the 
inseparability of form and content in well-written literature has been sadly left behind by 
thinkers who read her as making just such a separation. I highlighted the importance of 
the integrality of form and content through a comparison of Nussbaum with Richard 
Kearney. 
It is not uncommon for the next generation of philosophers to react against 
philosophers before them who have broken new ground. Although the original 
philosopher may at times be caricatured and dismissed, the backlash also tends to clear 
the ground by pointing out possible misunderstandings or limitations in his or her 
approach. This allows a second wave of philosophers to come along and point out missed 
details and connections, reinvigorating the power of the original philosopher’s insights. 
When it comes to Nussbaum, I appear to be part of this second wave. My dissertation 
aims to make an important contribution to the conversation by insisting on and clarifying 
the significance of the connection between form and content as vital to our understanding 
of how fiction can inform our lived and academic philosophies. 
I expanded the discussion of how story and philosophy relate through a discussion 
of Hannah Arendt’s insights and approach on this subject. When it comes to Arendt, the 
first two generations have already done their work; she has been caricatured and 
dismissed, and now her insights are being expanded upon and appreciated. Philosophers 
 202  
who take up themes from Arendt’s thought with sympathy and insight have become 
numerous. I mentioned several of these philosophers, with special attention to Lisa Jane 
Disch, who demonstrates how Arendt approached storytelling as a form of thinking that 
is both critical and situated, although Arendt’s perspective on the subject was never as 
articulated as Nussbaum’s is. Arendt’s emphasis on plurality, however, adds an important 
ballast to Nussbaum’s emphasis on particularity, as I demonstrated through a discussion 
of their respective views of compassion, love, and solidarity. 
Philosophical commentary that comes alongside fiction to make manifest its 
philosophical importance, the inseparability of form and content, and the importance of 
plurality: my discussion of all of these led me to questions of how to find sharable criteria 
for a mutual sense of storied normativity without insisting on the ability to extract and 
generalize morals from stories. I began to expand the discussion in these directions in 
Chapter 4 by situating fiction in a larger aesthetic, normative, and societal framework. 
The key to this discussion was Lambert Zuidervaart’s thoroughly hermeneutical 
conception of art and our interaction with art. His theory of imaginative disclosure and 
his insistence on the fact that art informs our lives via interpretation provide a framework 
for an understanding of art’s contribution to lived philosophy that is real and discernable 
but does not follow the rules of cause and effect; art does not unilaterally cause changes 
in lived philosophy, but contributes through a sort of reciprocal interaction. I linked 
Zuidervaart’s perspective with Nussbaum’s theory of always-revisable normativity in 
order to address the need for a normative approach to fiction’s relationship with lived 
philosophy, mitigating the problem of damaging encounters with art. To flesh out the 
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accuracy of the hermeneutical model, I assessed a number of specific ways that art 
informs people’s lives, with special attention to philosophical fiction. 
In Chapter 5, I presented the metaphor of friendship as an excellent noncausal 
model for the relationship between fiction and lived philosophy. While Nussbaum’s 
original contribution to the discussion centered on her insistence that fiction should be a 
contributing member of academic philosophy, Wayne C. Booth is well recognized as the 
seminal contemporary theorist on the relationship between reading and ethical character 
development—that is, the relationship between story and lived philosophy. No other 
thinker appears to have reached his scope and insight in the field of literature and ethics. I 
demonstrated some of the strengths and limitations of Booth’s metaphor and related 
criteria for evaluating narrative friends in comparison with Nussbaum’s criticisms of 
Booth’s approach. I suggested that Booth’s model could be made even stronger by 
resisting the inclination to expand the metaphor of friendship into that of “worlds” and by 
recognizing that the term “companion” may at times be a more appropriate description of 
our relationship with narrative works than “friend.” 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I sought to demonstrate philosophical commentary by 
undertaking my own philosophical reading of two young adult novels and a short story. 
Through this exercise, I highlighted the unique value of treating story as a philosophical 
companion, contrasting this approach with the limitations of treating story as a tool. 
Throughout this project, I have moved from the connections between story and lived 
experience to an examination of the theoretical underpinnings of these connections 
(taking into account the larger normative and societal framework involved) to a 
consideration of the most helpful way to approach story and back again to the actual 
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experience of reading. I hope this approach has at the very least made it more possible for 
the reader to remain connected to story in its own right, so that the ideas and 
generalizations presented here come with a specific reference, and not as isolated 
members of a self-referential whole.  
As I came in the last chapter to my own philosophical commentary, I found that 
each book needs to be approached uniquely. I discovered that I could not dialogue with 
Izzy, Willy-Nilly in the same way I could with Tehanu. Izzy resists dissection, somehow, 
while Tehanu’s message (inextricable though it is from the story itself) seemed to me all 
the clearer and stronger for being compared with some of the classic approaches in 
feminist philosophy. And perhaps this makes sense, since no two friendships are ever the 
same, as no two different narrative encounters travel over the same bridge. In this way, I 
have been reminded again that the very structure of story encourages the sort of plurality 
and imaginative empathy people like Booth and Nussbaum and Arendt—and Kearney, 
too—are striving toward.  
In this journey, it has been my aim to continue pointing out the pitfalls of 
reductionism; tendencies toward pseudo-universality and pseudo-individuality lie all 
around us in our philosophical endeavors. As we have seen, an emphasis on particularity 
and revisability will continue to dissatisfy those, like Hilary Putnam, who believe that we 
can in fact internalize an understanding of general rules that satisfactorily takes into 
account exceptions. Again, he would say that fiction can be accepted as a complement to 
general rules of ethics, but does not offer an acceptable primary model.1 Putnam has 
                                                
1 Hilary Putnam, “Taking Rules Seriously: A Response to Martha Nussbaum,” in 
“Literature and/as Moral Philosophy,” special issue, New Literary History 15, no. 1 
(Autumn 1983): 195, http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/469002. 
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expressed this as a concern that a devaluation of general rules will mean an empty 
morality where “anything goes.”2 I return to this concern one more time to summarize the 
nature of the principled yet imaginative plurality that I find to be fiction’s unique 
contribution to the philosophical conversation. 
Pointing out the dangers of a theory’s trajectory is always a worthwhile endeavor, 
although Putnam does at times seem to be overly concerned about possible trajectories of 
Nussbaum’s thought to the point of obscuring what she actually says. He is worried that 
an understanding of morality that highlights particularity, incommensurability, and the 
newness inherent in every situation means that general rules will no longer be taken 
seriously, leaving moral agents to pick and choose which moral they want to follow in 
any given context. This would indeed be an empty morality. In contrast, however, I 
suggest that an emphasis only on general moral rules, even with carefully hedged 
exceptions, does not take moral duty and obligation seriously enough. In a world in 
which contexts are always changing, general rules are an approximation for which one 
must always compensate in each particular situation. Putnam’s belief that morality must 
be based on general rules leaves him imagining that a perspective that emphasizes the 
primacy of particulars is simply a mixture of incompatible fragments in which any kind 
of ethical coherence is not possible. It is as if the only options available when one is 
thrown into deep water are to wear a life jacket or drown; however, I suggest that we can 
also learn to swim. My emphasis on principled plurality offers a sense of the whole that 
does not reduce the hermeneutical, contextual nature of ethical obligations to the pseudo-
universality of abstract rules that must always be “applied” or to the pseudo-individuality 
                                                
2 Ibid., 193. 
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of “anything goes.” Literature’s contribution is to offer alternative systems of morality 
(supplementing, not simply supplanting, the temporary, general ethical articulations we 
have developed) that have not traditionally been taken into account by moral philosophy, 
to its own loss. 
As we seek to allow literature a place in the philosophical conversation, our 
conception of what story is and how we relate to it is very important. The discussion of 
Kearney in Chapter 3 highlighted my concerns about his understanding of story as 
primarily bringing coherence to a fragmentary existence and his separation of the work of 
art from its application. I recognize that these emphases express a response to the 
experience of the way we narrate our lives individually and communally, and the fact that 
there are more and less ethically appropriate ways to respond to works of art. However, I 
am concerned that Kearney’s focus on coherence makes it difficult for his readers to 
know what to do when they come up against irreconcilable inconsistencies as they seek to 
orient themselves ethically. One of story’s greatest strengths is its ability to help us 
negotiate precisely those irreconcilabilities that a direct focus on coherence would lead us 
to either ignore or jettison. The importance Kearney places on coherence is not in itself 
bad, but when this value becomes seen as story’s primary role, its other powers are 
weakened or even stifled. Kearney’s claim that stories can equally be applied well or 
badly also arises out of this uncongenial simplification. He seems to mistake the sense of 
the whole that a story can give as something that can be articulated, and therefore 
consciously manipulated. In contrast, I have argued that the ability that stories give us to 
dialogue with and even hold together incompatible views is not an act of understanding 
and then application, but arises from the complete fusion of form and content, such that 
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the “good” in story cannot be “taken out” without loss. The possibility of bridge-building 
is one of these inextricably storied benefits. What North American culture stands in need 
of, I have argued, is exactly the imaginative insight available in young adult fiction and 
the integrality of form and content in all well-written works. 
Of course, the scope of my project is necessarily limited. My emphasis on 
conversation may not be appropriately applicable to every sphere. In politics, for 
example, some may argue that consensus, not just conversation, should be the rule, while 
others may object that decisions need to be made under time constraints that limit the 
possibility for even a relatively inclusive conversation. These are valid and defensible 
concerns. The problem of time constraints is, I believe, analogous to Nussbaum’s 
understanding of generalization—sometimes a limited conversation is the best we can do 
for the time being, but it should not therefore become the guiding principle. But should 
consensus be the guiding principle in some cases? Again, a thorough examination of the 
question is outside the scope of my project, but I will reiterate that although I do not deny 
the possibility that consensus may at times be the ideal, I retain a worry about the 
consensus being a false one, in which some of the relevant voices have been suppressed. 
Another scope-related concern may be the stress I have given to certain principles 
and not to others. I have emphasized principles related to compassion—especially 
plurality and solidarity. This emphasis may be in danger of obscuring the importance of 
other principles, notably justice, although a concern for justice is very much in the 
background of my project. My hope, of course, is that all of the principles we value will 
act in concert, but I recognize that in certain contexts one may take priority over others; 
perhaps at times they will conflict. Again, however, I feel that in many cases North 
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American culture currently demonstrates a clear need for a greater emphasis on plurality 
and solidarity, and I have articulated my project accordingly. 
At the same time, I remain committed to the perspective that Booth has described 
of reality as multivalent and poly-storied, meaning that multiple conflicting perspectives 
are to be not only expected, but welcomed into conversation. My concern remains that 
the conversation is indeed happening—that we do not simply fall into the reductionism of 
pseudo-universality, insisting that certain moral interpretations are applicable to every 
context, or into the reductionism of pseudo-individuality, assuming that all these 
perspectives are just opinions, and that it is not necessary to converse about them since 
there is no point in trying to reach any agreement about anything. Contra pseudo-
universality, the question “How should we live?” will need to be answered differently in 
different contexts; contra pseudo-individuality, ethical criteria remain important. In my 
own context, I offer a response of principled, imaginative plurality that values young 
adult fiction as an important philosophical contributor to the ethical conversation. 
This project has been motivated by my conviction that both philosophy and 
fiction can contribute to a movement toward the ethical development of justice and 
solidarity through imagination. I add my voice in support of a world in which boys and 
girls are treated as unique instances of newness, not simply specimens of a gender; 
alternative, marginal voices are heard and have power to direct themselves as part of a 
society that communally resists oppressive impulses; academic philosophy is normatively 
responsible and takes seriously nontraditional contributions; and young people (and 
adults) have the opportunity to read and discuss good books that will guide and open 
them in these directions. 
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In this way, I have sought to bring into relief the real life-changing power of 
story—not the sort of world-changing power one expects, perhaps, but an ability to hear 
voices never heard before, and to thus become attuned to new possibilities. My aim is for 
my readers to find here not simply an analysis of several philosophical themes, hopefully 
treated in a balanced, adequate manner. I hope they will also be motivated to turn back 
even to old, familiar stories, and read them as if for the first time; and in these stories to 
find strength, hope, and imagination to face the problems of the day. 
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Samenvatting 
Vanuit een sterke persoonlijke overtuiging dat het lezen van goede boeken kan 
bijdragen aan het positief vormgeven van ons leven, begin ik dit proefschrift met de 
bespreking van een in de Noord-Amerikaanse cultuur dominant aanwezige kwestie 
waarop naar mijn mening een bepaald soort fictie een normatief antwoord biedt. Die 
kwestie is het gebrek aan aandacht voor, en de onderwaardering van pluraliteit, waarvan 
een voorbeeld te vinden is in twee tegengestelde tendensen: de tendens om wat 
gegeneraliseerd kan worden als normatief te beschouwen, en de tendens om universeel 
toepasbare normativiteit te ontkennen. Ik suggereer dat deze beide trends, terwijl ze 
streven naar pseudo-universaliteit en pseudo-individualiteit, geworteld zijn in een vorm 
van reductionisme die pluraliteit verwaarloost.  
 Het reductionisme waarop ik reageer kan via een aantal wijd verbreide 
symptomen opgespoord worden. Een van de meest voorkomende is dat mensen geloven 
dat ze zich bij de keuzes die ze in hun leven maken laten leiden door wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek, een geloof dat wijst op een verlangen om statistische gemiddelden voor 
universele normen te houden. Als voorbeeld onderzoek ik genderstereotypen, want 
gender is bij uitstek een gebied waarop afwijking van het gemiddelde verdacht is. 
Wanneer mensen horen van “onderzoeken” die aantonen dat “de meeste mannen” 
bepaalde kenmerken vertonen en dat “de meeste vrouwen” bepaalde andere kenmerken 
vertonen, dan denken ze veelal dat dat betekent dat mannen en vrouwen die kenmerken 
behoren te vertonen. Het bijzondere (individu) wordt irrelevant, ontkend of als een 
bedreiging beschouwd, tenzij het gezien kan worden als deel van het algemene 
(stereotype) en als zodanig behandeld kan worden. Deze onderdrukking van 
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particulariteit is een indicatie van pseudo-universaliteit – het idee dat wat voor de 
meesten geldt voor iedereen moet gelden. 
 De invloed van stereotypen wordt eerder door het persoonlijk ervaren van 
werkelijke of fictionele alternatieven minder dan door abstracte kennis. We hebben 
elkaars verhalen nodig om ons in staat te stellen ons mogelijkheden voor te stellen die 
door ons geloof in statistieken verborgen blijven. Ik suggereer daarom dat de liefde van 
een cultuur voor verhalen ons in staat stelt nieuwe mogelijkheden te verbeelden en te 
leren van hen die anders zijn dan wijzelf.  
 Ik betoog dat filosofie het verhaal van oudsher als gereedschap heeft benaderd, 
door het hetzij als een hamer op te vatten om een punt te maken of door het te behandelen 
als een voorbeeld waaruit een boodschap gedestilleerd kan worden. Tegenover deze 
benaderingen stel ik als alternatief voor het verhaal te benaderen als een metgezel, 
waarbij verhaal en filosofie elkaars partner zijn die elkaars unieke waarde erkennen. Het 
verhaal kan filosofische vragen entameren op een wijze waarop academische filosofie dat 
niet kan, terwijl filosofisch commentaar op verhalen kan helpen de filosofische portee 
daarvan naar boven te halen. Op deze wijze, als metgezellen, kunnen verhaal en filosofie 
een bijdrage leveren aan gepaste pluraliteit, in plaats van aan een misleide zoektocht naar 
pseudo-universaliteit die voorbij gaat aan fictionele stemmen, en kunnen ze een pleidooi 
voeren voor echte interactie in plaats van alleen opinies te spuien onder het mom van 
pseudo-individualiteit.  
 Neigingen tot pseudo-universaliteit en pseudo-individualiteit zijn overal in onze 
filosofische bezigheden aanwezig. Ik geef aan dat aandacht alleen voor algemene regels, 
zorgvuldig omlijnde uitzonderingen daarop incluis, morele plicht en verplichting 
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onvoldoende serieus neemt. In een wereld waarin contexten voortdurend veranderen 
kunnen algemene regels alleen bij benadering richting geven en is in iedere bijzondere 
situatie bijstelling daarvan noodzakelijk. Het geloof dat moraal beschreven moet worden 
in termen van algemene regels leidt ertoe dat men zich een perspectief dat het primaat 
van het particuliere benadrukt slechts kan voorstellen als een mengsel van incompatibele 
fragmenten waartussen geen enkele vorm van ethische coherentie mogelijk is. Het is 
alsof verdrinken of een reddingsvest dragen de enige opties zijn die men heeft als men in 
diep water gegooid wordt; mijn suggestie zou echter zijn dat men ook kan leren 
zwemmen.  
 De bijdrage van fictie is het bieden van alternatieve systemen van moraal (die de 
tijdelijke, algemene ethische articulaties die we ontwikkeld hebben aanvullen en niet 
eenvoudigweg vervangen), systemen die, tot haar schade, niet al van oudsher door de 
morele filosofie in beschouwing genomen zijn. Ik beweer daarom dat, te midden van 
ander kunstvormen, kwalitatief goede fictie voor jongvolwassenen een bijdrage levert aan 
principiële pluraliteit die een idee geeft van het geheel zonder de hermeneutische, 
contextuele aard van ethische verplichtingen te reduceren tot de pseudo-universaliteit van 
abstracte regels die altijd “toegepast” moeten worden, of tot de pseudo-individualiteit van 
“anything goes.” 
 Ik richt me op fictie voor jongvolwassenen primair vanwege het brede bereik en 
vanwege de bijzondere relevantie daarvan voor ethische vorming. Tot nu toe hebben 
filosofen en literatuurcritici vrijwel geen gehoor gegeven aan oproepen tot serieus 
theoretisch engagement met fictie voor jongvolwassenen. Fictie voor “jongvolwassenen” 
houdt zich echter bezig met thema’s die veel verder reiken dan de adolescentie. Thema’s 
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als macht, persoonlijkheid en identiteit, relaties tussen het zelf en anderen, dood, gender, 
ethiek en ideologie staan in dit genre consequent voorop. Fictie voor jongvolwassenen 
neigt er vooral toe stereotiepe opvattingen over het menselijk bestaan ter discussie te 
stellen, een kwestie die eveneens een leidend thema is in dit proefschrift. 
 In hoofdstuk 2 licht ik de in potentie positieve bijdrage van boeken aan ons leven 
toe door een onderscheid te maken tussen academische en geleefde filosofie, waarbij ik 
stel dat verhalen aan beide categorieën iets te bieden hebben. Ik verhelder dit onderscheid 
met behulp van Herman Dooyeweerds concepten van theoretisch denken en naïeve 
ervaring, en Sander Griffioens bespiegelingen over levensbeschouwing. Een korte 
inleiding in de visie van verschillende filosofen op de relatie tussen filosofie en fictie stelt 
mij in staat om mijn project binnen de bredere filosofische discussie te situeren. Die 
visies deel ik op basis van hun interessegebieden in in drie breed geconstrueerde families: 
de cognitief-analytische, de historisch-narratieve en de moreel-politieke. Mijzelf reken ik 
tot de laatste categorie. Mijn project plaats ik namelijk op het snijvlak van 
moraalfilosofie, literaire kritiek en ethiek, met een specifiek culturele focus op de 
filosofische interactie van individuen met literaire werken. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 leg ik een meer gedetailleerd fundament voor de opvatting van het 
verhaal als iets wat een filosofische bijdrage levert samen met het soort van commentaar 
dat Martha C. Nussbaum voorstaat. Nussbaum heeft beweerd dat een bepaald soort 
roman behoort tot de filosofische canon die antwoord probeert te geven op de vraag “Hoe 
moeten we leven?” Ondanks het brede bereik dat haar werk heeft gekregen, hebben 
denkers bij lezing van haar werk haar nadruk op de onscheidbaarheid van vorm en inhoud 
in goed geschreven literatuur gemist of verkeerd begrepen door dat werk juist op te vatten 
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als een pleidooi voor een scheiding daartussen. Ik haal het belang van de integraliteit van 
vorm en inhoud voor het voetlicht door Nussbaums begrip van verhaal te vergelijken met 
dat van Richard Kearney. Ik betoog dat het vermogen van verhalen om in gesprek te gaan 
met incompatibele visies, en die zelfs bij elkaar te houden, geen zaak is van eerst 
begrijpen en vervolgens toepassen, maar voortkomt uit de versmelting van vorm en 
inhoud, die zo totaal is dat “het goede” in het verhaal er niet “uitgelicht” kan worden 
zonder iets te verliezen. De mogelijkheid van bruggenbouwen is een van die voordelen 
die onlosmakelijk bij het verhaal horen. Wat de Noord-Amerikaanse cultuur nodig heeft, 
zo stel ik, is precies het fantasierijke inzicht dat aanwezig is in fictie voor 
jongvolwassenen en de integraliteit van vorm en inhoud in alle goed geschreven literaire 
werken.  
 Ik verbreed de discussie over hoe verhaal en filosofie zich tot elkaar verhouden 
door de inzichten van Hannah Arendt en haar benadering van dit onderwerp te bespreken. 
Lisa Jane Disch laat zien hoe Arendt het vertellen van verhalen benaderde als een vorm 
van denken die zowel kritisch als gesitueerd is. Arendts nadruk op pluraliteit geeft 
Nussbaums nadruk op particulariteit substantieel extra gewicht, zoals ik laat zien door 
een bespreking van hun respectievelijke visies op compassie, liefde en solidariteit.  
 Natuurlijk is de scope van mijn project beperkt. Ik leg de nadruk op het gesprek 
terwijl dat wellicht niet bij iedere sfeer past en daarin toepasbaar is. Ook benadruk ik 
principes die aan compassie gerelateerd zijn – vooral pluraliteit en solidariteit. Door die 
nadruk kan wellicht het gevaar ontstaan dat het belang van andere principes, met name 
rechtvaardigheid, onvoldoende belicht wordt, hoewel zorg voor rechtvaardigheid op de 
achtergrond van mijn project sterk aanwezig is. Ik hoop dat alle principes die we 
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waarderen samen zullen optrekken, hoewel ik besef dat in bepaalde contexten wellicht 
het ene principe prioriteit krijgt boven andere, dat ze bij tijden zelfs conflicteren. Ik heb 
echter sterk het gevoel dat vandaag de dag de Noord-Amerikaanse cultuur in veel 
gevallen een duidelijke behoefte laat zien aan een grotere nadruk op particulariteit en 
solidariteit, en heb de accenten in mijn project daarop afgestemd.  
 Ik blijf trouw aan de visie dat verschillende conflicterende perspectieven niet 
alleen te verwachten zijn, maar ook welkom zijn. Mijn zorg is dat we niet eenvoudigweg 
blijven volhouden dat bepaalde morele interpretaties toepasbaar zijn in iedere context of 
aannemen dat al die perspectieven maar opinies zijn, en dat het niet nodig is om daarover 
een gesprek te voeren omdat het geen zin heeft om waarover dan ook overeenstemming 
te bereiken. Contra de pseudo-universaliteit zal de vraag “Hoe moeten we leven?” in 
verschillende contexten verschillend beantwoord moeten worden; contra de pseudo-
individualiteit zullen ethische criteria belangrijk blijven. In mijn eigen context bied ik als 
antwoord een principiële, verbeeldingsvolle pluraliteit aan, die de bijdrage van fictie voor 
jongvolwassenen aan het ethische gesprek als belangrijk waardeert.  
 Filosofisch commentaar dat fictie vergezelt om het filosofische belang daarvan 
manifest te maken, de onscheidbaarheid van vorm en inhoud, het belang van pluraliteit: 
mijn bespreking van dat alles brengt me bij vragen over hoe we criteria voor een 
wederzijds gevoel van narratieve normativiteit kunnen vinden, criteria die gedeeld 
kunnen worden, zonder dat we erop staan dat uit verhalen een algemeen geldige moraal 
te halen. In hoofdstuk 4 breid ik de discussie in deze richtingen uit door fictie te situeren 
binnen een breder esthetisch, normatief en maatschappelijk kader.  
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 De sleutel tot dit deel van de discussie is Lambert Zuidervaarts door-en-door 
hermeneutische conceptie van kunst en onze interactie met kunst. Zijn theorie van 
verbeeldingsvolle ontsluiting en zijn beklemtonen van het feit dat kunst via interpretatie 
ons leven vorm geeft, verschaffen een kader voor een verstaan van de bijdrage van kunst 
aan geleefde filosofie, die werkelijk en waarneembaar is, maar die geen simpele regels 
van oorzaak en gevolg volgt. Ik verbind Zuidervaarts perspectief met Nussbaums theorie 
van de altijd reviseerbare normativiteit om in te spelen op de behoefte aan een normatieve 
benadering van de relatie tussen fictie en geleefde filosofie, waarbij het probleem van 
beschadigende ontmoetingen met kunst verzacht wordt. Met het oog op het concretiseren 
van de precisie van het hermeneutische model, beoordeel ik een aantal specifieke 
manieren waarop kunst het leven van mensen helpt vormgeven, met speciale aandacht 
voor literatuur 
 In hoofdstuk 5 presenteer ik Wayne C. Booth’ vriendschapsmetafoor als een 
voortreffelijk niet-causaal model voor de relatie tussen fictie en geleefde filosofie. 
Terwijl in Nussbaums originele bijdrage aan de discussie haar standpunt centraal staat dat 
fictie actief moet bijdragen aan de academische filosofie, vindt Booth brede erkenning als 
invloedrijk theoretisch denker over de relatie tussen lezen en ethische karaktervorming – 
dat wil zeggen, de relatie tussen verhaal en geleefde filosofie. Ik laat enkele sterke en 
zwakke punten van Booth’ metafoor en verwante criteria voor de beoordeling van 
narratieve vrienden zien, in het licht van Nussbaums kritiek op Booth’ benadering. Ik 
suggereer dat Booth’ model zelfs sterker gemaakt zou kunnen worden als we weerstand 
bieden aan de neiging de metafoor van vriendschap uit te breiden naar die van 
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“werelden” en als we erkennen dat de term “metgezel” soms een meer passende 
beschrijving is van onze relatie met narratieve werken dan “vriend.” 
 In hoofdstuk 6 poog ik tenslotte een illustratie te geven van filosofisch 
commentaar door mij te zetten aan een eigen filosofische lezing van twee romans voor 
jongvolwassenen en een kort verhaal. Met deze oefening breng ik de unieke waarde van 
de behandeling van het verhaal als filosofische metgezel voor het voetlicht, waarbij ik 
deze benadering afzet tegen de beperkingen van de benadering van verhaal als 
gereedschap. Bij dit uitproberen van filosofisch commentaar kom ik tot de conclusie dat 
ieder boek als uniek benaderd moet worden. Evenmin als twee vriendschappen ooit 
hetzelfde zijn, volgen narratieve ontmoetingen precies hetzelfde pad. Zo word ik er 
opnieuw aan herinnerd dat de structuur zelf van een verhaal stimuleert tot het soort 
pluraliteit en verbeeldingsvolle empathie waarnaar Booth en Nussbaum en Arendt – en 
ook Kearney – streven. 
De motivatie achter dit project is mijn overtuiging dat zowel filosofie als fictie 
een bijdrage kunnen leveren aan een beweging in de richting van ethische ontwikkeling 
van rechtvaardigheid en solidariteit door middel van verbeelding. Ik sluit mij aan bij de 
steun voor een wereld waarin jongens en meisjes als unieke voorbeelden van nieuwheid 
behandeld worden, niet eenvoudigweg als exemplaren van een gender; een wereld waarin 
alternatieve, marginale stemmen worden gehoord en autonoom handelen als deel van een 
samenleving die gezamenlijk weerstand biedt aan onderdrukkende impulsen; waarin 
academische filosofie normatief verantwoordelijk is en niet-traditionele bijdragen serieus 
neemt; en waarin jongvolwassenen (en volwassenen) de gelegenheid hebben om goede 
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boeken te lezen en te bediscussiëren die hen ontvankelijk zullen maken voor en leiden in 
die richtingen. 
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